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This thesis examines the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus standi criteria 
in Article 263(4) TFEU on the EU judicial review system and its compliance with the 
right of private parties to effective judicial protection. The force of the criticism 
against the EU judicial review system focused upon the restrictive interpretation of 
the standing criterion of individual concern and the insufficiency of the preliminary 
reference route of challenging acts of the EU, advocating that only a direct action for 
annulment ensures respect of the right to effective judicial protection. The Lisbon 
Treaty relaxed the locus standi criteria for regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures. The interpretation of the notion of a “regulatory act” by the CJEU was 
rather unsurprising. However, the notion of “implementing measures” was given a 
very restrictive interpretation by the CJEU, despite early expectations and a forceful 
Opinion by AG Cruz Villalon. This thesis records some contemporary realities related 
to the judicial review system and considers issues of judicial policy choice, the 
academic reception and the possible justifications of the locus standi rules as 
developed by the CJEU, questioning the interpretative choices of the CJEU. The 
effects of the reform are further examined by a review of a sample of the pre-Lisbon 
Case-Law under the post-Lisbon rules and a quantitative study of a sample of post-
Lisbon EU measures. Both offer comparisons of the results reached under the 
interpretation of the notion of implementing measures adopted by the CJEU with the 
results that could have been reached under the interpretation proposed by AG Cruz 
Villalon. This thesis argues that the Lisbon Treaty reform offered a great opportunity 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Reverse impressions of the CJEU 
 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU)1 has undoubtedly 
been a key player when it comes to the many achievements of European integration 
and the successes of the European Union (hereinafter: EU) as a union on which the 
Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.2 
Indeed, whole sectors of European Union Law were developed almost exclusively on 
the back of some rather bold judicial thinking by the Luxembourg Court. To give a 
single example, the development of the common market, now called the internal 
market, has been decisively helped by the CJEU’s Case-Law. 
The CJEU embraced the role of judicial guardian of the Treaties and protector of the 
rights of European citizens very early on. The impression of the CJEU as a protector 
of rights, a bold court willing to strike down the behaviour of powerful commercial 
players and states in order to uphold the Treaties and individual rights is perhaps the 
most established in public opinion. And indeed, European citizens have seen and 
continue to see some remarkable defences of their rights before the CJEU, 
irrespective of the state or commercial interests at stake. 
If one is asked to justify this impression of the CJEU as a protector of rights to a lay 
person, leaving out all legal terminology, this proves to be a challenge. A good 
                                                 
1 Under Article 19(1) TEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) includes 
the Court of Justice (hereinafter “ECJ”), the General Court (hereinafter: GC) and specialised courts. 
Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1/12/2009, the General Court was called the 
Court of First Instance (hereinafter: CFI). These commonly used abbreviations are employed herein. 
The ECJ and the GC (previously the CFI) shall also be collectively referred to as “the EU Courts”. 
2 Article 1 TEU. 
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answer seems to be that this is so because the CJEU upholds EU Law and all rights 
and obligations created or derived thereof, and even goes beyond what is written in 
the Treaties for this purpose. One can readily cite for example, the principles of direct 
effect, supremacy and state liability which the CJEU derived from the Treaties 
notwithstanding the lack of any explicit Treaty basis.3 
On the issue of standing of private parties in actions for annulment of EU acts under 
what is now Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC), this impression is however 
reversed. By contrast to its generally expansive reading of EU primary law, the CJEU 
generally refused to entertain direct actions for annulment by private parties through a 
restrictive interpretation of the standing criteria. In other words, the CJEU has 
repeatedly proved unwilling to go beyond a very strict reading of the Treaties in order 
to ensure the protection of legality and individual rights derived from the Treaties. 
Due to the resulting general unavailability of an action for annulment and the 
consequent need to use the preliminary reference route, which is a relatively 
cumbersome route, in order to challenge via the national courts the validity of acts 
before the CJEU, there has been widespread criticism that this did not afford effective 
protection to private parties as against EU institutions and bodies. As notably put by J. 
Schwarze, the discussion about the lack of legal protection against Community (now 
Union) measures is as old as the Court of Justice itself.4 
The force of the criticism was mostly centred on the CJEU’s interpretation of the 
locus standi requirement of individual concern in what is now Article 263(4) TFEU, 
and on the inadequacy of the preliminary reference procedure in what is now Article 
                                                 
3 A. Albors-Llorens, “The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the 
European Court Missed the Boat?” (2003) 62(1) CLJ 72, at p. 90. 
4 J. Schwarze, “The Legal Protection of the Individual against Regulations in European Union Law” 
(2004) 10(2) EPL 285, at p. 287. 
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267 TFEU as a route of challenging EU acts. It was generally the restrictive 
interpretation of individual concern that dictated use of the preliminary reference 
route, so calls for reinterpretation and reform mainly centred on that criterion. 
2. The problem with standing 
 
 
The EU Courts interpreted other elements of the action for annulment quite liberally, 
displaying their usual rigorousness in subjecting all institutions,5 bodies, offices and 
agencies to judicial review despite the fact that some of them were not listed as 
possible defendants in the text of the predecessors of Article 263(1) TFEU,6 
considering that it cannot be acceptable, in a community based on the Rule of Law, 
that acts of such bodies escape judicial review.7 And in the case of acts of the 
European Parliament, they did so even though the intergovernmental conference that 
drafted the Single European Act had rejected the Commission’s proposal to so amend 
Article 173 EEC as it then stood.8  
Similarly, they looked into the substance rather than the form of an act to determine 
whether an act is reviewable, generously holding as reviewable all measures, 
whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects, that is when 
they are binding on and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing 
                                                 
5 As to acts of the European Parliament, see K. St. Clair Bradley, “The Variable Evolution of the 
Standing of the European Parliament in Proceedings Before the Court of Justice” (1988) 8 YEL 27, and 
G. Bebr, “The Standing of the European Parliament in the Community System of Legal Remedies: A 
Thorny Jurisprudential Development” (1990) 10 YEL 171. 
6 Articles 173 EEC and 230 EC. 
7 See Case T-411/06 Sogelma-societa generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v. European Agency for 
Reconstruction  [2008] ECR II-2771. See further P. Craig & G. DeBurca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (OUP, 5th edition, 2011), at p. 486. 
8 See G. Bebr, “The Standing of the European Parliament in the Community System of Legal 
Remedies: A Thorny Jurisprudential Development” (1990) 10 YEL 171, at p. 187, referring to Case 
294/83 Les Verts v. European Parliament  [1986] ECR 1399, para 25. See further K. Lenaerts and T. 
Corthaut, “Judicial Review as a Contribution to European Constitutionalism” (2003) 22 YEL 1, at p. 2, 
and A. Arnull, “Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under Article 173 of the EC Treaty” 
(1995) 32 CMLRev 7, at p. 19. 
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about a distinct change in his legal position.9 And did so by ignoring at the same time 
the explicit use of the word “decision” in the predecessors of Article 263(4) TFEU, 
aiming to prevent the institutions from limiting review by their choice of measure.10 
The CJEU even went as far as effectively crossing out the requirement that the 
contested decision is in the form of a regulation from the text of the predecessors of 
Article 263(4) TFEU, holding that despite an act’s legislative nature and general 
application, this may nevertheless be of direct and individual concern to some 
persons.11 In these respects, EU Courts have significantly enhanced judicial review, 
legal accountability and effective judicial protection, with the relevant Lisbon Treaty 
amendments only codifying these developments rather than bringing about ground-
breaking reform. 
Direct access to the EU system of judicial review was, on the other hand, severely 
restricted for private parties as the CJEU was hardly generous or bold in its 
interpretation of the two main standing criteria of direct and individual concern. The 
test for direct concern, requiring an applicant to show that an EU measure directly 
affects his legal situation and its implementation is purely automatic and results from 
EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules, focusing generally 
on whether another party, usually an institution or a Member State, has discretion in 
implementing a measure,12 did not occupy as central a position in this criticism of the 
system. However, it cannot be readily considered as unproblematic or universally 
                                                 
9 See Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (“ERTA case”)  [1971] ECR 263, para 42, and Case 60/81 
IBM v. Commission  [1981] ECR 2639, para 9. 
10 See, for example, Case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig v. Council and Commission  [1977] ECR 
797, paras 5-7. 
11 Case C-309/89 Codorniu v. Council  [1994] ECR I-1853. See also A. Albors-Llorens, “The Standing 
of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat?” 
(2003) 62(1) CLJ 72, at p. 90, and generally also A. Arnull, “EU Recommendations and Judicial 
Review – ECJ 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16P Kingdom of Belgium v. European Commission” 
(2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 609, at p.p. 620-621. 
12 See for example Case T-69/99 Eurotica v. Commission  [2000] ECR II-4039, para 24. 
12 
 
acceptable since, generally, it never played a central role in filtering actions for 
annulment by private parties as these casually failed under individual concern,13 so its 
full effect may have remained unexplored. After the Lisbon Treaty reform in Article 
263(4) TFEU, it was foreseen that the interpretation of direct concern would 
inevitably be tested to its limits, since for regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures it is rendered the only standing criterion that private parties will need to 
satisfy. 
The test developed for individual concern remains one of the most uneasy issues of 
EU Law. It has been graphically said that this created an awkward tightrope on which 
the ECJ had to walk.14 The classical and well known formulation in Plaumann,15 
requiring persons who are not the addressees of a measure to show that they are 
affected by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, sets a very high 
hurdle in itself. Its vagueness has resulted in even higher hurdles being set in its 
application. With the exception of the more generous approach adopted in the areas of 
competition, anti-dumping and state aid, where complainants of competition 
violations, producers and exporters of goods subject to anti-dumping duties and 
persons affected by the grant of state aid were more readily found to be individually 
concerned, a private party succeeding under the Plaumann test has been rather the 
                                                 
13 Something indirectly recognised by AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. 
Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, para 79 of his opinion. See also M. Hedemann-Robinson, “Article 173 
EC, General Community Measures and Locus Standi for Private Persons: Still a Cause for Individual 
Concern?” (1996) 2(1) EPL 127, at p. 131, and A. Albors-Llorens, “The Standing of Private Parties to 
Challenge Community Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat?” (2003) 62(1) CLJ 72, at 
p. 75 where the same view is expressed. 
14 M. Hedemann-Robinson, “Article 173 EC, General Community Measures and Locus Standi for 
Private Persons: Still a Cause for Individual Concern?” (1996) 2(1) EPL 127, at p. 132. 
15 Case 25/62 Plaumann v. Commission  [1963] ECR 95, para 9. 
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exception to the rule, and was more or less limited to measures that had some 
retroactive effect on a closed class of private parties.16 
The EU Court’s application of the Plaumann test was accordingly based on this 
distinction between open and closed categories, expecting an applicant to belong to a 
closed class that is fixed by the time a measure is adopted and cannot be enlarged 
afterwards. In Plaumann itself, the contested measure affected all present and future 
importers of clementines in the same manner and the applicant, although one of the 
few and known importers at the given time, belonged to an open class because the list 
of importers could change at any time. What was on its own very restrictive, was 
subsequently rendered even more restrictive by a clarification that belonging to a 
closed class is not enough, as there must be a specific connection between the 
applicant’s situation and the contested measure.17 
The exceptions to this closed class requirement of the Plaumann test were extremely 
limited. It could only be bypassed in the very limited cases where a legal provision 
required an institution to take into account the interests of the applicant before 
adopting a measure18 and in the even more limited and rare cases where a measure 
was found to have exceptional economic impact on an applicant19. 
As a result, a highly decentralised system of validity challenges was put in place, 
where private parties were generally forced to bring proceedings before national 
                                                 
16 See for example M. Hedemann-Robinson, “Article 173 EC, General Community Measures and 
Locus Standi for Private Persons: Still a Cause for Individual Concern?” (1996) 2(1) EPL 127, at p. 
133. 
17 See for example Case 26/86 Deutz und Geldermann v. Council  [1987] ECR 941. 
18 See, typically, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission  [1985] ECR 207 and Case C-152/89 
Sofrimport v. Commission  [1990] ECR I-2447. 
19 Case C-358/89 Extramet v. Commission  [1991] ECR I-2501 and Case C-309/89 Codorniu v. 
Council  [1994] ECR I-1853. See also M. Hedemann-Robinson, “Article 173 EC, General Community 
Measures and Locus Standi for Private Persons: Still a Cause for Individual Concern?” (1996) 2(1) 
EPL 127, at p.p. 133-136. 
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courts and seek to induce a preliminary reference to the ECJ on the validity of the 
measure they sought to contest, since national courts lack jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of an EU measure themselves.20 The shortcomings of this system led to heavy 
criticism which culminated in two forceful calls for reform in the year 2002, from AG 
Jacobs in UPA21 and the CFI22 in Jego Quere23, reflecting the almost universal outcry 
for a reinterpretation of the Plaumann test for individual concern on the grounds of 
the principle of effective judicial protection. 
And no doubt the concerns expressed were significant. According to AG Jacobs in 
UPA, effective judicial protection was argued to dictate that applicants have access to 
a court that can grant remedies capable of protecting them against the effects of 
invalid acts, and national courts, being unable to rule on the validity of an EU act 
themselves, were not the appropriate forum for such cases. A preliminary reference is 
not a remedy available as of right, as the national court decides whether to refer and 
on the grounds of the reference. As a result, it is inevitable that national courts, even 
at the highest level notwithstanding their obligation to refer, may err in their 
preliminary assessment of the grounds of invalidity put forward and refuse to refer.24 
Lower courts would further be very reluctant to refer and inclined to leave the matter 
to the highest courts of their jurisdiction, which means increased costs and delays 
which could also be contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection. And the 
gravest concern was that in the case of acts of general application which do not need 
                                                 
20 Case 314/85 Foto Frost v. Hauptzollampt Lubeck-Ost  [1987] ECR 4199. 
21 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677. 
22 Now the General Court under the TFEU. 
23 Case T-177/01 Jego Quere v. Commission  [2002] ECR II-2365. 
24 For example, France has been recently found to be in breach of its obligations under Article 267(3) 
TFEU for a failure of the Conseil d’Etat to send a preliminary reference to the ECJ. See Case C-416/17 
Commission v. France  EU:C:2018:811, at paras 105-114 of the judgment. 
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implementing measures, an individual may not be able to reach the national courts 
unless he breaks the law.25 
In view of all these shortcomings, it was strongly argued that the interpretation of 
individual concern did not provide an effective remedy in the light of Articles 6 and 
13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: the Charter),26 and that 
effective judicial protection could only be ensured through direct actions for 
annulment. The proposal of AG Jacobs was that an applicant should be considered as 
individually concerned where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure 
has or is liable to have a substantial adverse effect on his interests27. The CFI, heavily 
influenced by AG Jacobs and joining the call for reinterpretation, considered that 
individual concern should be satisfied where a measure affects an applicant’s legal 
position in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or 
imposing obligations on him.28 
The ECJ remained unfazed and refused to revisit the Plaumann test for individual 
concern, maintaining that, by Articles 230 EC (now Article 263 TFEU) and Article 
241 EC (now Article 277 TFEU) on the one hand, and Article 234 EC (now Article 
267 TFEU) on the other, the Treaty established a complete system of legal remedies 
and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the institutions. It 
was, according to the ECJ, for the Member States to establish a system which ensures 
respect for the right to effective judicial protection, and this required national courts to 
                                                 
25 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-
6677. 
26 OJ 2010 C83/02. 
27 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, para 60 of his 
opinion. 
28 Case T-177/01 Jego Quere v. Commission  [2002] ECR II-2365. 
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interpret and apply national procedural rules in a way that enables private parties to 
bring challenges before the European courts against the legality of any Community 
measure of general application.29 In other words, the ECJ expected national courts to 
make the preliminary reference route of validity challenges work in a way that would 
ensure the effective judicial protection of individuals. 
While the ECJ did not change its approach, these calls for reform were not left 
unanswered. The proposals of the Working Group on Reform of the Court of 
Justice,30 set up by the Secretariat of the European Convention for the purposes of the 
drafting of the now failed Constitutional Treaty, were incorporated into Article III-
365 of the Constitutional Treaty, and then into the Lisbon Treaty, in what has become 
Article 263 TFEU. This resulted in private parties being granted standing to bring an 
action for annulment against a regulatory act that does not entail implementing 
measures and which is of direct concern to them, without the need to show individual 
concern. In addition, the duty of Member States to provide remedies sufficient to 
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU Law has been 
incorporated in Article 19(1) TEU.31 In effect, it incorporates the right to effective 
judicial protection from one general principle of EU Law into the Treaty, as also 
                                                 
29 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 40-42, and 
Case C-263/02P Commission v. Jego Quere  [2004] ECR I-3425, paras 30-31. For detailed reviews of 
the reform proposals see, among others, A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in 
EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2007), Chapter 6, C. Kombos, “The Recent Case Law on Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under Art. 230(4) EC: A Missed Opportunity or A Velvet Revolution”  (2005) 9 
EIoP No. 17; M. Granger, “Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking 
Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jego-Quere et Cie SA v. Commission and Union de Pequenos 
Agricultores v. Council”  (2003) 66 MLR 124; A. Albors-Llorens, “The Standing of Private Parties to 
Challenge Community Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat?”  (2003) 62(1) CLJ 72; J. 
Manuel et al, “Ubi ius, Ibi Remedium? – Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC at 
a European Constitutional Crossroads”  (2004) 11 MJ 233. 
30 See, in particular, Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the discussion circle on 
the Court of Justice of 25/3/2003, CONV 636/03, and Cover Note from the Praesidium to the 
Convention of 12/5/2003, CONV 734/03. 
31 On the effect of Article 19 TEU, see generally L. Pech and S. Platon, “Judicial Independence Under 
Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue in the ASJP Case” (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 
1827, and A.M. Van Den Bossche, “Private Enforcement, Procedural Autonomy and Article 19(1) 
TEU: Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd” (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 41. 
17 
 
effected by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This change proved 
significant, as in the recent ground breaking ASJP32 ruling, the ECJ accepted that 
Article 19(1) TEU empowers it to review a national measure temporarily reducing the 
remuneration of judges for a possible violation of the independence of the judiciary, 
which is an aspect of the principle of effective judicial protection, so extending the 
reach of the EU principle of effective judicial protection to national measures which 
could potentially affect national courts and their independence or capacity to act as 
ordinary courts of EU Law. 
A significant debate came to the forth as to the proper interpretation of the term 
“regulatory act”, which is to be found in Article 263(4) TFEU but not elsewhere in the 
TFEU. The term has now been firmly defined by the ECJ as including all acts of 
general application other than legislative acts, in its much anticipated judgment in 
Inuit.33 In doing so, the ECJ refuted the alternative, and broader, interpretation 
covering legislative acts as well. The ECJ remained firm to its traditional position that 
a complete system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring review of the legality of 
EU measures was in place and rejected once again any further extension or 
reinterpretation of individual concern on the basis of effective judicial protection and 
the right to an effective remedy under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and 47 of the Charter. 
The effect of the requirement that the contested act does not entail implementing 
measures, being the second constituent of the reform in Article 263(4) TFEU, was 
somehow overlooked following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A possible 
reason for this might be the partial resemblance of this phrase to the test for direct 
                                                 
32 Case C-64/16 Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses  EU:C:2018:117. 
33 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, paras 58-61, affirming the Order of the General Court at first instance, Case T-18/10 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  [2011] ECR II-5599. 
18 
 
concern, which the CJEU considered as satisfied if any intermediate act or action by 
an EU or Member State body does not encompass the exercise of any real discretion. 
This was corroborated to a significant extent by the early judgment of the General 
Court in Microban,34 where the contested measure was considered as a regulatory act 
of direct concern to the applicant and standing was accorded without dealing with the 
requirement of entailing implementing measures any differently. The CJEU however 
adopted the strictest possible interpretation in terms of locus standi, ruling that any 
degree of action taken by the national authorities would constitute implementing 
measures for the purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU, and that this is not to be called 
into question by the mechanical nature of the measures taken at national level.35 
Although the relaxation of the standing criteria brought about by the Lisbon Treaty 
was apparently in favour of private parties and a step towards a more centralised 
system of judicial review, this reform proved ultimately quite limited following the 
interpretation adopted by the CJEU post Lisbon, so the question whether the system 
affords effective judicial protection or an effective remedy to private parties remains.  
3. Contemporary realities and challenges 
 
 
The 2002 calls for reform and the related discussion accordingly still have their place 
in any review of the system, and the question marks over the compliance of the 
system with these fundamental rights will continue to constitute a challenge for EU 
and national courts. Any contemporary review or discussion should, in my opinion, 
however henceforth take into account some undeniable realities. 
                                                 
34 Case T-262/10 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v. Commission 
EU:T:2011:623. 




3.1. The first reality 
The first such reality is that the Plaumann test for individual concern is here to stay. 
The CJEU implicitly stressed that any reform of this test should come by way of a 
Treaty amendment and the EU Courts would not alter it on the premise of effective 
judicial protection or on any other ground.36 The discussion that followed in the 
preparation of Article III-365(4) of the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe did not envisage a change in the test applied for individual concern, but only 
the removal of this criterion for a certain type of acts,37 a change which found its way 
in the Lisbon Treaty. With the Member States, in their capacity as Masters of the 
Treaties, having decided to proceed as they did and only relax the conditions for 
regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, realistically it can strongly be 
argued that the Plaumann test has been expressly, or at least impliedly, confirmed by 
the Lisbon Treaty. It is hard to flaw the reasoning of the CJEU in this regard.38 It can 
possibly even be argued that such a confirmation, at least implicitly, could also be 
found in the previous revisions of the Treaties and the predecessors of Article 263 
TFEU, being Article 173 EEC and Article 230 EC, which again did not result in any 
alteration of the test for individual concern.39 It seems highly unlikely that the 
Plaumann test will be revisited by the EU Courts in the near future. This is why it 
may not be worth suggesting a different test apart for the sake of academic discussion. 
With EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: 
ECHR) seemingly at a halt, it also remains highly doubtful whether there can be any 
                                                 
36 Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 44-45. 
37 See, in particular, Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the discussion circle on 
the Court of Justice of 25/3/2003, CONV 636/03, and Cover Note from the Praesidium to the 
Convention of 12/5/2003, CONV 734/03. 
38 Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, paras 70-71. 
39 See also S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Longman, 2002), at p. 369. 
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contribution or effect of the existing Case-Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the interpretation of individual concern.40 No doubt, the proposal of AG 
Jacobs for a test based on substantial adverse effect, and that of the General Court 
based on the alteration of the legal position of the applicant, will continue to be 
mentioned from time to time, but it seems unlikely that arguments for such 
reinterpretation will ever succeed under the present circumstances. 
3.2. The second reality 
The second reality is that the test for direct concern will also remain the same. Any 
concerns for a more restrictive interpretation of this test after the Lisbon Treaty 
reform were dismissed by the GC rather quickly, recognising that the aim of the 
reform was the relaxation of the standing criteria for regulatory acts not entailing 
implementing measures, for which it remains the sole criterion.41 The ECJ also 
confirmed the existing interpretation in its later orders and judgments.42 
3.3. The third reality 
The third reality is that legislative acts are not regulatory acts so the Lisbon Treaty 
relaxation of the locus standi criteria does not encompass actions for annulment 
against legislative acts.43 Any degree of action required of any EU or national body, 
irrespective of its automatic or mechanical nature, is also taken as constituting 
                                                 
40 The possible contribution and effect of the ECHR to the locus standi conditions and the EU judicial 
review system is further discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. 
41 See for example, Case T-262/10 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v. 
Commission  EU:T:2011:623, para 32. 
42 See for example Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and 
Council  EU:C:2013:625 and Case C-456/13 P T & L Sugars and Sidul Acucares v. Commission  
EU:C:2015:284. 




implementing measures.44 For all legislative acts and for regulatory acts entailing 
implementing measures, a direct action for annulment will continue to be unavailable 
apart from exceptional circumstances. For these types of acts of general application, 
private parties will still be required to go through national courts in order to challenge 
validity via a preliminary reference and will continue to face the shortcomings of that 
procedure. In effect, although the reform could be seen as a step towards a more 
centralised model of remedies, the judicial review system remains largely 
decentralised. It follows that the UPA obligation for Member States and national 
courts to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensures respect 
for the right to effective judicial protection by means of access to the preliminary 
reference mechanism for validity challenges will still constitute a requirement and a 
challenge for national legal systems to meet.45 
3.4. The fourth reality 
The fourth reality is that the TWD46 rule, rendering a measure definitive against a 
private party who undoubtedly had standing to bring an action for annulment to 
challenge it but failed to do so within the time limit, is still alive and extends to 
regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures.47 With the possibility of 
increased availability of an action for annulment under the Lisbon Treaty, it is 
foreseeable that this rule will play an increasing role and act as a restriction on the use 
                                                 
44 Case C-456/13 P T & L Sugars and Sidul Acucares v. Commission  EU:C:2015:284. 
45 See Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, at paras 89-107. 
46 Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v. Germany  [1994] ECR I-833. See A. Ward, Judicial 
Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2007), Chapter 6, at p.p. 321-
329. See also D. Wyatt, “The Relationship Between Actions for Annulment and References on Validity 
After TWD Deggendorf” in J. Lonbay and A. Biondi, Remedies for Breach of EC Law (Wiley, 1997), 
Chapter 6. 
47 See Case C-550/09 E, F  [2010] ECR I-6209, para 46, as well as the Opinion of AG Sharpston in 
Case C-158/14 A, B, C and D v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken  ECLI:EU:C:2016:734, paras 58-88. 
See also R. Schwensfeier, “The TWD principle post-Lisbon” (2012) ELRev 156. 
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of the preliminary reference procedure, the desirability of which is debatable.48 The 
rule also poses new challenges for national courts, which will be required to consider, 
at first instance, whether an applicant could have lodged an action for annulment 
against the measure for which a preliminary reference is sought. Where the criterion 
of individual concern is still required, the Lisbon Treaty reform has not made any 
difference as far as national courts are concerned. Generally, a private party that is not 
the addressee of an act is not regarded as being undoubtedly able to lodge a direct 
action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, due to the difficulty in satisfying 
individual concern. On the other hand, where individual concern is not required, in 
order to fulfil their task under the TWD rule, national courts will be required to readily 
recognise the new requirements of Article 263(4) TFEU, and, in particular, be able to 
judge whether the contested measure is a regulatory act and whether it entails 
implementing measures. National courts are accordingly faced with new challenges in 
this respect, while their need for clear guidance and clear rules to follow in order to 
perform their tasks in light of the reformed locus standi criteria is, on the other hand, a 
challenge for the CJEU. Under these revised criteria and the TWD rule, challenges 
against regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures will not, in principle, be 
maintained before national courts, and although the potential opening of an action for 
annulment in relation to such acts is welcome in terms of effective judicial protection, 
concern develops that the consequent restriction of the use of a national forum for an 
applicant as a result of the TWD rule may not prove to be so welcome. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Note AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, 
para 65 of his Opinion. 
23 
 
3.5. The fifth reality 
The fifth reality is that the CJEU has constantly found that effective judicial 
protection has always been guaranteed in the EU judicial review system. The CJEU’s 
consistent view on this leaves little hope of any further relaxation of the standing 
conditions without further Treaty amendment. Indeed, in its judgment in Inuit the ECJ 
seemed to be smoothly integrating the TFEU reform into its existing view of the 
system, and totally at ease in accommodating the relaxed standing conditions within 
it, without any admission that greater compliance with the principle of effective 
judicial protection has been achieved. The ECJ’s stance was rather that there was 
nothing wrong with the pre-Lisbon system of judicial review as it did provide a 
complete system of legal remedies and procedures which was open for private parties 
to use, but nevertheless, the Member States in their capacity as Masters of the 
Treaties, more as a policy choice, decided to allow private parties to challenge a 
certain type of acts by means of a direct action for annulment. 
3.6. The sixth reality 
The sixth reality is that the principle of effective judicial protection is refined on case 
by case basis, and although its minimum core meaning can be deduced from the 
CJEU’s well established Case-Law,49 when it comes to questions of access to judicial 
review proceedings, it remains rather inconclusive as to whether a direct action for 
annulment should always be available, or whether the indirect challenge via the 
preliminary reference mechanism suffices. It has been noted that when asked to define 
the concept of effective judicial protection in the EU legal order, it would be trite for 
the CJEU to simply recall that the acts of the EU based on the Rule of Law are subject 
                                                 
49 See Case C-64/16 Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses  EU:C:2018:117. 
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to judicial review.50 In this respect, it was also argued that there is no yardstick 
against which to measure effectiveness and this is reflected in the fact that the CJEU 
refers to it but never defines it.51 Strikingly, it is a principle which, as understood by 
the CJEU, can tolerate the fact that a party may have to contravene a measure adopted 
at EU level in order to obtain access to justice and challenge it, whereas at the same 
time it cannot tolerate the same for a measure adopted at national level.52 Although it 
is not unusual for courts not to define key concepts but to make explicit key facets on 
a case by case basis, the CJEU has left the content and requirements of this principle 
highly abstract,53 and consequently this retracts from the strength of building a case 
for any further reform of the system on the basis of effective judicial protection. 
3.7. The seventh reality 
In addition to the above, the seventh reality is that the principle of effective judicial 
protection is not, in any event, competence conferring. This has always been the view 
of the CJEU, which consistently held that the EU courts cannot, without exceeding 
their jurisdiction, interpret the conditions under which an individual may institute 
proceedings against an EU measure in such a way which has the effect of setting aside 
the conditions expressly laid down by the Treaty, even in the light of the principle of 
effective judicial protection.54 
 
                                                 
50 M. Safjan and D. Dusterhaus, “A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level 
Challenge Through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU” (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 3, at p. 3. 
51 See A.H. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Elgar, 2009), at p.p. 326-328. 
52 Case C-263/02 P Commission v. Jego Quere  [2004] ECR I-3425, compared with Case C-432/05 
Unibet v. Justitiekanslern  [2007] ECR I-2271. See A. Arnull, “The Principle of Effective Judicial 
Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?” (2011) European Law Review 51, at p. 56. 
53 See T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2006), Chapter 9, at p. 443. 
54 See for example Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, 
para 44, and Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, paras 81-83. 
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3.8. The eighth reality 
The eighth reality is that, along with the right to effective judicial protection, the right 
to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy under Articles 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter have once again 
been rejected by the ECJ as bases for a more liberal approach on the standing criteria 
for annulment actions, with the ECJ repeating once again its consistent approach in 
this regard as well.55 Notably, AG Kokott in Inuit also explicitly accepted that there 
are no precedents from the European Court of Human Rights requiring that 
individuals must be accorded a direct legal remedy against legislative acts.56 
3.9. The ninth and tenth realities 
This leads to the ninth reality, that direct challenges against legislation and other types 
of acts that are comparable to legislative acts or regulatory acts are not available in 
many Member States, and then on to the tenth reality, that reference systems to a 
superior or other competent court, with inevitable shortcomings similar to the ones 
highlighted for the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure, also exist in 
many Member States and beyond.57 No such system has been declared incompatible 
with the ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights under Articles 6 and 13 
ECHR on grounds that a direct challenge should always be available. In addition to 
this, the European Court of Human Rights considered the preliminary reference 
                                                 
55 See again Case C-50/00P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 39-
44, and Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, paras 81-84. 
56 Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, para 110 of her Opinion. 
57 See Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev. 
See also the example of Germany in A.H. Turk, The Concept of Legislation (Kluwer, 2006), Part 1, 
Chapter 3, at p. 56. 
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mechanism as compatible with Article 6 ECHR in Bosphorus.58 Comparative studies 
also provide evidence that direct challenges against legislation are rather the 
exception than the norm,59 while approaches to review of administrative action vary60. 
This ties up with the finding of AG Kokott that the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights does not demand that private parties are accorded a direct 
remedy against legislative acts, not even against any kind of measure of general 
application. It further retracts strength from any argument that the constitutional 
traditions and values common to the Member States demand that such measures 
become challengeable by direct actions for annulment before the EU courts. And as a 
corollary, similarly to the lower courts’ function in such reference systems, the 
statement made that each Member State contributes its own judicial system for the 
sake of ensuring the effective application and enforcement of EU Law61 seems 
rightfully in place for the EU judicial review system. 
3.10. The eleventh reality 
Finally, the eleventh reality is quite similar to the first reality. The CJEU’s view that 
the architecture of the judicial review system established a complete system of legal 
                                                 
58 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland  (2006) 42 EHRR 1. See Chapter 3. 
59 See Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev, 
and A.H. Turk, The Concept of Legislation (Kluwer, 2006), Part 1, Chapter 1, at p. 24 for the United 
Kingdom, Part 1, Chapter 2, at p. 43 for France (note however that recent reform is reported by the 
Venice Commission in France), Part 1, Chapter 3, at p. 56 for Germany, and Part 2, Chapter 2, at p. 
173 for this conclusion. See also A.H. Turk, “Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial 
Review” (2013) 19 European Law Review 126, and K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, “Judicial Review as a 
Contribution to European Constitutionalism” (2003) 22 YEL 1, at p.p. 14-15. See further E. Barendt, An 
Introduction to Constitutional Law (OUP, 1998), Chapter 1, at p.p. 17-18. 
60 M. Eliantonio, C.W. Backes, C.H. Van Rhee, T.N.B.M. Spronken and A. Berlee, Standing Up for 
Your Right(s) in Europe – A Comparative Study on Legal Standing (Locus Standi) Before the EU and 
Member States’ Courts (Intersentia, 2013), Chapters 4 and 6, and the Study on Individual Access to 
Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law of the Council of 
Europe (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev. 
61 K. Lenaerts, “The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union” 
(2007) Common Market Law Review 1625, at p. 1625. See also M. Safjan and D. Dusterhaus, “A 
Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge Through the Lens of Article 
47 CFREU” (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Union Law 3, at p. 9. 
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remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of EU acts, and that 
it is for the Member States to provide effective access to the preliminary reference 
procedure where a direct action for annulment is unavailable, is now corroborated, if 
not even confirmed by the Member States, through their inaction, or failure to effect 
further amendments of the Treaties. The Lisbon Treaty reform in Article 263 TFEU 
was passed with reference to the existing judicial review system and related Case-
Law, and as AG Kokott noted, not least as a response to the well known calls for 
reform. The Member States had the opportunity to undertake a more ambitious reform 
of the locus standi rules, but, irrespective of whether this was due to lack of 
unanimity, eventually chose not to. Similar conclusions seem also valid in relation to 
previous Treaty reforms.62 
4. Assessing the effects of the Lisbon Treaty reform 
Building on the above, and with the stated realities in mind, the aim of this doctoral 
thesis is to assess the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform in Article 263 TFEU and to 
consider the interpretative choices of the CJEU in the context of the need for effective 
judicial protection of private parties in an EU that is based on the Rule of Law. 
Chapter 2 offers an outline of the EU judicial review system, and particularly the 
action for annulment and the locus standi criteria. It also covers other matters related 
to the action for annulment, such as the concept of reviewable acts and the abstract 
terminology test, as well as the issue of possible defendants, and shows how these 
developed in the Case-Law of the CJEU and then codified by the Lisbon Treaty into 
Article 263 TFEU. It further considers the alternative means of validity review, such 
as the plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU, the preliminary reference mechanism 
                                                 
62 See S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Longman, 2002), at p. 369. 
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of Article 267 TFEU and the action for damages under Articles 268 TFEU and 340(2) 
TFEU. 
Chapter 3 explores questions of judicial policy and the possible justifications of the 
locus standi rules for actions for annulment as developed by the CJEU. It explores 
further the criticism of the EU judicial review system and the shortcomings of the 
preliminary reference mechanism for validity challenges against EU measures. A 
historical overview of the academic reception of the various developments in the 
locus standi rules is offered, starting from the very early years before Plaumann was 
decided and continuing up to the point of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It will 
be shown, on the back of this historical overview, that most points of the criticism 
against the EU judicial review system that led to the 2002 forceful calls for reform in 
UPA and Jego Quere, are actually quite old. This chapter concludes with a summary 
of the relevant aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law. 
Chapter 4 examines the extent and the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus 
standi criteria in Article 263(4) TFEU and especially the relaxation of these 
admissibility conditions in relation to regulatory acts that do not entail implementing 
measures. It considers the interpretation of the notions of a regulatory act and of 
implementing measures by the CJEU, exploring also the possible alternative 
interpretations based on the travaux preparatoires of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
possible limitations in the CJEU’s interpretative choices. It ends by considering how 
the Lisbon Treaty reform was rendered of very limited effect due to these 
interpretations by the CJEU, especially the interpretation of implementing measures. 
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This is related back to the discussion of judicial policy choice and its limits, first 
offered in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 5 offers a review of a sample of the pre-Lisbon Case-Law in the light of the 
post-Lisbon locus standi criteria in Article 263(4) TFEU. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to demonstrate whether some of the key pre-Lisbon rulings would have 
been decided differently post-Lisbon. This involves consideration of the contested 
measure in each of the cases in this sample, and its possible classification as a 
regulatory act not entailing implementing measures under the Lisbon Treaty. The 
outcome reached under the interpretation of implementing measures adopted by the 
CJEU in T & L Sugars63 is compared with the outcome that would have been reached 
under the interpretation proposed by AG Cruz Villalon in the same case. 
Complementing this review of the older Case-Law, Chapter 6 offers a quantitative 
assessment of a sample of EU measures that were adopted after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The sample consists of the measures published in the Official 
Journal of the EU in 3 randomly chosen calendar months. The measures are classified 
in various categories, with the main question of course being which of those are likely 
to be interpreted as regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures. The aim 
of this chapter is to provide a quantitative assessment of the effect of the Lisbon 
Treaty reform. The results reached under the interpretation of implementing measures 
adopted by the CJEU in T & L Sugars are once again compared with the results that 
would have been rendered under the interpretation proposed by AG Cruz Villalon. As 
the number of legislative acts in this sample of 3 months was small, this Chapter also 
proceeds with a similar analysis of all legislative acts adopted in an also randomly 
chosen calendar year, the year 2011. These legislative acts are classified into various 
                                                 
63 Case C-456/13 P T & L Sugars and Sidul Acucares v. Commission  EU:C:2015:284. 
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categories, and a brief overview of the content of some of them is also attempted. The 
key objective at this stage is to assess, based on their content, whether they are acts 
that would normally affect private parties without further implementation so as to 
question the choice of the CJEU or the Member States not to include them in the 
definition of a regulatory act. 
Chapter 7 offers concluding remarks based on the findings of the previous chapters. 
My key submission is that the Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus standi criteria was 
transformed into a missed opportunity by the CJEU. In other words, Article 263(4) 
TFEU offered a great opportunity for significant improvement in judicial protection 
by means of increased availability of a direct action for annulment, which was 
unfortunately missed, mainly due to the overly strict interpretation of the notion of 
implementing measures by the CJEU. The need for higher levels in judicial protection 
is highlighted, as well as the fact that this can be achieved simply by a reinterpretation 
of the notion of implementing measures, without even touching any of the realities 
outlined in the present chapter. It will accordingly be submitted that the interpretation 
of the notion of implementing measures proposed by AG Cruz Villalon in T & L 
Sugars was capable of leading to such higher levels in judicial protection, and that the 







CHAPTER 2: THE EU JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM AND LOCUS STANDI 
OF PRIVATE PARTIES 
 
This chapter offers an overview of the EU judicial review system and the 
interpretation of the locus standi rules for direct actions for annulment as developed 
before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The alternative routes of validity challenges 
are then outlined, and the chapter ends with a consideration of the 2002 calls for 
reform by way of reinterpretation of the test for individual concern. 
1. The judicial review system and the action for annulment 
An overview of the judicial review system, and mainly the action for annulment, is 
illustrative of the determination of the CJEU to eliminate the possibility that any EU 
measures escape judicial review, but also of the strictness and complexity of the Case-
Law on the standing conditions that private parties need to satisfy in a direct action 
for annulment.64 
The main vehicle for challenging validity of EU measures before the CJEU is of 
course the direct action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. The text of Article 
263 TFEU, as revised after the Lisbon Treaty, provides: 
                                                 
64 For definitive detailed overviews see A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in 
EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2007), Chapters 6 and 7, A.H. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Elgar, 
2009), Chapter 1, A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd edition, 2006), 
Chapter 3, T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (OUP, 8th edition, 2014), Chapter 
12, L. Neville Brown and T. Kennedy, Brown and Jacobs – The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edition, 2000), Chapter 7, D. Edward and R. Lane, Edward and 
Lane on European Union Law (Elgar, 2013), Chapter 5, R. Schutze, European Union Law (CUP, 
2015), Chapter 10, and A. Albors-Llorens, Private Parties in European Community Law – Challenging 
Community Measures (Clarendon Press, 1996). For a comparative study with some Member State 
judicial review systems see P. Birkinshaw, European Public Law – The Achievement and the 
Challenge (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd edition, 2014), Chapter 3, and see also J. Schwarze, “The Future of 
European Public Law” in P. Birkinshaw and M. Varney, The European Union Legal Order After 
Lisbon (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), Chapter 2. 
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“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of 
legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European 
Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, 
offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties. 
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member 
State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of 
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, 
or misuse of powers. 
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions 
brought by the Court of Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the 
Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that 
person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures. 
Acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down 
specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural 
or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to 
produce legal effects in relation to them. 
34 
 
The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two 
months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, 
or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the 
latter, as the case may be”. 
Under Article 264 TFEU, a successful action for annulment leads to a declaration that 
the contested act, or the contested part of an act, is void ab initio, and this ruling has 
an effect erga omnes, not only between the parties.65 
Article 265 TFEU supplements the action for annulment of EU measures, by 
providing for an action for failure to act. This provides that in case an EU Institution, 
body, office or agency has been called upon to act, but fails to act in infringement of 
the Treaties, Member States or other EU Institutions, bodies, offices or agencies may 
bring an action before the CJEU for this failure. A private party may, under the same 
conditions, also complain to the CJEU that an Institution, body, office or agency of 
the EU has failed to address to that party any act other than a recommendation or an 
opinion. 
Complementing the action for annulment of Article 263 TFEU, are the indirect 
avenues of review, which are the plea of illegality in Article 277 TFEU, and the 
preliminary reference mechanism under Article 267 TFEU. This chapter will consider 
in some detail the action for annulment and the locus standi rules, and will then offer 
an overview of these indirect remedies, as well as the action for damages. The 2002 
calls for reform will also be detailed, setting the background for further discussion in 
the following chapters. 
                                                 
65 See for example Case C-228/92Roquette Freres SA v. Hauptzollampt Geldern  [1994] ECR I-1445. 
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2. Possible defendants 
 
The Rule of Law has been the key justification used by the ECJ to expand the list of 
possible defendants against which an action for annulment may be brought. This is an 
area where the EU courts notably went beyond the text of the Treaties in their attempt 
to ensure the highest degree of compliance with the Rule of Law and the promotion of 
legality and accountability of the various players in the EU administrative structure. 
Article 263(1) TFEU, quoted above, empowers the CJEU to review the legality of 
legislative acts, acts of the Council, the Commission and of the European Central 
Bank, other than recommendations and opinions. It further empowers the Court to 
review the legality of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council, 
and also the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to 
produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties. 
The notable differentiation from the text of what was previously Article 230(1) EC is 
the express inclusion of the European Council and bodies, offices and agencies of the 
EU in the list of bodies whose acts are subject to review. This was not a real novelty 
but only a formal approval of the previous position taken by the EU courts that the 
Rule of Law dictated that any act of a Community (now Union) body intended to have 
legal effects vis-a-vis third parties must be subject to judicial review, notwithstanding 
the actual text of the Treaties.66 As the General Court put it in Sogelma v. EAR,67 it 
                                                 
66 See Chapter 1. This was also recognised by AG Jaaskinen at para 6 of his Opinion of 12/9/2013 in 
Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, not yet reported. 
67 Case T-411/06 Sogelma-societa generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v. European Agency for 
Reconstruction  [2008] ECR II-2771. See further P. Craig & G. DeBurca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials (OUP, 5th edition, 2011) at p. 486. See also Chapter 1. 
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cannot be acceptable, in a community based on the Rule of Law, that such acts escape 
judicial review.68 
In any event, especially in view of the increased use of delegation of authority to 
agencies and generally the increased role of bodies other than the institutions, this 
amendment was a welcome clarification and a clear contribution of the EU courts to 
the development of the judicial review system, in the name of further enhancing the 
EU’s compliance with one of the key values on which it is said to be founded, namely 
the Rule of Law. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that this express inclusion in the 
revised text of Article 263 TFEU was not entirely unconditional, since Article 263(5) 
TFEU provides that acts setting up such bodies, offices and agencies may lay down 
specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal 
persons against acts of these bodies intended to produce legal effects in relation to 
them. As it appears from the text of this provision, the position of privileged and 
semi-privileged applicants cannot be affected by conditions put in place under Article 
263(5) TFEU. Such conditions can only affect challenges by natural or legal persons, 
being non privileged applicants, who need to satisfy the standing criteria in Article 
263(4) TFEU. Depending on the case, this can be both a good thing and a bad thing 
for private applicants. On the one hand, such conditions or arrangements may restrict 
challenges even further than the standing criteria of direct and individual concern 
already do. On the other hand, such conditions or arrangements may however provide 
for more relaxed standing criteria than those of Article 263(4) TFEU. Paragraph (5) 
does not seem to be dependent on paragraph (4) of Article 263 TFEU and this does 
                                                 
68 Sogelma, ibid, para 37. See also Case C-15/00 Commission v. European Investment Bank  [2003] 
ECR I-7281, particularly paras 74-75. 
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seem to enable acts setting up such bodies to even bypass the general standing criteria 
completely. This provision could accordingly play an increasingly important role 
depending on the use made of it. 
The actual effect of Article 263(5) TFEU remains to be seen. As P. Craig points out,69 
some Regulations, like the one regulating the Office for Harmonisation of the Internal 
Market (OHIM), contain detailed provisions on legality review, with a system of 
internal appeal followed by legality review by the EU Courts, whereas the 
Regulations in relation to some other agencies such as the European Maritime Safety 
Authority (EMSA), the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) and the European Railway Agency (ERA) have no provisions at all in 
relation to legality review. A rather pessimistic view is expressed by A. Turk,70 
according to whom, these provisions would have a rather limited effect since most 
agencies would not produce acts with legal effects, and the provisions of Article 
263(5) TFEU merely sanction the already existing practice of agency regulations to 
provide for such judicial review procedures. This view does appear realistic, as it is 
rather doubtful that any attempt to seriously bypass the general standing criteria of 
Article 263(4) TFEU will become the norm, despite any possible justifications based 
on the fact that such bodies, offices and agencies lack any democratic representation 
since they are unelected.71 It is even doubtful whether such an attempt will ever be 
made in the absence of an express Treaty authorisation. 
                                                 
69 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2012), at p. 157-158. 
70 A. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2009), at p. 11. 
71 See generally P. Craig, “Comitology, Rulemaking, and the Lisbon Settlement: Tensions and Strains” 
in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, Rulemaking by the European Commission (OUP, 2016), Chapter 9, 
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Schaefer, “The Problem of Democratic Legitimacy in a Supranational Government” in H.C.H. 
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3. Acts not subject to review 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has extended the scope of judicial review to cover acts adopted 
under Articles 67-89 TFEU in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The EU 
Courts can now review the legality of all measures adopted in this area, with the 
exception of measures concerning the validity of police or enforcement agency 
operations and the responsibilities of Member States in the safeguarding of internal 
security and maintenance of Law and order.72 
On the contrary, the jurisdiction of the EU Courts has not been extended to measures 
adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, despite the abolition of the 
pillar structure of the EU. They are however granted limited jurisdiction in this area 
under Article 275 TFEU, to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU and to rule on 
proceedings instituted under Article 263(4) TFEU reviewing the legality of decisions 
providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU. 
4. Reviewable acts 
As also previously touched upon,73 driven by considerations of the Rule of Law and 
the need to provide effective judicial protection,74 the EU Courts looked into the 
substance and not the form of an act to determine whether it is reviewable, and did so 
                                                                                                                                            
Hofmann and A.H. Turk, EU Administrative Governance (Elgar, 2006), Chapter 16, R. van Schendelen 
and R. Scully, The Unseen Hand – Unelected EU Legislators (Frank Cass, 2003), C. Joerges and E. 
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Committee System (OUP, 2005), T. Christiansen and T. Larsson, The Role of Committees in the Policy-
Process of the European Union – Legislation, Implementation and Deliberation (Elgar, 2007), D. 
Geradin, R. Munoz and N. Petit, Regulation Through Agencies in the EU (Elgar, 2005), and E. 
Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies – Law and Practices of Accountability (OUP, 2013). 
72 See also L. Pech, ““A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law 
as a Constitutional Principe of EU Law” (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359. 
73 See Chapter 1. 
74 See F.G. Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way (CUP, 2007), Chapter 4, at p.p. 42-45. 
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by ignoring at the same time the use of the word “decision” in the predecessors of 
Article 263(4) TFEU, namely Article 173 EEC and Article 230 EC, aiming to prevent 
the Institutions from limiting review by their choice of measure.75 This is another area 
where the relevant Lisbon Treaty amendments came only as a confirmation of the 
position taken by the EU Courts. 
The text of Article 263(1) TFEU, quoted above, provides that the CJEU shall review 
the legality of legislative acts and other acts of the institutions and other bodies 
intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties. In Commission v. Council76 
the ECJ had generously held that the acts that are reviewable via an action for 
annulment are all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, 
which are intended to have legal effects, clarifying further in IBM77 that this is 
satisfied when the measure is binding on and capable of affecting the interests of the 
applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position. The Case-Law does 
not even exclude the possibility that an oral decision can be a reviewable act for the 
purposes of an action for annulment.78 Even recommendations can be challenged if it 
can be shown that the particular act, although entitled a recommendation, was 
intended to have binding legal effects and accordingly would not constitute a true 
recommendation.79 
                                                 
75 See, for example, Case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig v. Council and Commission  [1977] ECR 
797, paras 5-7. 
76 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (“ERTA case”)  [1971] ECR 263, para 42. 
77 Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission  [1981] ECR 2639, particularly para 9. See also A. Arnull, “When is 
an Act not an Act?” (2007) European Law Review 1. 
78 Case T-85/03 R Government of the Cayman Islands v. Commission, judgment of 26/3/2003, 
unreported, at para 60; Joined Cases 316/82 and 40/83 Kohler v. Court of Auditors  [1984] ECR 641, 
para 9; Case T-113/95 Mancini v Commission  [1996] ECR-SC p. I-A-185 and p. II-543, para 23. 
79 Case C-16/16 P Kingdom of Belgium v. Commission, judgment of 20/2/2018. See also A. Arnull, 
“EU Recommendations and Judicial Review – ECJ 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16P Kingdom of 
Belgium v. European Commission” (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 609. 
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The position is however more complicated when the act sought to be challenged is a 
refusal to a request. The general rule is that an act which amounts to a rejection must 
be appraised in the light of the request to which it constitutes a reply, meaning that if 
the requested act would not be a reviewable act, this rejection will also not be 
regarded as reviewable.80 The application of this general rule seems cumbersome. In 
Eurocotton81 for example, the ECJ found that the refusal of the Council to adopt an 
anti-dumping regulation was a reviewable act as it affected the interests of the 
applicants and the requested act would also be a reviewable act. Whereas in T-Mobile 
Austria,82 a refusal by the Commission to take action against Austria under Article 
86(3) EC (now Article 106 TFEU) did not produce legal effects and was not a 
reviewable act, because that Treaty Article did not oblige the Commission to bring 
such proceedings against a Member State. 
It is also clear that only final acts of an institution or other body of the EU can be 
considered as reviewable acts. A classic example comes from IBM,83 where a letter to 
the applicants containing the Commission’s statement of objections in an Article 82 
EC (now Article 102 TFEU) investigation procedure and inviting them to respond in 
writing, was held not to be reviewable. It was held to be simply a preliminary act and 
not the Commission’s final decision in the investigation. Such preliminary or 
preparatory acts can only be reviewable where they affect the applicants 
                                                 
80 See Case C-150/06P Arizona Chemical BV and others v. Commission  [2007] ECR I-39, paras 22-25; 
Case 42/71 Nordgetreide v. Commission  [1972] ECR 105, para 5; Joined Cases C-15/91 and C-108/91 
Buckl and Others v. Commission  [1992] ECR I-6061, para 22. 
81 Case C-76/01 P Eurocotton and others v. Council  [2003] ECR I-10091. 
82 Case C-141/02 P Commission v. T-Mobile Austria GmbH  [2005] ECR I-1283. 
83 Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission  [1981] ECR 2639. 
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independently of the final decision.84 Similarly, internal rules of the institutions and 
other bodies of the EU do not produce legal effects and are not reviewable.85 
Acts simply confirming previous acts are also not reviewable, unless the later act 
creates new rights and obligations. A good example comes from AssiDoman,86 where 
the applicants had requested the Commission to waive the fines that were imposed on 
them, based on the fact that that other companies that were affected by the same 
measure succeeded in annulment proceedings and invalidated the measure as far as 
they were concerned. The Commission refused to waive the fines imposed on the 
applicants in view of the fact that they had failed to challenge them in annulment 
proceedings as other companies had done. The ECJ on appeal decided that by this 
decision the Commission simply confirmed its previous decision imposing the fines, 
and was accordingly not a reviewable act.87 
5. Non existent acts 
 
 
Where an act has so serious defects that can be considered as non existent, then the 
general rule is that an action for annulment will be declared as inadmissible because 
such an act will not produce any legal effect.88 It has rightly been pointed out 
however, that such a finding of inadmissibility will have the same effect in practice as 
a finding of invalidity89 and the applicant would effectively have succeeded. 
 
                                                 
84 See for example Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie v. Commission  [1986] ECR 1965. 
85 See for example Case 78/85 Group of the European Right v. Parliament  [1988] ECR 1753. 
86 Case C-310/97P Commission v. AssiDoman and others  [1999] ECR I-5363. 
87 See also D. Leczykiewicz, ““Effective Judicial Protection of Human Rights After Lisbon: Should 
National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law?” (2010) European Law Review 326. 
88 See Case C-137/92P Commission v. BASF  [1994] ECR I-2555. 






The Treaties have always distinguished between privileged, semi-privileged and non 
privileged applicants. The list of privileged applicants changed over time, particularly 
in relation to the position of the European Parliament. Now Article 263(2) TFEU lists 
Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
Privileged applicants are considered to be the guardians of the Treaties and are 
entitled to bring an action under Article 263 TFEU without satisfying any locus standi 
conditions, irrespective of whether the act is addressed to them or to any other 
person.90 They are presumed to have an interest in the legality of all EU acts and have 
no standing criteria to satisfy.91 This could in certain circumstances be an indirect 
benefit for private parties who, despite being unable to bring an annulment action 
themselves, may nevertheless lobby the competent bodies of their Member States to 
challenge a measure on their behalf in order to safeguard their interests. This may not 
be realistic in individual cases, but it could well be appropriate where a sector of the 
economy of a Member State would be affected by an EU act.92 It has become clear 
however after Ten Kate93 that Member States are not obliged to bring an action for 
annulment upon the request of a private party, but on the other hand, a national 
provision stipulating such an obligation would be acceptable.94 
                                                 
90 See J. Schwarze, “The Legal Protection of the Individual against Regulations in European Union 
Law” (2004) 10(2) EPL 285, at p. 288. 
91 See A. Arnull, “Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under Article 173 of the EC 
Treaty” (1995) 32 CMLRev 7, at p. 13. 
92 For a study of annulment actions initiated by Member State governments, see C. Adam, M.W. Bauer 
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The Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions 
are considered as semi privileged applicants as they can only bring an action for 
annulment for the purpose of defending their prerogatives. P. Craig does point out that 
oddly the European Council and bodies, agencies and offices of the EU are neither 
privileged nor semi privileged applicants, despite the fact that their acts are 
susceptible to review.95 
All other natural or legal persons, including territorial units of a Member State,96 are 
non privileged applicants and can only bring an action for annulment if they satisfy 
the standing criteria of Article 263(4) TFEU. 
Under Article 263(6) TFEU, an action for annulment must in all cases be lodged 
within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the 
plaintiff, or in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of 
the plaintiff, as the case may be. 
7. Private parties and standing 
 
 
The original provisions of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 setting out the conditions 
under which private parties could challenge acts of the EU, contained in Article 173 
EEC, remained in effect the same ever since, despite the revisions in other parts of 
Article 173 EEC and Article 230 EC. The first substantial reform was only brought 
with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, Article 230(4) EC provided: 
                                                 
95 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2010), Chapter 4. See also P. 
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“Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision 
which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”. 
Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 263(4) TFEU, also quoted 
above, reads: 
“Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that 
person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures”. 
 
7.1. The abstract terminology test 
 
 
The first criterion that the ECJ required private parties to satisfy was that an act is in 
substance a decision and not a regulation. This derived directly from the actual text of 
Article 230(4) EC. In relation to this, it developed the so called “abstract terminology 
test” in Producteurs de Fruits.97 The ECJ emphasised in this test that the essential 
characteristics of a decision arise from the limitation of the persons to whom it is 
addressed, whereas a regulation, being essentially of a legislative nature, applies not 
to a limited number of persons, defined or identifiable, but to categories of persons 
viewed abstractly and in their entirety.98 This was further supplemented by 
                                                 
97 Joined Cases 16/62 and 17/62 Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes and 
others v. Council  [1962] ECR 471. 
98 Producteurs de Fruits, ibid, at p. 478. 
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Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt,99 where the CJEU clarified that a measure does not lose its 
character as a regulation simply because it may be possible to ascertain with a greater 
or lesser degree of accuracy the number or even the identity of the persons to which it 
applies at any given time.100 
The Case-Law had become blurred as to the distinction between the abstract 
terminology test and the test for individual concern, something which was firmly 
recognised by AG Lenz in Codorniu.101 
The abstract terminology test had come under heavy attack as perilously close to 
looking behind form to form, rather than looking behind form to substance, and 
entailed the danger that careful drafting of regulations could secure immunity from 
challenge, even if the task of the enactment were essentially administrative in 
nature.102 The ECJ even applied the test to measures passed as decisions, further 
contributing to the blurring of the distinction between regulations and decisions. In 
Spijker,103 for example, it had the effect of requiring the sole importer of Chinese 
made brushes into the Benelux to prove that a measure labelled as a decision was not 
in fact a regulation. It had been argued that the test appeared to even ignore the 
obvious dangers of effectively leaving access to judicial review in political as opposed 
to judicial hands.104 
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In its judgment in Codorniu,105 somehow surprisingly,106 the CJEU in effect 
abandoned the abstract terminology test. It did so by holding that although an act may 
be by virtue of its nature and sphere of application of legislative nature in that it is of 
general application, this does not prevent it from being of individual concern to some 
persons. It has however convincingly been argued that if an act is recognised as being 
by nature a decision, it is more likely to affect someone individually than a true act of 
general application.107 
Since Cordorniu, the main standing requirements for private applicants were those of 
direct and individual concern. This was confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty which deleted 
the words “although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person” from the text of Article 263(4) TFEU. This is yet another instance where the 
relevant Lisbon Treaty amendments came only as a confirmation of the Case-Law of 
the EU courts, which were apparently driven by considerations of  effective judicial 
protection and compliance with the Rule of Law. 
7.2. Present and vested interest 
A further requirement was developed, that a private applicant must have an interest in 
seeing the contested measure annulled, which must be vested and present on the date 
the action is brought.108 The test is said to presuppose that the action, if successful, 
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will procure an advantage to the applicant.109 This seems to serve as a safeguard that 
pointless actions will be excluded as an abuse of process. 
7.3. Direct concern 
 
As previously noted,110 virtually all criticism focused on the interpretation of 
individual concern, and direct concern did not occupy as central a position in this 
discussion.111 
Direct concern is satisfied where the contested measure directly affects the legal 
situation of the applicant and its implementation is purely automatic and results from 
Community rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules.112 The 
deciding factor is whether a party, usually another EU institution or a Member State, 
has discretion in implementing a measure. Where there is no discretion, direct concern 
is normally satisfied.113 
Where there is discretion, the general rule is that direct concern cannot be satisfied.114 
However, exceptions have been recognised, such as in cases where a confirmation by 
an institution renders valid a measure which was at the discretion of a national 
authority as in Toepfer,115 or where the national authorities already informed the 
applicant of their intention and requested the authorisation from an EU institution 
with reference to his position as in Bock.116 Even where such intention had not been 
                                                 
109 See Case C-362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I-4333, para 42, and Case 
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communicated to the applicant but there was no doubt as to how the national authority 
intended to exercise its discretion when an authorisation from an EU institution was 
requested, Piraiki-Patraiki117 shows that direct concern may still be found if the 
possibility of the national authority not using the authorisation was entirely 
theoretical. 
When directives are contested, the general rule is that direct concern cannot be 
satisfied,118 but could exceptionally be found when the discretion conferred is entirely 
theoretical.119 
The rationale of the test for direct concern seemed clear to A. Albors-Llorens, in that 
the exercise of any real discretion by the addressee of a measure would cause a 
private applicant to be directly concerned not by the Community measure, but by the 
act of the addressee, and therefore it is the act of the addressee that should be 
challenged instead.120 In this sense, it appeared as a rather logical criterion, which is 
also based on substance rather than in form when it comes to the determination of the 
existence of any discretion in the implementation of a measure. 
 
7.4. Individual concern 
 
The requirement for individual concern constitutes in effect the main filter for actions 
for annulment lodged by private parties. 
                                                 
117 Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission  [1985] ECR 207. 
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The classical and well known formulation in Plaumann121 reads: 
“persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to 
be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain 
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which 
they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors 
distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed”. 
One of the former judges of the GC described this cited passage as a good example of 
one of the more regrettable aspects of EU jurisprudence, namely a statement which 
has, by mere force of repetition, achieved the status of a classic definition, 
notwithstanding its obvious grammatical deficiencies.122 
The gist of this vague formulation seems to be that a private applicant needs to 
differentiate himself from all other persons. It hardly provides any helpful guidance as 
to what can constitute such differentiation since very general phrases were used. It is 
indeed difficult to discern any useful guidance from the phrases “certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them” or “by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons” from this formula itself. Four categories of 
application of this test can nonetheless be discerned from the Case-Law.123 
7.4.1. The open and closed class category 
The first is the “open and closed class” category and an example can be found in 
Plaumann itself. An applicant will need to show that he belongs to a closed class 
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applications of the Plaumann test, see C. Harlow, “Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court 
of Justice” (1992) 12 Yearbook of European Law 213. Further Case-Law on individual concern is 
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which was fixed at the time the contested measure was adopted and could not be 
enlarged afterwards. In Plaumann, the measure affected all present and future 
importers of clementines in the same manner, and the applicant, although one of the 
few and known current importers, belonged to an open class since the list of importers 
could change at any time. In Toepfer124 on the other hand, the measure affected only 
those importers of cereals who had applied for an import licence on a specific date. 
This was clearly a closed class that could not be enlarged afterwards, and individual 
concern was satisfied. 
Belonging to a closed class is a necessary precondition but does not on its own 
establish individual concern. In Deutz und Geldermann,125 a regulation prohibited 
references to a method of wine production containing geographical designations if a 
product did not qualify for this designation. The applicants were affected as producers 
who had traditionally used such a reference. Although they seemed to belong to a 
closed class of producers traditionally using such references, the ECJ considered this 
irrelevant as the measure concerned them in just the same way as any other producer 
in the same position. There has to be a specific connection between the applicant’s 
position and the contested measure, something which obviously leads to a very 
restrictive test.126 
7.4.2. Procedural guarantees 
The second category of applications of the Plaumann test is where there are 
procedural guarantees or other legal provisions protecting the interests of an 
individual or requiring an institution to take his interests into account. In 
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Sofrimport,127 the Commission had a legal obligation to consider the special position 
of products in transit before adopting the contested measure. The applicant who had 
goods in transit was considered as individually concerned.128 Obviously, it is in 
limited cases that an applicant will fall within this category. 
7.4.3. Exceptional economic impact 
The third category includes the exceptional economic impact cases of Codorniu129 
and Extramet130. In Codorniu, an amendment of a regulation prevented the largest 
European producer of sparkling wines from using the designation “cremant” and 
consequently a trademark it held since 1924. The ECJ found individual concern since 
the deprivation of this trademark would result in considerable benefit to the 
applicant’s competitors and this distinguished the applicant from other traders. 
In Extramet, the applicant was the largest importer of the product for which an anti-
dumping duty was applied and also the end user. The applicant’s business was 
severely affected as it would consequently have to obtain supplies from its main 
competitor. The ECJ accepted that such severe economic impact distinguished the 
applicant from other importers so as to be individually concerned by the contested 
measure. 
The decision in Codorniu led to hopes of a more liberal approach to individual 
concern which however never materialised.131 The post-Codorniu approach was 
                                                 
127 Case C-152/89 Sofrimport v. Commission  [1990] ECR I-2447. 
128 Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission  [1985] ECR 207 is another example. 
129 Case C-309/89 Codorniu v. Council  [1994] ECR I-1853. 
130 Case C-358/89 Extramet v. Commission  [1991] ECR I-2501. 
131 It was “a false dawn” according to A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP, 
1999), p. 44. 
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purely based on the traditional application of the Plaumann test.132 Both Codorniu 
and Exramet were treated as exceptional and limited to their own facts.133 They have 
remained just special strands of the Case-Law.134 
The case of Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council135 is cited by A. Ward136 as a good 
example of the methodology employed by the Community Courts in assessing 
individual concern, by examining the general rule first and then moving on to 
consider the exceptions. This was an action for annulment of Council Regulation (EC) 
2821/98, amending Directive 70/524/EEC. The contested regulation actually 
withdrew from an annex of this Directive some antibiotics and thereby revoked the 
authorisation for their use in feeding stuffs. Direct and individual concern were found 
to be satisfied in this case. The applicants were the only manufacturers of 
virginiamycin in the world, and this substance was prohibited by the contested 
measure. The CFI found the contested Regulation to apply to objectively determined 
situations and to have legal effects with respect to categories of persons viewed 
generally and in the abstract, rendering it general in nature. It then noted that the 
general application of this measure does not preclude it from being of direct and 
individual concern to certain natural or legal persons.137 In these circumstances, a 
Community measure can be of general nature and at the same time in the nature of a 
                                                 
132 See, among others, Case C-209/94P Buralux v. Council  [1996] ECR I-615 and Case C-321/95P 
Greenpeace v. Commission  [1998] ECR I-1651. See also A. Adinolfi, “Admissility of Action for 
Annulment by Social Partners and “Sufficient Representativity” of European Agreements” (2000) 
European Law Review 165. 
133 See for example, Case T-268/99 FNAB v. Council  [2000] ECR II-2893. 
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decision in respect of some traders. Direct concern was conceded by the Council and 
accepted by the CFI. 
Pfizer, the applicants, belonged to an open class and did not satisfy individual concern 
on that ground, despite being the only manufacturer of virginiamycin in the world, the 
CFI repeating that the fact that it is possible to determine the number or even the 
identity of the persons to whom a measure applies does not render it of individual 
concern to them. It was however necessary, in the words of the CFI, to analyse the 
provisions under which the contested regulation was adopted in so far as the latter 
concerns virginiamycin in order to ascertain whether Pfizer was affected by the 
adoption of the measure by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to it or by 
reason of circumstances in which it is differentiated from all other persons.138 In the 
circumstances, the applicants were the only persons who, at the time the contested 
Regulation was adopted, were in a legal position which would have enabled it to 
obtain, under the existing procedural provisions and through a Commission or 
Council regulation, authorisation to market virginiamycin as the person first 
responsible for putting it into circulation. Furthermore, if following the examination 
of the withdrawal of the product provided under the contested regulation, the product 
had been authorised again, only the applicants would have been in a position to obtain 
a new authorisation of virginiamycin as an additive linked to a person responsible for 
putting it into circulation. Consequently, although at the time when the contested 
regulation was adopted, it had not acquired the status of person first responsible for 
putting virginiamycin into circulation, since the evaluation procedure was still 
continuing the applicants were already able to rely on an inchoate right in that regard. 
Additionally, by virtue of having made an application for further authorisation, the 
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applicants had obtained a position in respect of which Directive 70/524 offered legal 
safeguards. The CFI concluded that in the particular circumstances of this case, 
certain elements of Article 9 of this Directive closely resembled a specific right 
comparable to the right on which the applicants in Codorniu could rely.139 This 
differentiated the applicants from all other persons. 
The CFI then considered the argument in relation to the participation of Pfizer in the 
procedure leading to the adoption of the contested Regulation. It observed that the 
procedure laid down in Article 24 of Directive 70/524 did not entitle the traders 
concerned to take part in the procedure for the adoption of the contested measure140. 
According to settled Case-Law, the fact that a person is so involved in some way or 
the other is capable of distinguishing that person individually only if the applicable 
Community legislation grants him certain procedural rights, which was not the case 
here for Pfizer. However, it was nevertheless the case that the adoption of the 
contested Regulation terminated or at least suspended the procedure of Article 9 of 
Directive 70/524 which had been instigated by Pfizer’s application for a new 
authorisation. In such a context, by terminating or at least suspending this procedure 
which had been opened at Pfizer’s request and in the course of which the applicants 
had the benefit of procedural guarantees, the contested Regulation affected the 
applicants by reason of a legal and factual situation which differentiated them from all 
other persons. The applicants’ were accordingly held to be individually concerned, 
but their application failed on its substance. 
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7.4.4. Anti-dumping, competition and state aid 
As a fourth category of application of the Plaumann test one can list the more 
generous approach taken in the special areas of anti-dumping, competition and state 
aid.141 In anti-dumping cases, measures imposing duties are generally of individual 
concern to producers and exporters who are identified in the measures or concerned in 
the preliminary investigations, since these persons do not have an alternative remedy. 
On the other hand, they are normally not of individual concern to importers.142 
Complainants of competition violations are also often individually concerned to 
challenge a negative finding of the Commission.143 In state aid investigations, the 
CJEU found individual concern even in cases where the applicant did not participate 
in the investigation if his position was substantially affected by the aid.144 
8. Unpredictability and a brief look in numbers 
The characteristic sketch illustration of Nik Baker shows two angry security guards at 
the entrance of the Court asking a private plaintiff how he got in.145 As A. Albors 
Llorens put it, the overall picture that emerged from the Case-Law on individual 
concern is one of bleak predictability.146 And M. Granger also thought that the Case-
Law was as notorious for its restrictive nature as it was for its unpredictability and 
                                                 
141 See generally M. Hedemann-Robinson, “Article 173 EC, General Community Measures and Locus 
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even inconsistency,147 while A. Ward concluded that the rights of the individual have 
taken second place to the cardinal value which was the promotion and protection of 
the EU institutions and the measures they promulgate.148 Notably, D. Waelbroeck has 
characterised the EU judicial review system as a meaningless “judicial carrousel” 
with unnecessary costs and burdens for applicants and national courts.149 T.C. Hartley 
went as far as to say that the ECJ’s jurisprudence makes it hard to avoid feeling that 
the Court decides first whether it wants the application to be admissible and then 
applies whichever test will produce the desired result.150 An argument that has been 
corroborated by C. Harlow, in that many courts choose to blur the distinction between 
standing and justiciability, in the sense that if the judge scents a justiciable issue, 
standing can be overlooked and even an actio popularis be allowed, whereas 
otherwise the court can stand firmly on the strict rules of locus standi, and the ECJ 
would not be alone in adopting this fluid discretionary model.151 To H. Rasmussen, 
this inconsistency could be attributed to the Court being internally divided on this 
point of judicial protection and locus standi.152 
A very interesting study by T. Tridimas and G. Gari,153 offers a statistical analysis of 
judicial review proceedings between the years 2001 and 2005. This interestingly 
                                                 
147 M. Granger, “Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking Judicial 
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Agricultores v. Council” (2003) 66 MLR 124, at p. 128. 
148 A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2007), 
Chapter 8, at p. 406. 
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150 T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 1988), at p.p. 345-
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12 Yearbook of European Law 213, at p. 231. 
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152 See also H. Rasmussen, European Court of Justice (Gadjura, 1998), Chapter 6, at p.p. 179-180. 
153 T. Tridimas and G. Gari, “Winners and losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical Analysis of Judicial 
Review Before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)” (2010) 35 
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reports a result that 113 out of a total of 340 actions for annulment initiated before the 
CFI were dismissed as inadmissible, which is a percentage of 33.2%, something 
which comes naturally as a result of the restrictive standing conditions. The study 
further reports that the chances of an action for annulment being dismissed as 
inadmissible are much higher, at a percentage of 63.8%, where the contested act is a 
measure of general application, like a directive or a regulation, than where it is a 
decision, in which case the percentage reported is at 28.3%. All actions against 
directives were dismissed as inadmissible, whereas actions against regulations were 
admissible in 43.5% of the cases.154 Their conclusion is that these results are in 
accordance with the general stance of the Case-Law on the locus standi conditions, 
and as far as regulations are concerned, while the rate of admissibility in relation to 
anti-dumping measures reaches a high 80%, it drops to 32.1% in relation to other 
types of regulations.155 
The corresponding analysis of direct actions for annulment before the ECJ reports that 
only 9 out of 140 such actions were dismissed as inadmissible which is a percentage 
of 6.5%. The difference with the GC is however easily explained by the fact that 
direct actions before the ECJ were initiated only by privileged applicants and 
Community institutions.156 
Preliminary references on validity were limited. There were only 44 in this sample, 
with a minimum of 6 in 2001 and a maximum of 12 in 2004, while the rate of success 
in establishing invalidity was at 13.6%. This compares unfavourably with the rate of 
                                                                                                                                            
Heede, “Who Litigates at Union Level and Where?” (2001) European Law Review 509, H. Schepel and 
E. Blankenburg, “Mobilising the European Court of Justice” in G. De Burca and H.H. Weiler, The 
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154 T. Tridimas and G. Gari, ibid, at p.p. 155-158 
155 T. Tridimas and G. Gari, ibid, at p. 156. 
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success of privileged applicants in direct actions before the ECJ, which was 30.7%, 
and also with the rate of success of private parties before the CFI, which was 
31.8%.157 
These results seem to be in line with the criticism, that the standing criteria rendered 
direct actions for annulment inadmissible to their vast majority in respect of 
challenges against measures of general application, while at the same time it seems 
difficult to induce a preliminary reference on validity. 
9. Alternative means of review 
The insistence of the CJEU that the Treaty establishes a complete system of remedies 
and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of EU acts is based on the 
interrelation of direct actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU with the plea of 
illegality in Article 277 TFEU on the one hand, and the preliminary reference 
mechanism under Article 267 TFEU on the other. 
9.1. The plea of illegality 
Under Article 277 TFEU, the plea of illegality can be invoked by an applicant against 
any act of general application which is at issue in other proceedings properly 
instituted before the EU courts, pleading its invalidity under the same grounds as 
under an action for annulment, as these are specified in Article 263 TFEU. It is a form 
of collateral review, and not an independent action, as it presupposes the proper 
existence of other proceedings pending before the EU courts. The obvious benefits are 
that there is no limitation period for lodging a plea of illegality and it is also possible 
                                                 
157 T. Tridimas and G. Gari, “Winners and losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical Analysis of Judicial 
Review Before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)” (2010) 35 
European Law Review 131, at p. 140 and at p.p. 172-173. 
59 
 
to challenge any acts, legislative or regulatory, irrespective of whether they entail 
implementing measures.158 
9.2. The preliminary reference on validity 
Likewise, the preliminary reference procedure is available in any proceedings before 
national courts.159 Any private party, however distant from a measure in terms of the 
standing requirements of Article 263(4) TFEU, can put forward his arguments for the 
invalidity of that EU measure if it is relevant to the proceedings and the national 
court, lacking jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the EU measure itself,160 cannot 
decide the case without the answer to such claims.161 The national court has to 
consider such claims, and if it is convinced that they are unfounded, may dismiss 
them and consider the EU measure as perfectly valid. If the national court considers 
the claims for invalidity to be founded, it can send a reference to the CJEU on the 
validity, itself effectively acting as a filter.162 The benefits are obvious, in that 
challenges can be indirectly made by anyone, without satisfying any standing 
conditions and without any time limit. Article 267 TFEU allows the review of acts of 
the institutions as well as bodies, offices and agencies of the EU. 
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The range of reviewable acts under the preliminary reference procedure is also wider 
than under Article 263 TFEU. In Grimaldi,163 the CJEU explicitly accepted that 
unlike the case of a direct action for annulment which excludes recommendations,164 
the then Article 177 EEC, now Article 267 TFEU, confers jurisdiction to give a 
preliminary ruling on the validity and interpretation of all acts without exception. 
The grounds of validity review under Article 267 TFEU are also the same as under 
Article 263 TFEU.165 If there is a finding of invalidity by a preliminary ruling, the 
national court referring the matter is bound to treat the contested measure as invalid. 
However, such a ruling also constitutes sufficient reason for any other national court 
to regard that measure as void, and there is a further obligation on the institution that 
adopted the measure so held invalid to take all necessary measures to comply with 
such ruling.166 A declaration of invalidity normally takes retroactive effect from the 
date of entry into force of the invalid measure,167 although there have been cases 
where the declaration made was set to take effect as from the date of the judgment168 
or even exempted certain categories of persons from such limits on the temporal 
effects of invalidity.169 
Although national courts have no competence to rule on the validity of an EU act 
themselves, they are nevertheless competent to issue interim measures against the 
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61 
 
effects of such acts. In Zuckerfabrik,170 the ECJ set uniform conditions for the grant of 
such interim relief by national courts, which must be satisfied that serious doubts exist 
as to the validity of contested act. In its later judgment in IATA,171 the ECJ rephrased 
this to a condition that the national court considers the arguments as to invalidity to be 
well founded. The need for uniformity also drove the ECJ in Zuckerfabrik to point 
national courts to the Case-Law on interim measures in direct actions for annulment 
which are now found in Article 278 TFEU and Article 279 TFEU, taking into account 
the main requirements of urgency, irreversible damage from the immediate 
application of the measure, and the interest of the EU that measures should not be set 
aside without proper guarantees. 
The known shortcomings of the preliminary reference mechanism for validity 
challenges against EU measures have been extensively highlighted in the Opinion of 
AG Jacobs in UPA172 and have been the basis of the criticism that this indirect 
remedy is insufficient to ensure effective judicial protection.173 
9.3. The TWD rule 
Both these indirect avenues of validity review are subject to the procedural limitation 
set by the TWD174 rule, rendering a measure definitive against a private party who 
undoubtedly had standing to bring an action for annulment to challenge it but failed to 
do so within the time limit. Effectively, this rule precludes an individual from raising 
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a plea of illegality for such a measure or from contesting its validity in national 
proceedings in order to seek a preliminary reference on this issue, but does not 
preclude a national court from referring the question of its validity of its motion.175 
After extensive examination and elaboration on the Case-Law related to the TWD 
rule, R. Schwensfeier concludes that the true position is that the rule does not apply to 
measures of general application unless the party relying on the invalidity of a 
contested measure was its addressee or fulfilled the standing criteria to challenge it. 
And, further, the criteria for the rule’s application can be reduced to a premise that a 
measure becomes definitive against those parties who could have been expected to 
have knowledge of the measure as well as their standing to challenge it.176 
This rule is still alive under the reformed Article 263(4) TFEU,177 and this was 
recorded as the fourth reality that should be taken into account in this review of the 
Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus standi conditions.178 The concerns that emerged 
post-Lisbon were that with the potential increase in the availability of an action for 
annulment for regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures, this rule 
would play an increasing role and act as a restriction on the use of the preliminary 
reference procedure, the desirability of which would be debatable.179 As also 
mentioned when examining this fourth reality, the rule would also pose new 
challenges for national courts, which are required to consider whether an applicant 
could have lodged an action for annulment against the measure for which a 
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preliminary reference is sought. Where the criterion of individual concern is required, 
the reform would not have made any difference as far as national courts are 
concerned. A private party who is not the addressee of an act, cannot be regarded as 
being undoubtedly able to lodge a direct action for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU, due to the difficulty in satisfying individual concern. However, where 
individual concern is not required, national courts will be required to recognise 
whether the contested measure is a regulatory act and whether it entails implementing 
measures in order to enforce the TWD rule. 
As also mentioned above, these were new challenges for the national courts, and 
called for clear guidance and clear rules to follow in order to perform their tasks in 
view of the reformed locus standi conditions, something which constitutes a challenge 
for the EU courts. Under the revised Article 263(4) TFEU, challenges against 
regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures will not, in principle, be 
maintained before national courts, and although the anticipated opening of an action 
for annulment in relation to such acts is welcome in terms of effective judicial 
protection, the consequent restriction of the use of a national forum for an applicant as 
a result of the TWD rule does not appear so welcome.180 
9.4. The action for damages 
The action for damages under Articles 268 TFEU and 340(2) TFEU complements 
these routes of validity review. It is an independent action that can be lodged by any 
party that has suffered damage or loss as a result of illegal action by an EU institution 
or civil servants, and leads only to an award of damages. There are no standing 
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conditions, but under a rather restrictive test pronounced in Lutticke,181 an applicant 
needed to show the existence of an unlawful act or conduct on the part of the 
defendant, actual damage suffered by the applicant, and a causal link between the 
illegality of the act and the damage suffered by the applicant. In Bergaderm,182 the 
CJEU abandoned its earlier narrow approach on the first condition, that of the 
existence of an unlawful act, requiring a flagrant violation of a superior rule of Law 
for the protection of the individual,183 and adopted a line where now liability arises 
where the rule of Law infringed by an act was intended to confer rights on 
individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious, and there is a causal link between the 
breach and the damage suffered by the applicant.184 
10. The calls for reform 
The calls for reform in 2002, contained in the Opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA185 and 
the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Jego Quere186, can be seen, as 
previously mentioned,187 as a summary of all the main arguments comprising the 
criticism of the system as it then stood under Article 230 EC. These centred upon the 
premise that effective judicial protection dictated that applicants should have access to 
a court that can grant remedies capable of protecting them against the effects of 
invalid acts, and national courts, being unable to rule on the validity of an EU act 
themselves, were not the appropriate forum for such cases. In the words of AG Jacobs 
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in UPA188, a preliminary reference is not a remedy available as of right, as the 
national court decides whether to refer and on the grounds of the reference, and as a 
result, it is inevitable that national courts, even at the highest level which have an 
obligation to refer, may err in their preliminary assessment of the grounds of 
invalidity put forward and refuse a reference. Lower courts would further be very 
reluctant to refer and inclined to leave the matter to the highest courts of their 
jurisdiction, something which means increased costs and delays which could also be 
contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection.189 And the gravest concern 
was that in the case of acts of general application without the need for implementing 
measures at national level, an individual may not be able to reach the national courts 
unless he breaks the Law. 
                                                 
188 Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, at paras 40-45 of 
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In addition to these shortcomings, AG Jacobs argued that an actions for annulment is 
generally more appropriate for determining issues of validity than reference 
proceedings because the institution which adopted the impugned measure is a party to 
the proceedings from beginning to end and because a direct action involves a full 
exchange of pleadings, as opposed to a single round of observations followed by oral 
observations before the Court. The availability of interim relief effective in all 
Member States, also constitutes a major advantage for individual applicants and also 
serves the need for uniformity. Further, where a direct action is brought, the public is 
informed of the existence of the action by means of a notice published in the Official 
Journal of the EU and third parties may, if they are able to establish a sufficient 
interest, intervene in the proceedings. On the other hand, in preliminary reference 
proceedings interested individuals cannot submit observations unless they have 
intervened in the action before the national court. According to AG Jacobs, that may 
be difficult since, although information about reference proceedings is published in 
the Official Journal, individuals may not be aware of actions in the national courts at a 
sufficiently early stage to intervene. 
He also considered that it is manifestly desirable for reasons of legal certainty that 
challenges to the validity of EU acts be brought as soon as possible after their 
adoption. While direct actions have a time limit of two months, the validity of EU 
measures may, in principle, be questioned before the national courts at any point in 
time. The strict criteria for standing for individual applicants make it necessary for 
such applicants to bring issues of validity before the Court via the preliminary 
reference procedure, and this may have the effect of reducing legal certainty.190 
                                                 




Both AG Jacobs and the CFI accordingly concluded that the ECJ’s interpretation of 
individual concern deprived private parties of any effective remedy, in the light of 
Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,191 and that effective judicial protection 
could only be ensured through direct actions for annulment. The proposal of AG 
Jacobs was that an applicant should be considered as individually concerned where, 
by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has or is liable to have a 
substantial adverse effect on his interests.192 The CFI in its turn, heavily influenced by 
AG Jacobs and joining the call for reinterpretation, considered that individual concern 
should be satisfied where a measure affects an applicant’s legal position in a manner 
which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or imposing obligations 
on him.193 
The ECJ however maintained its previous interpretation, stating that by Article 230 
EC (now Article 263 TFEU) and Article 241 EC (now Article 277 TFEU) on the one 
hand, and Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU) on the other, the Treaty 
established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure 
review of the legality of acts of the institutions. This moved the responsibility onto the 
Member States to establish a system which ensures respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection. It was accordingly required that national courts interpret and apply 
national procedural rules in a way that enables private parties to bring challenges 
before the EU courts against the legality of any EU measure of general application.194 
                                                 
191 Although not legally binding at the time. 
192 Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, para 60 of his 
Opinion. 
193 Case T-177/01 Jego Quere v. Commission  [2002] ECR II-2365. See also A. Arnull, “April Shower 
for Jego-Quere” (2004) European Law Review 287. 
194 Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 40-42, and 
Case C-263/02 P Commission v. Jego Quere  [2004] ECR I-3425, paras 30-31. 
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In other words, the ECJ expected the Member States and their national courts to make 
the preliminary reference route of validity challenges work in a way that ensures 
effective judicial protection of individuals. 
Following these judgments, the issue appeared to have settled. The ECJ would not 
consider or accept any reinterpretation of individual concern in the absence of express 
Treaty amendment by the Member States. 
As previously mentioned, these calls for reform were not however left unanswered. 
The proposals of the Working Group on Reform of the Court of Justice,195 were 
incorporated into Article III-365 of the Constitutional Treaty, and then into the Lisbon 
Treaty, in what has become Article 263 TFEU, relaxing the locus standi conditions 
for regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. 
The following chapter explores issues of judicial policy, the possible justifications of 
the locus standi rules for actions for annulment, the criticism of the EU judicial 
review system and the shortcomings of the preliminary reference mechanism for 
validity challenges against EU measures. The key aims are to consider the possible 
reasons for the development of the restrictive test for individual concern and the 
criticism, as well as the theoretical background for the justification of locus standi 
rules, before proceeding to the effects of the Lisbon Treaty reform. 
  
                                                 
195 See, in particular, Secretariat of the European Convention, Final Report of the discussion circle on 
the Court of Justice of 25/3/2003, CONV 636/03, and Cover Note from the Praesidium to the 






CHAPTER 3: POLICY CHOICES, JUSTIFICATION AND CRITICISM OF 
THE EU JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM 
 
This chapter will begin with a consideration of the policy choice given to the ECJ by 
the Treaties and the limits within which it had to be exercised. It will then move to 
consider the academic reception of the various developments in relation to the locus 
standi rules. This will be followed by a consideration of the relevant provisions of the 
ECHR, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, before moving to the 
possible justifications of the locus standi rules. The final part refers to the benefits of a 
private enforcement model in the area of judicial review. 
1. Judicial policy choice and its limits 
The development of the Plaumann test for individual concern, both in terms of its 
formulation as well as its application, was indeed very controversial. This also seems 
true in relation to the test for direct concern. To begin with, the text of the Treaty 
itself provided very little guidance, if any at all, as to what the notions of direct and 
individual concern were intended to mean or how they should have been interpreted. 
They simply appeared in the text of Article 173 EEC in the Treaty of Rome as the 
standing criteria for private parties to challenge an act not addressed to them, without 
any further explanation or indication, apart from their dictionary definitions. And 
perhaps also the somehow restrictive effect their combined use obviously conveyed, 
by requiring a person to be both directly and individually concerned by an act. 
It was also highly unclear what the background of the particular phrases actually was, 
since there was no available record or travaux preparatoires to evidence the 
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discussions that led to their adoption.196 And they could not either be linked or 
parallelised to any existing national or international judicial review system or model. 
Not even to the standing conditions under the pre-existing European Coal and Steel 
Community. 
In 1965, D.G. Valentine197 notes that it is to be regretted that no record of the travaux 
preparatoires exists, and that only two glimpses can be obtained of the preliminary 
discussions in relation to the foundation and the jurisdiction of the Court of the then 
European Economic Community. The first comes from the Report of the French 
Delegation,198 which declares that it was quite clear that the actions of the High 
Authority must be exercised with a respect for law, and especially for the rules set out 
in the Treaty, and that this forms the reason why the necessity of subjecting the High 
Authority to a judicial control was at once recognised. The second glimpse comes 
from the Expose de Motifs of the Luxembourg Government199 which indicated that it 
was only despite certain hesitations that it was decided to institute a court rather than 
an arbitral tribunal. 
On top of these also came the overall uncertainty as to what the nature of the then 
newly created European Economic Community actually was, or as to the extent of its 
activities or how these activities would actually.200 The Treaty of Rome evidenced 
that it was intended to be an economic union of states, indeed unlike any other 
international body, but, as such a bold aspiration, it necessarily was at the time some 
sort of a journey to the unknown. Both as to whether it was going to succeed as such, 
                                                 
196 See also H. Rasmussen, European Court of Justice (Gadjura, 1998), Chapter 6, at p.p. 173-176. 
197 D.G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Stevens & Sons, 1965), Vol. 1, 
at p.p. 3-4. 
198 Rapport de la Delegation Francaise sur le Traite instituant la C.E.C.A. published by the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1951, as referenced by D.G. Valentine, ibid. 
199 Compte Rendu, Session ordinaire, 1951-1952, at p. 127, as referenced by D.G. Valentine, ibid. 
200 For an interesting historical overview see M. Avbelj, “Theory of the European Union” (2011) 
European Law Review 818. 
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but also as to its development. Likewise, the role of the Court, and within it the role of 
the action for annulment under Article 173 EEC, was also a journey to the unknown. 
These considerations offered little context in which to place the two standing criteria 
of direct and individual concern. 
In these circumstances, the Court was forced to find a solution on its own and of its 
own. And it was, more or less, free to impose any solution it considered appropriate, 
effectively setting in accordance with its own judgment the standing criteria for an 
action for annulment, and consequently shaping the judicial review system of the then 
EEC. Arguably, any definition of direct concern and individual concern, from the 
most restrictive to the most liberal, was indeed possible.201 The words “direct” and 
“individual” did not set any degree of required “directness” or “individuality”,202 so it 
was pretty much open to the Court to set any such degree it wished as the basis of 
these tests. Even if the contrary view could be expressed for the term “direct”, whose 
meaning may arguably point to the non existence of intermediate or intervening acts, 
something which of course is still difficult to support, when it comes to the term 
“individual” such a contrary view or limitation seems almost untenable. 
This can be rather easily illustrated by practical scenarios. If, for example, there is an 
EU act causing somehow an increase in the price of the most widely used computer 
processors, then there can be a range of private parties that can be affected by this. 
Local importers of those processors are affected, and taking the literal meanings of the 
phrases “direct concern” and “individual concern”, could claim to be so affected 
                                                 
201 See also H. Rasmussen, European Court of Justice (Gadjura, 1998), Chapter 6, at p. 174, and  A. 
Arnull, “Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Under Article 173 of the EC Treaty” (1995) 
32 CMLRev 7, at p. 13. 
202 Borrowing the words as used in E. Stein and G.J. Vining, “Citizen Access to Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in a Trannational and Federal Context” (1976) 70 American Journal of 
International Law 219, at p. 240. 
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directly as a result of that increase, and also individually since they personally suffer a 
loss. Computer manufacturers could also claim that they are affected since their loss is 
directly flowing from the EU act, and also individually since, again, they personally 
suffer the loss. A business buying several computers every year cannot be excluded 
since their loss is still a direct result of the EU act, and also again individually since it 
personally suffers the loss. A consumer seeking to buy a computer that year cannot 
also be excluded since, again, the fact that he needs to pay more is a direct result of 
the EU act, and also individually since, again, he personally suffers the loss. All these 
private parties could argue that, but for the EU act, they would not have suffered such 
a loss. Or, put differently, that they cannot be excluded from the possible meanings of 
direct and individual concern.203 
Limiting the persons who could satisfy those standing conditions accordingly 
involved a policy choice to be made by the Court, since this policy choice had not 
been made by the drafters of the Treaties. And this policy choice had to be exercised 
by means of the development of legal tests for the criteria of direct and individual 
concern. Unrestrained as this choice may have been by the text of the Treaties, it had 
to be exercised within certain limits. 
The widest and most liberal definition would of course have been unwelcome, as this 
would have led to a full dilution of the standing rules. It is necessary in any judicial 
review system that there is some filtering of legal challenges against legislative and 
administrative acts, preventing the possibility of disruption of vital functions of the 
                                                 
203 See also the example of John Smith, the turnip grower, in G.F. Mancini, Democracy and 
Constitutionalism in the European Union – Collected Essays (Hart Publishing, 2000), Chapter 3, at p. 
47, as well as in G.F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court of Justice” 
(1994) 57 Modern Law Review 175, at p. 188, and the example of car emission standards in K. 
Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, “Judicial Review as a Contribution to European Constitutionalism” (2003) 
22 YEL 1, at p. 20. 
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state or governmental policy implementation by judicial proceedings.204 Accordingly, 
this could be seen as the first restraint or limit, advocating against the most liberal 
tests. 
At the opposite end, the choice had to be limited by individual rights, the need for 
accountability of decision makers and the need to ensure compliance with the Rule of 
Law. The set of individual rights restraining this choice were, on the one hand, the 
rights of individuals to access to justice and an effective remedy, which were widely 
recognised by the Member States and also contained in Articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR, and on the other hand, the right of private parties to effective judicial 
protection which was one of the general principles of EU Law. The relevant aspect of 
the Rule of Law that again restrained this choice was the need to ensure that all acts of 
the institutions are subjected to judicial review. Closely related to all these, was the 
need to ensure legal accountability of the institutions and other decision making 
bodies within the EU.205 
The definitions and tests for direct and individual concern had to be placed 
somewhere within this context. But still the policy choice remained an extremely 
difficult one as the ECJ was, in effect, building a judicial review system from scratch 
for a union of states that was still in its infancy.206 And also at a time when even the 
above rights and principles had not been so developed in its Case-Law or even the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, to which the European Economic 
                                                 
204 See also L. Pech, ““A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of 
Law as a Constitutional Principe of EU Law” (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359, at p. 
387. See further below. 
205 See generally A. Benz, C. Harlow and Y. Papadopoulos, “Introduction” (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 441, and A. Benz, “Accountable Multilevel Governance by the Open Method of 
Coordination?” (2007) European Law Journal 505. 
206 For historical accounts on the development of the European Union, see D. McKay, Federalism and 
European Union (OUP, 1999), Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and G. Slynn, Introducing a European Legal Order 
(Stevens and Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), Chapter 1. 
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Community was not anyway a contracting party. Even today, the limits set by those 
rights and principles and the applications of those rights and principles are not entirely 
clear, especially in the context of restricting some right to take legal proceedings, such 
as is the function of standing rules for judicial review proceedings. 
A further problem is created by a somehow natural realisation that it seems unrealistic 
to say that one general test or set of tests could always serve the purpose and ensure 
respect of those rights and principles or at least the same level of respect. Respect for 
those rights and principles necessarily demands a high degree of particularity, which 
transposes itself into a need to examine each case on its own merits and its own 
circumstances. A general test alone may have the result that in the context of one area 
of EU activity those rights may appear to have been respected, whereas not in another. 
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights does not usually make general 
findings for the adequacy of compliance with the ECHR in a contracting state, but 
only examines compliance on a case by case basis. 
The above considerations indeed seem to be reflected in the Case-Law of the CJEU. 
General tests were adopted for direct and individual concern, but their applications, 
especially the applications of the Plaumann test for individual concern, differed in 
some areas, such as competition, anti-dumping and state aid proceedings, or in even 
more specific cases such as Codorniu and Extramet. Both the formulation of the tests 
and the applications of the tests generally but also in particular areas, were policy 
choices of the CJEU. The CJEU of course never admitted that such choices were its 
own, with the ECJ firmly maintaining in UPA, and indeed throughout the Case-Law, 
that the judicial review system was set by the Treaties. 
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The fact that these choices were not expressly made by the drafters of the Treaties is 
not something uncommon, especially in the context of international agreements. The 
Treaties sought to establish, in the unique circumstances of the aftermath of the 
Second World War, a unique union of states. In the realities surrounding the 
conclusion of international agreements, the struggle for accord between the 
contracting states necessarily leads to ambiguities in the text, often even termed as 
“productive ambiguities”. Such ambiguities can naturally be expected in an 
international agreement such as the Treaties, surrendering a part of state sovereignty 
and competences to an international body, such as the EEC, and submitting the state 
to the authority of an international court, as was the ECJ. The unavailability of 
travaux preparatoires leaves much to speculation as to the actual reasons why Article 
173 EEC was so formulated, and as to whether the ambiguities surrounding the 
definitions of the standing criteria were the result of a deliberate decision of the 
founding states to leave this task to the ECJ, or just a matter that did not occupy a 
central role in the negotiation process. The first possibility would not anyway be 
strange at all, since the development of tests for criteria or specific terms used in 
legislation or set by legislation is something commonly left to the judiciary, especially 
in Common-Law jurisdictions. 
The choice of the ECJ for the test for individual concern was undeniably a very 
restrictive one, leaving actions for annulment available only in exceptional 
circumstances, as discussed previously. This led A. Arnull to suggest that in direct 
actions the European Courts sometimes seem content to collude with other institutions 
to evade the requirements laid down by the Treaty and deny applicants the right to an 
effective remedy by showing reluctance in engaging directly in effective judicial 
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review.207 In so shaping the judicial review system of the EU, the ECJ obviously 
considered as a safeguard the availability of the preliminary reference route of 
challenging EU acts, and the fact that this means of challenge was common in several 
Member States, and indeed, many states around the world.208 The availability of the 
plea of illegality has also been considered as a safeguard by the ECJ, as was, although 
perhaps to a lesser degree, the action for damages. The ECJ appears to consider the 
EU judicial review system holistically, with the consequence that the interpretation of 
each form of action is not interpreted on its own right, but in light of the judicial 
review system as a whole.209 
The preliminary reference route is not of course completely ineffective as a means of 
challenging validity of EU measures. It has the benefits of being a procedure that 
integrates into national proceedings, which are initiated in the applicant’s Member 
State and therefore may be labelled a “familiar” legal system.210 There are also further 
benefits such as no time limits and no locus standi requirements to satisfy, apart from 
national standing rules. The procedure may also lead to the invalidity of the contested 
EU measure inter partes, but such a ruling constitutes sufficient reason for any 
national court to regard the measure as invalid. 
In theory, and in the view of the CJEU, the preliminary reference procedure may seem 
sufficient to mitigate the effects of the restrictive locus standi conditions in Article 
263 TFEU, which result in limited availability of a direct action for annulment. 
                                                 
207 A. Arnull, “EU Recommendations and Judicial Review – ECJ 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16P 
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Community Action” (1981) 1 YEL 93, at p. 96. 
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Theoretically, national courts are anyway considered as the ordinary courts of EU 
Law in other areas of remedies for breach of EU Law so why should they not be so 
considered for validity challenges as well. And in the reasoning of the CJEU, Member 
States can and should create remedies capable of protecting the interests of private 
parties and ensure that they are able to put their full arguments against validity of EU 
measures before national courts. The reality however is that this procedure is 
tormented with the problems highlighted by AG Jacobs, such as increased delays, 
costs, and possible errors by national courts in their assessment of the applicant’s 
claims for invalidity. It is also not a remedy available as of right because it is the 
national court, and not the applicant, that decides what questions to refer and the ECJ 
answers only those.211 
In addition to these inherent shortcomings, there is also the potential gap that national 
legal systems may not provide for challenges against certain types of measures which 
are taken at national level as a result of an EU measure. In such cases, the ECJ’s 
answer in UPA was that it was up to the Member States to establish rules and 
procedures rendering such acts challengeable before national courts. Again, in theory, 
this may seem sufficient. In practice, however, this cannot be but another hurdle for 
private parties who may have to convince national judges to hear their claim, based 
only on the fact that they wish to contest an EU measure.212 In this light, it cannot be 
excluded that the effectiveness of the preliminary reference mechanism for validity 
challenges, and consequently the level of judicial protection, may indeed differ from 
Member State to Member State. There is also the danger that there could be such 
                                                 
211 Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council  [2002] ECR I-6677, paras 40-48 of his 
Opinion. 
212 See also K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, “Judicial Review as a Contribution to European 
Constitutionalism” (2003) 22 YEL 1. 
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different levels of judicial protection due to difference in competence of national 
judges, which can again vary from Member State to Member State. 
It also seems difficult to find a compelling reason for choosing to have national judges 
reviewing claims for invalidity of EU measures, even if such assessment is only 
preliminary. The obvious purpose is to dismiss unmeritorious claims and avoid 
overburdening the CJEU. However, it seems questionable why this cannot be done 
within the procedure of an action for annulment.213 Many systems hold preliminary 
reviews of cases, aimed at dismissing obviously unmeritorious claims before they 
reach a hearing, at a party’s request or of their own motion. A similar procedure could 
be employed in the action for annulment. It may be argued that even the existing 
procedure for hearing objections of inadmissibility in actions for annulment214 could 
be seen as not less burdening for the GC’s resources than a procedure under which the 
GC considers whether to dismiss unmeritorious claims. 
In any event, it is submitted that the possible lack of resources of the General Court to 
fulfil this task of filtering unmeritorious claims, should not be acceptable as an 
adequate justification for reductions in judicial protection or in the protection of 
individual rights, as they occur in the case of the EU judicial review system. And this 
should be so, in so much the same way as lack of resources does not constitute a 
justification for delays in national proceedings for the purposes of the right to a fair 
trial under Article 6 ECHR for example. 
It can further be argued that national courts are not in the best position to judge such 
issues of validity, even preliminarily. There are differences between judging whether 
                                                 
213 See also M. Granger, “Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking 
Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jego-Quere et Cie SA v. Commission and Union de Pequenos 
Agricultores v. Council” (2003) 66 MLR 124, at p.p. 134-135. 
214 See Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 
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an interpretation of an EU measure by the ECJ is necessary, on the one hand, and 
judging validity, on the other. The need for interpretation appears in a specific 
scenario, relevant to the pleadings and the procedure before the national court. In such 
cases, the question is naturally more specific. The judge acquires an understanding of 
what is needed to be interpreted, which is a task the judge would have done on his 
own had that been a national measure. The judge may even have an opinion as to the 
plausible interpretation, and is naturally in an excellent position to formulate 
questions to the ECJ on these matters.215 
Considering the validity of an EU measure and drafting relevant questions are 
arguably wholly different issues. The judge will need to consider grounds of 
invalidity, not related to the case before him. This seems much different than 
considering acte clair, act eclaire and relevance to the proceedings in considering 
preliminary reference requests in the context of specific cases where interpretation is 
required. It requires a high degree of expertise on the grounds of invalidity of EU 
measures and the related Case-Law of the CJEU in order to consider such claims and 
formulate questions. And it can further be argued that the higher the degree of 
expertise needed, the higher becomes the risk of reluctance of national judges to send 
a request for a preliminary reference. Risk of criticism from higher courts or the 
CJEU are also factors that should be taken into account and naturally reduce 
willingness of a first instance national judge to send a reference, while increasing this 
judge’s preference to dismiss a request or leave the matter to a higher court. This is 
not of course to say that errors could not go the opposite way, and there may well be 
cases where references are made where they should not have been. However, in such 
cases there is less at stake, in the sense that such errors do not endanger effective 
                                                 
215 See also the Opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA, at para 41. 
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judicial protection. The risk in refusals to refer is much greater in terms of effective 
judicial protection and this needs to be avoided. And the problems continue, since 
failure to request a preliminary reference can only be remedied by appeals which 
mean further delays, while, as AG Jacobs recognised, even higher courts may err in 
their assessment and refuse to send a reference or even reformulate the questions and 
limit the applicant’s claims.216 
The European Court of Human Rights has demanded that national judges should give 
reasons for their refusals to request preliminary rulings from the ECJ.217 While of 
course this is a positive step, promoting judicial protection, it is rather questionable 
whether it offers a solution to any of the above concerns. It enables review by higher 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights, possibly even the CJEU, especially 
if the ASJP218 ruling is extended to all aspects of effective judicial protection, but 
adds very little in respect of the other shortcomings of the procedure. 
All these are concerns that materialise in practice and are not obvious in the abstract. 
Even if the benefits of the preliminary reference procedure are real, it is very 
questionable whether they balance all these complications, costs and delays inherent 
in its use, compared to a direct action for annulment. 
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v. France  EU:C:2018:811, at paras 105-114 of the judgment. 
217 Schweighofer v. Austria, No. 35673/97, judgment of 24/8/1999, Matheis v. Germany, No. 73711/01, 
1/2/2005, Lutz John v. Germany, No. 15073/03, 13/2/2007, Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. 
Belgium, No. 3989/07, 20/9/2011. See J. Krommendijk, ““Open Sesame!”: Improving Access to the 
ECJ by Requiring National Courts to Reason their Refusals to Refer” (2017) European Law Review 46, 
and C. Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights – Commentary  (C.H. Beck, Hart and 
Nomos, 2014), at p. 133. 
218 Case C-64/16 Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses  EU:C:2018:117. 
82 
 
2. The reception of the interpretation of the locus standi rules 
A historical search through the earlier commentaries proves highly revealing in terms 
of expectations and the reception of the various developments related to the locus 
standi rules for actions for annulment, and the consequent need to use national courts 
and the preliminary reference mechanism for validity challenges against EU 
measures. 
2.1. The world before Plaumann 
 
The unprecedented nature of the newly founded European Economic Community was 
readily recognised in an early article, before Plaumann was decided, on the judicial 
review powers of the ECJ by D.G. Valentine,219 acknowledging that this was the first 
time that an international court is acting as a Conseil d’Etat, hearing actions for 
annulment lodged by States, the Council of Ministers but also enterprises and 
associations of individuals.220 There is however, little mention of the then Article 173 
EEC and no coverage of the standing criteria therein, the focus at the time being more 
on the European Coal and Steel Community than on the European Economic 
Community. 
Expectations that the admissibility conditions for private parties would be very 
restrictive can be traced even in the world before Plaumann. G. Bebr readily 
considered in 1962 that private parties may appeal regulations but only under almost 
impossible conditions, and their strong quasi-legislative nature was, at least partly, an 
explanation for this extremely restricted appeal.221 He also readily considered that the 
nature and type of an act determines the extent of the right of appeal of a person and 
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the extent of the judicial protection individuals are to enjoy, but the acts of the 
Community have their own original character, so their nature can only be determined 
by their material content.222 Even at this early stage, a distinction is made between 
Council regulations which were expected to bear an unmistakeable imprint of a quasi-
legislative character, and those of the Commission, which resembled rather 
administrative regulations, and the form of an act already appeared irrelevant  as to 
what could be subject to appeal.223 It is however realised that the broader scope of 
acts subject to appeal for annulment may easily deceive, in that only the privileged 
applicants actually benefit from this, leading to weak spots in the judicial protection 
of private parties.224 The point is made that it would be unrealistic if all private parties 
could exercise the right to appeal without any restrictions, as this would paralyse an 
effective administration. A reasonable balance must be struck between the higher 
Community interests and the protection of the interests of private parties, but the 
Treaties were thought as somewhat vague as to what the admissibility conditions may 
be.225 However, even at the time when the admissibility tests were yet to be 
developed, the author does spot that the protection of individuals against general acts 
and regulations might well have to be reconsidered, and argues that the ECJ should 
develop, by its flexible judicial policy, a protection which would come close to a 
constitutional complaint. He regarded this as contingent on the development of certain 
fundamental rights at Community level, as only violation of such rights would fully 
justify a constitutional complaint against quasi-legislative acts beyond the protection 
already provided for by the Treaties.226 
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Some elements of the Plaumann test were already evident under the very early 
jurisprudence developed under the differently worded Article 33 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Writing in 1960, A. Wolters 
observed that the general or individual character of a decision does not depend on its 
form but on its substance, and that it does not matter whether that decision has 
particular effects on certain enterprises or on a certain number of enterprises grouped 
into one association, such a matter being incapable of transforming a general act into 
an individual decision. An individual decision is one that applies directly to certain 
enterprises and which is based on a special and concrete situation of those enterprises, 
even if this decision formally has another recipient.227 Further, the author observed 
that the right of action under the ECSC was dependent on a need to show a special 
and individual interest, something feared to create uncertainty within the field of 
admissibility of annulment actions.228 
It is interesting to note from the above, that a restrictive interpretation of the locus 
standi criteria for actions for annulment was rather expected from the very early years 
of the then EEC. 
2.2. The reception of Plaumann 
The first commentary on Plaumann seems to be the one by L. Goffin,229 published in 
the very first volume of the Common Market Law Review journal. Ironically enough, 
the case that was destined to be the benchmark and landmark reference for the 
interpretation of the criterion of individual concern, is only analysed with respect to 
its aspects relating to non contractual liability claims under what are now Articles 268 
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TFEU and 340 TFEU.230 Only in one of the introductory paragraphs does it comment 
briefly that the Court has made an effort to limit the scope of the “regulation”, which 
may not be attacked by private parties, to its proper field, namely acts of a legislative 
character which are applicable to a group of persons defined generally and in the 
abstract, with a further assertion that the conclusions that base the finding that the 
applicants were not individually concerned are “clearly enumerated” in the text of the 
judgment.231 Important points are however made, although in the context of non 
contractual liability, as to the possible explanations of the restrictive approach of the 
ECJ, corroborating what has been said above, that this restrictive approach is driven 
by the need to allow the process of the building of the European Economic 
Community, the fact that the spirit of the Treaty imposed sacrifices in order to achieve 
this goal, and consequently some of the ECJ’s inspirations may be heavily drawn 
from the needs of the Community.232 
A footnote in an article by M. Lagrange233 states that it is a pity that the drafters of the 
Treaty did not show the same wisdom in respect of applications for annulment by 
private parties, unlike in the case of non contractual liability where the drafters of the 
Treaty were wise enough to leave the conditions of such actions to the ECJ with a 
simple general conferral of jurisdiction. Such an approach, in the author’s view would 
have been able to prevent those difficulties and injustices to which the application of 
those provisions has given rise, considering that those fields are by their nature, more 
suited to the judge than to the legislator. The contrary view was respectfully submitted 
above, as the interpretation of the admissibility criteria was quite open to the ECJ 
since all concepts were openly defined in Article 173 EEC and accordingly, the tests 
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as developed, especially that for individual concern, were far from the only possible 
interpretation. 
Evidence of early calls for reform is given by J. Linthorst Homan who refers to a 
colloquium organised by the University of Liege in 1965.234 This reports that some 
speakers considered that all private persons should have the right to appeal EEC 
regulations, on the grounds that under some national legal systems private citizens can 
contest government administrative instruments, whereas others contended that the 
parallel was inaccurate, since EEC regulations have the force not of government 
orders but of Acts of Parliament, against which the individual cannot appeal. 
Two other early commentaries, interestingly, and rather surprisingly, reveal pretty 
much what recent analyses and calls for reform of the locus standi criteria put 
forward. 
The first is a review of the then known interpretation of the admissibility criteria by 
G. Raskin and R.M. Chevallier.235 It notes that Producteurs de Fruits did not provide 
any helpful guidance as to the test for individual concern, the first “precise” guidance 
on which coming from Plaumann, the formula of which was repeated in all 
subsequent cases.236 It is also noted that some commentators have, frequently orally, 
highlighted the irony of the statements of the ECJ in Plaumann, that the letter and 
grammatical meaning of Article 173(2) EEC justified the broadest interpretation, that 
the Treaty provisions concerning the right to bring an action cannot be interpreted 
restrictively, and that in the silence of the Treaty, such a limitation cannot be 
presumed. The first question that is identified is whether the ECJ could, with a bolder 
interpretation, render Article 173(2) EEC less restrictive than actually intended by the 
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authors of the Treaties. But a simple reading of the text seemed to the authors to 
impose a negative answer. It also seemed difficult to the authors for a judge to 
distinguish between types of acts, a matter which was not in any case provided for in 
the Treaty. The second question is whether the ECJ could allow an action for 
annulment based on a simple interest alone in view of the text of the Treaty. But in 
their view, the answer pointed to the negative since the Treaty provides the 
qualifications of direct and individual concern. The third question is whether the 
Court could adopt a wider interpretation of the criteria in order to justify the need to 
avoid a denial of justice. It is argued that the administration may act in what way it 
likes and be immune from action for annulment or for damages. But the authors ask 
whether this is actually a fault of the ECJ, and why are not the authors of the Treaty 
equally to blame. It is highlighted that the ECJ regretted in Producteurs de Fruits 
being bound such a restrictive Treaty text. And has pointed out the alternative means 
available to unhappy applicants whose actions it had to declare inadmissible. Overall, 
the authors cannot attribute to the ECJ a process of intention and cannot concur with 
the criticism of a lack of boldness in the interpretation. They attribute the problem to 
the authors of the Treaty and call that the then Article 173(2) EEC is amended at the 
earliest convenience. They content that the ECJ had very well understood the 
intention of the authors of the Treaty, expressed regret about it, but had to follow it. 
Further, they observe that in all of the then Member States, applicants do need to 
satisfy certain interest criteria in order to bring challenges, so the question is asked 
whether citizens really expect to have a right of action against Community acts that 
they do not have in their national legal order. In effect, they note, the refusal of 
challenges by private parties is a characteristic of International Law. The existence of 
Community Law and the Community itself are the same thing. They further argue that 
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policies can battle over words and a revision of Article 173(2) EEC is indispensable. 
When the right to an action becomes open to private parties within reasonable limits, 
then, it is argued, there can be confidence in the ECJ for its application, which has 
already shown its wisdom.237 
These realisations at such early stage are striking. Especially bearing in mind that at 
the time of writing in 1966, there were very limited examples of the application of the 
Plaumann test, a matter so evident that even a practitioner text then available only 
referred to the text of the Plaumann test, which was simply reproduced verbatim in 
other judgments.238 Yet these realisations reflect, more or less, the basis of the 
criticism as developed through the decades that followed. 
The second such commentary comes from D. Ehle and is another of the early attempts 
at a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the legal protection afforded to 
private parties.239 It starts with an assumption that the authors of the Treaty have 
deliberately limited individual actions for annulment, fearing that the ECJ would be 
overloaded by actions, especially in the initial stage of integration, something which 
would also impair the work of the Commission, but asserts that this limitation had 
already proved to be a misjudgment. It then provides an early sketch of the categories 
of admissibility, based on the judgments available at the time, which does in fact 
roughly correspond to the contemporary position.240 The first category stated is that 
actions against Regulations of the Council or the Commission have been repeatedly 
declared inadmissible as they cannot possibly individually concern private parties. 
This was not considered to be unbearable, at least in comparison to national systems 
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of protection, in cases where Regulations demanded individual acts which could 
themselves be contestable, since an incidental challenge via a preliminary reference or 
a plea of illegality was possible. It did however recognise that a sensitive loophole 
existed in those cases where the Regulation did not need, legally or by administrative 
practice, an executing act for its application, citing Producteurs de Fruits241 as such 
an acute example. The second category so recognised, was that decisions addressed to 
Member States were also fundamentally inadmissible under the authority of 
Plaumann itself, whose requirements had, at the time, only been affirmed in one case, 
Toepfer.242 The commentary does note that the criteria of definition were, then, only 
barely outlined, and this affected such claims with a considerable risk that procedural 
requirements will not be satisfied, something equally true in later years, and to some 
degree even today. The third category stated was that of decisions addressed to natural 
or legal persons, which at the time were mainly issued in cartel proceedings, but equal 
protection in other fields where the Commission exercised its proper and 
administrative powers was also contemplated. The protection afforded in this category 
was widely elaborated, not least because of the already wide interpretation of the 
notion of reviewable act. And in view of this categorisation and routes of challenges 
against acts of the institutions, the author concludes that the legal system of Article 
173 EEC and the experience in its application in practice, put in place a satisfactory 
system of legal protection against acts addressed to private persons.243 
It then deals with challenges via preliminary references from national courts, as a 
means to challenge, as the author states, legislative acts, these being regulations, and 
other legal acts, such as directives or decisions addressed to Member States. It 
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concludes that the experience gained in this type of challenge was again satisfactory 
as such, not least because national courts quickly realised that direct legal protection 
of the individual before the ECJ does not correspond with the burden he has to bear as 
a result of integration, and made extensive use of their right to refer. It can 
respectfully be argued however that this seems of course to be a rather exaggerated 
conclusion, or at least one not corresponding to later experience. It does however 
further realise some of the inherent problems of the procedure, which flow naturally 
from the fact that the preliminary reference procedure is nothing more than a judicial 
dialogue, with the position of the individual remaining weak. Weak in the sense that 
he cannot force a reference or exercise a determining influence on the questions 
prepared for submission, change or complete them, but only to plead in the procedure 
before the ECJ.244 The author thought this situation could be improved by the 
strengthening of the role of the individual in the process of the preliminary reference, 
and ultimately considered this method not sufficient in view of the need for legal 
protection of the individual as it requires improvement.245 The author put forward two 
proposals.246 The first is that where the challenge is against a regulation or a decision 
addressed to a Member State, the individual ought to be allowed a direct challenge, 
without the need for the preliminary reference detour. The second is that where the 
challenge concerns a directive which requires execution by the Member States, legal 
unity is ensured by the preliminary reference, but the individual must also have his 
own right of application and be able to force a preliminary reference. This 
demonstrates an early realisation of the problems of the system. 
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It is striking to say the least that most of the contemporary criticism against the 
system of judicial review remains similar to the criticism which surfaced by 1967.247 
With little exaggeration, the majority of the elements of the Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
UPA can be found in the aforementioned review by D. Ehle. 
Another analysis of the standing criteria comes from A. Barav248 in 1974. At the time 
of writing, regulations as such were still thought to be immune from attack, and the 
conclusion from the then available Case-Law, was that two considerations prevented 
private parties from establishing individual concern when a decision was not 
addressed to them, belonging to a category which could be defined in an abstract 
manner and the general scope of the provision under attack. Until then, it is recorded 
that only three cases had succeeded under individual concern, Toepfer, International 
Fruit and Bock, and in all three the element of retroactivity was the decisive factor. 
But a further point is made, that another element was taken into consideration, in that 
the Court wished to sanction a certain detournement de pouvoir.249 And at the end, a 
question that is still relevant today is asked, whether the immunity of regulations is 
justified in cases of implementing regulations as distinct from basic regulations.250 
Some very important issues are raised by C. Harding251 in 1979. He finds the amount 
of time spent in arguing the admissibility of direct actions not surprising, certainly in 
those cases where a successful action would entail a review and recasting of measures 
of economic policy, which might lead to uncertainty or confusion amongst 
government agencies and individual traders. In these cases, he suggests that it is 
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possible to detect an underlying principle, which informs many modern systems, that 
often the interests of individuals must give way to what is perceived as the more 
general good, and this may be seen as a necessary concomitant of state intervention in 
economic affairs.252 The limited standing for direct actions has made, as the author 
suggests, the preliminary reference procedure fairly common, citing 11 references on 
validity in 1977 compared to only 2 admissible actions for annulment. He recognises 
on the other hand, still a good 23 years before UPA, some of the shortcomings of the 
preliminary reference route for validity challenges. He highlights the costs and delays 
caused by the need to go through a series of appeals and the procedure before the 
ECJ, the fact that it is for the national court, and not the claimant, to make such a 
reference, and that there are fears that the national court will refuse to send 
references.253 
The same author, C. Harding, continues his elaboration on the use of the preliminary 
reference for validity challenges in a very interesting and thorough article in 1981.254 
He starts by recognising the restrictive interpretation of the standing criteria for direct 
actions, noting that this may at least be seen as consistent with a tradition in Western 
European systems under which it is generally difficult for individuals to challenge 
legislative action, this tradition finding its inspiration both in the potentially disruptive 
consequences of such a challenge and in the fact that legislation in these countries is 
usually democratically conceived and private challenge may then appear as politically 
objectionable, although it is questionable whether these are equally valid 
considerations in a Community context. He does then emphasise that the Community 
does not however leave individuals wholly without legal protection, due to the 
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availability of the plea of illegality and the preliminary reference.255 In fact, he does 
even assert that it would be misleading to picture the private plaintiff as a 
disinterested legal watchdog, alert to identify as soon as possible illegal Community 
activity, and instead the individual’s interest arises when he is actually affected by the 
measure, so, in this light, the preliminary reference procedure appears as an equally, if 
not more, natural avenue of review than a direct action.256 
Assessing the impact of preliminary references and any possible disruptive effects on 
the implementation of Community policies, the same author finds that the successful 
invalidity cases via preliminary references as at the time of writing were no more than 
20. The number of measures annulled in these cases is rather more than just 20, but 
this remains a tiny proportion of the Community’s legislative output. He then 
comments that as is the case with direct actions and actions for damages, the chances 
of success are relatively small, but this is not surprising bearing in mind that many of 
the measures in question involve discretionary powers or necessarily prompt reactions 
to crises of unforeseen developments. The annulment of a measure in preliminary 
reference proceedings may have more or less disruptive results depending on how 
long the measure has been in force and the extent of its application. It is difficult to 
quantify or compare the costs of the results of a particular system of judicial review, 
for instance damage to traders on the one hand and administrative disruption on the 
other, but it is something that is necessary.257 He elaborates further on the 
shortcomings of preliminary reference challenges, stating that it would be misleading 
to convey the impression that individuals have automatic access to such a reference, 
as this is a matter for the national court, although at the time of writing there was little 
evidence that national courts were unwilling to send references on validity. He asserts 
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that the overall conclusion may be that an individual is likely to have little difficulty 
in practice in getting the matter before the ECJ, but remains nonetheless in a formally 
subsidiary position, so it cannot be said that a direct action is redundant since this is in 
many respects a superior procedure for his purposes, when available.258 
The contribution of C. Harding continues with another stimulating review in 1982.259 
This was also written before the judgment in Codorniu and the author repeats the then 
prevailing view that private parties could only challenge the legality of decisions and 
not of regulations, except where the contested regulation is in substance a decision, 
which was the crucial question. The difference between regulations and decisions 
was, according to the author, more conveniently put, that the regulation may be said 
to be “legislative” or “normative” in character, while the particular application of the 
decision connotes the idea of an administrative act. He notes that it is this legislative 
character of regulations that justifies their exclusion from review. In the first place, an 
individual is just one of an indeterminate number of persons affected by a regulation, 
so that his interest in the annulment would be proportionately small and uncertain. 
Secondly, the annulment of a legislative act is potentially more disruptive of 
established interests so that a private party’s proportionately small interest in a general 
measure does not justify his being able to set in motion the process of annulment. The 
author notes that on the whole, the distinction between legislative and non legislative 
acts does not loom so large in Member State legal systems, but since the distinction is 
fundamental to the Community judicial review system, the ECJ had to develop more 
exact distinguishing criteria to deal with borderline cases,260 and the abstract 
terminology test was developed. The criteria initially developed for direct actions are 
then described, under which the plaintiff first needs to show that the measure although 
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in the form of a regulation is in substance a decision, and secondly, that it is of direct 
and individual concern to him.261 He then notes that the ECJ’s Case-Law has been 
consistent to the extent that, in those cases where individuals were allowed to 
challenge regulations, the measures in question were clearly applicable to a 
determinate number of persons, so it would seem that the idea of individual concern 
plays a crucial role in the process of distinguishing regulations and decisions. The 
author then finds that it has sometimes been asserted in litigation that for an individual 
to challenge a regulation by a direct action, he need not show both that the measure is 
a decision and that it is of direct and individual concern to him, but only direct and 
individual concern, since evidence of individual concern implies that the measure is a 
decision, but he realises that this argument had not at the time, found acceptance, as 
this article was written before Codorniu. He raises the question whether “legislative 
nature” on the one hand, and “individual concern” on the other are no more than two 
sides of the same coin, so that the presence of one entails the absence of the other, but 
does not find support for this either in the Case-Law available at the time.262 He 
further observes that very generally the concept of individual concern functions to 
identify a special interest in a measure, which is clearly distinct from the general 
interest in that act, and the presence of this special interest at the same time reflects 
the juridical character of the measure. He then repeats that instances where individual 
concern was satisfied up to the time of writing involved an element of retroactivity.263 
He concludes that the Case-Law both as regards the distinction between decisions and 
regulations and the meaning of direct and individual concern, suggests that, in 
practice, direct actions by a private party are admissible only if there has been a 
species of misuse of powers, in that the Community should not have acted by means 
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of, for instance, a regulation or a decision addressed to a Member State, but ought to 
have directly addressed itself to a determinate group of individuals.264 
 
2.3. The reception of Codorniu 
 
As previously mentioned, the Court accepted for the first time in Codorniu265 that 
even where the contested provision is of a legislative nature, that does not prevent it 
from being of individual concern to some private parties, so dispensing with the need 
to satisfy the abstract terminology test. Effectively neutralising the text of Article 173 
EEC as far as it required a private applicant to show that the contested measure is in 
effect a decision although in the form of a regulation. 
In one of the first commentaries by D. Waelbroeck and D. Fosselard,266 this was 
described as an unexpected opening for private parties wishing to challenge true 
regulations, as it surely lifted one of the main hurdles obstructing the way of private 
applicants. The judgment was criticised for its bare reasoning, and it seemed too soon 
for these authors to decide whether this announced a radical change on locus standi of 
private applicants, although it certainly did raise the hopes.267 It was considered an 
important evolution in admissibility of actions, a stepping stone and a decisive step in 
enlarging the notion of individual concern. It was however realised that it should not 
prima facie be sufficient for an applicant to demonstrate some kind of prejudice 
following the adoption of a regulation, but it must be demonstrated that the applicant 
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is supporting an abnormally heavy prejudice peculiar to the applicant and which is not 
supported by other traders.268 
An extensive review of the position after the judgment in Codorniu was offered by A. 
Arnull.269 His article notes the trend of relaxing the standing criteria for challenges 
against administrative acts by private parties in several of the Member States, 
including France and the United Kindgom, while Germany still remained on a more 
restrictive approach. He then argued that the flexibility of the notion of direct and 
individual concern means that much has depended on the construction placed upon 
Article 173 EEC by the ECJ, and the ECJ’s approach has also been influenced by its 
conception of the fundamental characteristics of the Community legal order, an order 
in which the political institutions enjoy extensive legislative powers.270 He found that 
the requirement for individual concern is closely related to the requirement of a 
decision and the test is expressed by the ECJ in basically the same terms whether the 
contested measure takes the form of a regulation or that of a decision.271 
He further asserted that the special cases of competition, anti-dumping and state aid 
where a more relaxed approach had been taken by the Court in considering individual 
concern, all involve quasi-judicial measures taken at the end of a procedure in which 
interested parties may express their views.272 He takes the view that these cases were 
difficult to reconcile with the dominant trend that individual concern does not seem to 
have been based on the effect produced on the applicants by the contested measures. 
While the part played by an applicant in the procedure leading to the adoption of a 
measure is a perfectly proper basis on which to accord standing, it does not of itself 
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establish that the effect on him is qualitatively different from its effect on anyone else 
actually or potentially carrying on the same business. The difficulty of 
accommodating these cases accordingly indicated that there was a need for the Case-
Law to be relaxed, and that Extramet reinforced this indication when it accepted that 
the applicant was individually concerned because it happened to carry on a particular 
activity.273 
He proceeds by noting that the judgment in Codorniu effectively dispensed with the 
obligation to show that a contested measure is by nature a decision. He asserts that the 
judgment was evidently the subject of considerable controversy within the ECJ, based 
on the fact that the opening paragraphs on the standing of private parties to challenge 
regulations are incompatible with the rest of the reasoning, and also that from October 
1992 when AG Lenz gave his opinion judgment was not given until May 1994, as 
well as the fact that in the meantime jurisdiction on direct actions for annulment was 
conferred on the CFI.274 He also offers an interesting analysis on the relationship 
between direct actions for annulment and preliminary references on validity, with 
particular reference the fact that claims by applicants that preliminary references 
made by national courts did not cover all the arguments which had been advanced, did 
not succeed. The ECJ insisted that the fact that the national court is empowered to 
determine which questions it intends to submit to the Court is an inherent feature of 
the system established by the Treaty and is not therefore an argument which is 
capable of justifying a broad interpretation of the conditions of admissibility.275 
Pessimistic approaches about the impact of Codorniu and as to whether this signalled 
a relaxation of individual concern emerged very quickly. One author, M. Hedemann-
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Robinson,276 was quick to argue that such high hopes may well prove to be illusory in 
the short term in the absence of an amendment of the Treaty. He characterises the 
judgment as cursory and clouded in uncertainty on the issue of individual concern, 
unlike the fully reasoned opinion of AG Lenz, and finds it extremely difficult to glean 
any clear rationale from it as to how the impact of legislation on individuals will be 
assessed in order to determine whether they are individually concerned. In his view, 
this lack of guidance combined with the absence of reference to the reasoning of AG 
Lenz in the judgment, renders it of limited value as a precedent.277 He further 
considers that even a formal amendment of the Treaty will be of partial value so long 
as a hierarchy of norms is not established, and the institutions become no longer able 
to choose between regulations, directives and decisions at their discretion278. But he 
considers one thing for certain, that the Court needs to clear the murky waters of 
individual concern, and cannot seriously continue with its half way approach and 
hope to continue to muddle through on an unclear factual and casuistic basis279. 
 
2.4. The calls for reform in UPA and Jego Quere 
 
The calls for reform in 2002, as previously mentioned,280 contained in the Opinion of 
AG Jacobs in UPA281 and subsequently the judgment of the CFI in Jego Quere,282 can 
be seen as a summary of the criticism against the EU judicial review system as it was 
developed under Article 173 EEC and Article 230 EC. It will be recalled that it was 
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argued by AG Jacobs that effective judicial protection dictated that applicants should 
have access to a court that can grant remedies capable of protecting them against the 
effects of invalid acts, and this could only be achieved by a direct action for 
annulment. The preliminary reference mechanism was said to cause delays and 
increased costs, it is not a remedy available as of right, as the national court decides 
whether to refer and on the grounds of the reference and it is also inevitable that 
national courts, even at the highest level which have an obligation to refer, may err in 
their preliminary assessment of the grounds of invalidity put forward and refuse a 
reference.283 Also, in the case of acts of general application without the need for 
implementing measures at national level, an individual may not be able to reach the 
national courts unless he breaks the Law. The ECJ maintained that the Treaty 
established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure 
review of the legality of acts of the institutions and that it was up to the Member 
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States to establish a system which ensures respect for the right to effective judicial 
protection. In other words, it was up to the Member States and their national courts to 
make the preliminary reference route of validity challenges work in a way that 
ensures effective judicial protection of individuals. 
2.4.1. Back to numbers 
Before moving into the academic reception of these developments, it is worth going 
back to the statistical analysis of T. Tridimas and G. Gari, mentioned above.284 It 
should be recalled that the results of this study seem to convey a feeling in line with 
the criticism, that the standing criteria rendered direct actions for annulment 
inadmissible to their vast majority in respect of challenges against measures of 
general application, while at the same time it seems difficult to induce a preliminary 
reference on validity.285 
This study however slightly, if not only very slightly, blurs the point of criticism that 
the preliminary reference route of validity challenges is itself the cause of increased 
delays or the point that it is desirable for reasons of legal certainty that acts are 
reviewed directly within a reasonable time from their adoption, both of which were 
also employed by AG Jacobs and put forward as being contrary to the principle of 
effective judicial protection and as grounds for liberalising the test of individual 
concern.286 
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Their statistical analysis shows287 that 48% of actions for annulment lodged before the 
CFI and 67.6% of those lodged before the ECJ, compared to 61.4% of preliminary 
references on validity, lasted between 18 and 36 months. Only 12.2% of actions 
before the CFI, 2.2% of actions before the ECJ and 9% of preliminary references on 
validity lasted less than 12 months and the majority of these were rejected as 
inadmissible. A good 11.6% and 10.3% of annulment actions before the CFI and the 
ECJ respectively lasted more than 48 months. Only around 7% of preliminary 
references on validity lasted between 42 and 48 months and no preliminary reference 
exceeded 48 months. These results on the length of the proceedings being roughly the 
same for actions for annulment and preliminary references, seem to be corroborated 
by an earlier study by C. Harlow, of cases brought in the years 1995, 1996, 1999 and 
2000, where at that time however, the length of proceedings was significantly less, 
varying from 17.1 months to 23.9 months.288 
These results seem to confirm that the action for annulment is not very fast and that it 
is certainly not faster than a preliminary reference, not taking into account the 
possibility of accelerated and expedited procedures,289 although speed could be 
expected to increase following reform of the EU’s court system.290 It seems a fair 
point that the partial liberalisation of standing in Article 263 TFEU or indeed a bolder 
liberalisation of standing as proposed by AG Jacobs or the CFI cannot have any effect 
on the speed of these proceedings, and accordingly better serve legal certainty as 
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proposed, in terms of the action for annulment being a more suitable procedure for 
having the measures reviewed within a reasonable amount of time. 
In correlation, taking only into consideration the length of the procedure before the 
ECJ and not including the length of the procedure before national courts, the assertion 
that delays and costs entailed in the preliminary reference procedure could themselves 
be contrary to effective judicial protection should also be addressed to annulment 
actions. However, naturally, compared to a direct action for annulment, what makes 
the preliminary reference route of validity challenges a much longer procedure for 
private parties to pursue is the fact that it is additional to national proceedings. In this 
context, it is also fair to say that Member States and national courts can indeed 
contribute and expedite the process and time when they consider whether to send a 
preliminary reference on validity. The closer to issue of proceedings this is 
considered, the speedier will the issue of validity be brought before the ECJ, not even 
excluding the possibility of closely following the speed of a direct action for 
annulment. In this respect, there is the opportunity for example, that one jurisdiction 
may permit national courts to deal with requests for preliminary references on validity 
at an early stage by means of a specialised application for such a preliminary 
reference.291 
It should also be noted that the reluctancy of national courts to refer is also 
statistically documented elsewhere. K.J. Alter interestingly cites a 2000 study by D. 
Chalmers showing a calculation that from a sample from 1972 until 1998, 269 out of 
1088, that is less than 25%, of cases involving EU Law in the United Kingdom were 
actually referred to the CJEU.292 
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2.4.2. The reception of UPA and Jego Quere 
 
A plethora of academic commentaries followed the judgment in UPA,293 with most of 
them strongly critical of the judgments of the ECJ. The ECJ’s long maintained view 
that the Treaties provided a complete system of remedies and procedures which 
ensure review of acts of the institutions and other bodies, has always left a number of 
scholars unconvinced. 
As K. St Clair Bradley put it well before UPA, the “complete system of remedies and 
procedures” which the ECJ considers the Treaties to have established is a creature of 
the ECJ’s own begetting, and the decision to subject acts directly to judicial review is 
one of judicial policy based on a daring schematic interpretation of the institutional 
provisions as a whole. However, the author continued, a system of judicial protection 
cannot be said to be complete simply because all acts can be submitted to the ECJ for 
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a decision. It must also mean that the parties whose rights are affected necessarily 
have the possibility of initiating the procedure for the determination of those rights.294 
The author puts forward the argument that since the ECJ considers the Community to 
be based on the Rule of Law it should allow the European Parliament to issue 
annulment proceedings, arguing that it would otherwise be difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the ECJ’s use of the term “complete system of judicial remedies and 
procedures” partakes of the logic of Humpty Dumpty in “Alice through the Looking 
Glass”, that the phrase means what the Court chooses it to mean.295 
Others have been more sympathetic with the Court’s approach, like J. Schwarze,296 
arguing that it was not easy for the Court to ignore its previous Case-Law and the 
wording of the Treaty in order to introduce a universal right to judicial protection 
against measures of general application. He accordingly considers the UPA judgment 
to be within the limits of judge-made Law, and blames the unclear formulation of 
Article 230(4) EC as detrimental to an effective system of judicial protection. In his 
view, any attempt for reform should aim to provide more clarity, easier application, 
take into account the individual’s need for judicial protection and balance it with the 
scope of discretion required and enjoyed by the institutions. He sees that a 
differentiation between decisions and acts of general application remains a suitable 
solution, and these two basic forms of measures have to be distinguished by 
substantive criteria in order to prevent abuses based on choice of measure. With 
regards to acts of general application he sees a further distinction as appropriate, 
between regulations issued by the Commission and regulations issued by the “true 
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legislature”, the Council and Parliament. He asserts that the individual’s judicial 
protection should be enhanced by granting a remedy for objections only to regulations 
issued by the Commission. As for regulations with Law-like character, an exception 
should only be made for anti-dumping regulations issued by the Council, as their 
content is mainly administrative in nature. He even puts forward a formulation for a 
reform, that proceedings are also admissible against regulations issued by the 
Commission and anti-dumping regulations issued by the Council, as long as they 
directly concern the complainant. He notes that such a differentiation of judicial 
protection against legislative and administrative measures is also supported by a 
comparison of the legal systems of the Member States, where remedies against 
legislative measures, if available at all, need to satisfy stricter admissibility conditions 
than against measures of the executive. These differences are justified by the notion of 
stronger democratic legitimacy of legislative measures. He does however 
acknowledge the counterargument that such a sharp differentiation between the 
legislature and the executive does not exist at EU level.297 
The different ways in which the right to effective judicial protection affected the 
ECJ’s view and the opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA is analysed by P. Craig in a 2009 
article.298 He finds the case fascinating because both, as well as the CFI in Jego 
Quere, took this right expressly into account but accorded to it a markedly different 
role. He sees the opinion of AG Jacobs as a classic example of the use of background 
rights and principles as a mechanism for the reassessment of existing doctrine. He 
also considers it a reality that the right to effective judicial protection had not featured 
significantly in the Case-Law on locus standi, but more commonly been part of the 
reasoning in cases concerned with the effectiveness of national remedial protection. 
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The ECJ concluded its judgment by reaffirming its major premise, and the secondary, 
limited role that was played by the right to effective judicial protection. This 
secondary role was moreover interpretative in a minimalist sense, but could not have 
any greater impact since this would, in the view of the ECJ, entail the setting aside of 
a Treaty condition.299 He accepts it was perfectly reasonable for the ECJ to frame its 
analysis on the express premise that the Treaty provided for a complete system of 
remedies, but sees three major difficulties. The first are the difficulties of the 
preliminary reference route are in part procedural, as analysed by AG Jacobs, and in 
part substantive, in that the individual may not be able to challenge a measure before 
the national courts unless he contravenes it. Secondly, the ECJ, while not responding 
to these difficulties, sought to circumvent them by saying that it is for the Member 
States to apply national procedure rules in such a way so as to enable such indirect 
challenges, but such a strategy is of limited utility and cannot resolve the inherent 
difficulties of the preliminary reference route. Thirdly, the increased use of the 
preliminary reference route will entail more workload for the ECJ, which seems 
contrary to the reason for establishing the CFI, in order to allow the ECJ to deal with 
more important issues than matters of validity which do not really need to go to the 
top court of the Union.300 
He sees that the prospect of reforming the Case-Law on direct challenges raises two 
issues, legitimacy and practicality. On the issue of legitimacy, the ECJ considered that 
a reinterpretation of the concept of individual concern required a Treaty amendment, 
as it would otherwise have the effect of setting aside a condition expressly laid down 
in the Treaty. But he finds this unconvincing in view of the willingness of the ECJ to 
stretch the meaning of several provisions through teleological interpretation in order 
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to obtain the Community’s goals. Also, it is the meaning accorded to individual 
concern by the ECJ that was an issue, and Plaumann is not the only possible 
interpretation of individual concern, so there is in reality no reason why a different 
test like the one based on substantial adverse impact cannot be a legitimate reading of 
that notion. Considering practicality, the fear is the workload that can be generated for 
the EU courts by a more liberal test. However, he finds four reasons why this should 
not preclude such a shift. The first is that the Community prides itself as being based 
on the Rule of Law, so it is axiomatic to such an order that there should be proper 
mechanisms for the control of legality. It is right and proper in normative terms that 
those who have suffered some substantial adverse impact should have access to 
judicial review, and such a test is no more liberal than that which prevails in most 
domestic legal orders. The workload generated is a proper consequence of a system 
based on the Rule of Law. Secondly, there is no reason why such a change should 
necessarily entail an increased workload since the preliminary reference alternative 
can lead to a similar workload. Thirdly, this assumption seems to be based on the fear 
that there will be numerous challenges to a measure, but this ignores the possibility of 
cases being joined and also the fact that once the EU courts decide one claim this 
could be the end of the matter unless another applicant could raise some new legal 
argument. Fourthly, it must also be recognised that the EU courts may nevertheless 
influence the number of actions through the standards of review that they apply. The 
fact that the applicants have a relatively high hurdle to surmount in order to win on 
the substance of the case will have an impact on the number of actions brought.301 
The point that since the notion of individual concern was not defined in the Treaty it 
was perfectly open to the ECJ to adopt a flexible construction as it has done in 
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relation to numerous other Treaty concepts and even in the context of Article 230 EC 
itself, is repeated by A. Albors-Llorens.302 She favoured the test proposed by AG 
Jacobs as more realistic in economic terms than the one suggested in Jego Quere, 
arguing that it would increase legal certainty. In contrast, she thought that the test 
proposed by the CFI would leave scope for further debate and interpretation, as 
questions would soon have followed as to when a measure restricted a right or 
imposed an obligation.303 She criticises the judgment of the ECJ as the 
reinterpretation of the test would not signify a departure from the wording of Article 
230 EC, in contrast to the bolder, if less publicised, step it took when it accepted 
challenges against general acts. She acknowledges that the judgment does not 
convincingly demonstrate that the ECJ opposes a relaxation of standing, but only that 
it considers this the task of the Member States, and notes that the ECJ had previously 
suggested amendments as early as 1975 and for the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference, which fell on deaf ears.304 
It is acknowledged by M. Granger that although opening wider the gates of EU courts 
to private parties for the purpose of controlling more closely the action of the EU 
institutions may appear as a growing priority in a Communauté de droit, such a 
development requires careful consideration. It is argued that there is a delicate 
equilibrium to be found between the various objectives, such as the protection of 
individuals, the respect for the Rule of Law, the effectiveness of EU decision making, 
the principle of legal certainty, the coherence of the system of judicial remedies and 
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the EU and national courts’ missions and workloads.305 She draws a parallel with the 
test proposed by the CFI in Jego Quere to the French concept of an acte faisant grief 
which is the main admissibility requirement for judicial review of administrative acts 
in French Law, recalling that the action for annulment was originally modelled on the 
French recours pour exces de pouvoir. She then argues that since the drafting of the 
Treaty of Rome, the scope and intensity of Community action has expanded far 
beyond what was envisaged at the time, but the ECJ has recognised that the Treaty is 
a living instrument which can be adapted to changing circumstances and needs.306 She 
sees that the test of the CFI would open wider the gates to individuals but would not 
go as far as accepting actio popularis, and does not greatly help interest groups or 
associations. In addition, the effect of the measure must be definite, something which 
excludes effects which are only potential. The effect must also be immediate, 
although the meaning of this is not evident from the judgment. In comparison with the 
test of AG Jacobs, she considers that that test seemed to include any kind of potential 
effects, something which would enable interest groups to lodge actions.307 On the 
litigation flood argument, she considers that reasonable private parties will be 
dissuaded in pursuing actions that have limited potential of success on the merits and 
are unlikely to invest their time and money in such actions. Also, there is the 
procedural possibility of managing such claims internally by the Courts and disposing 
them more efficiently.308 
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3. Measuring “effective” judicial protection 
 
It can easily be seen from this sample of the academic reception of the judgments in 
UPA and Jego Quere, that reactions varied from critical to more nuanced views. This 
comes as a natural consequence of one of the contemporary realities,309 that there are 
no clear measures against which to measure the effectiveness of the judicial system 
and that there is no clarity to the concept of effective judicial protection, at least when 
it comes to the question of access to justice in judicial review proceedings. As a 
result, how one views the system is, to a degree, a subjective opinion, and 
consequently, from one’s standpoint the system may appear effective, whereas it may 
appear completely ineffective to another. In this light, and in view of the lack of 
clarity as to what actually constitutes effective judicial protection in terms of access to 
justice, the argument could be maintained that the CJEU should be considered as right 
in accepting, or at least cannot be blamed for accepting, that the judicial review 
system ensures respect for this right. 
Yet again, this may seem too simplistic an idea or conclusion in a modern system or 
in the EU as it is perceived today. It seems rather based on an approach that the 
system need only be “effective enough”, and the consequent presumption that the EU 
should tolerate even the least effective system of judicial protection. Meaning that 
there is no need for the most effective system of judicial protection in the EU, not 
even for a mediocre or averagely effective one, but the least effective system of 
judicial protection suffices. Put this way, this conclusion seems rather unsatisfactory. 
Without disregarding the fact that this argument does not refer to mere existence of 
judicial protection, but to effective judicial protection, although to the least effective 
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judicial protection, this statement leaves a negative impression. It turns the focus on 
the borderline of what can be considered as effective, with the consequent effect that 
when considering borderline cases, something which appears effective to some, may 
not appear effective to others. And it so appears that this is the position where the 
CJEU has put this matter, and itself, in relation to the question of the effectiveness of 
the judicial review system. A position which seems totally different to the impression 
it created of itself when it comes to the protection of individual rights in other areas of 
EU activity. 
In view of the above, it would seem more welcome had there been some requirement 
that such borderline interpretations are avoided. But this is indeed a question that 
seems to lead to problems once again. Such a venture would necessarily begin with a 
reinterpretation of what constitutes effective judicial protection when it comes to 
access to justice. To which there is no answer, or yardstick against which to measure 
effectiveness. Naturally there has to be a lowest in each measure or notion, and one 
necessarily has to be defined in this notion of effectiveness of access to justice. 
Something which is difficult to achieve, but seems unavoidable. 
Accordingly, any requirement to avoid such borderline cases has to be based 
necessarily on some additional requirement to the notion of effectiveness. And this 
begs the question as to what such a requirement could be. One argument could be that 
in a modern system of a modern union such as the EU in the 21st century, there should 
be a requirement of “substantially” effective judicial protection. Yet such an 
additional notion seems again to leave much to be desired and to lead to other grey 
and uncertain areas of its own. And it may also be criticised for not offering any more 
clarity than the concept of the effectiveness itself, leading in its turn to questions as to 
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what degree of effectiveness or protection would be considered as substantial, in 
which case there will again be no measure or yardstick to measure this against. 
An alternative argument could be based on a requirement that the system 
“undeniably” or “clearly” or “uncontroversially” offers effective judicial protection. 
This may seem better placed to set a requirement that borderline interpretations have 
to be avoided. It does seem to entail the necessity that one judges the effectiveness of 
the system, and consequently measures what he perceives as the lowest, but also 
needs to add something to it in order to bring it within a higher level of protection. By 
the use of such words, an interpretation needs to move to a higher than the lowest 
effective judicial protection, effectively creating something that no one should be able 
to say, or at least easily argue, that is not effective. This seems not so reliant on any 
measurement of the threshold for effectiveness, although of course it cannot be denied 
that some such degree of subjective opinion is unavoidable. It could however act as a 
requirement that borderline interpretations should be avoided. It leads to a 
requirement akin to proof beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Law, in that what it 
requires is interpretations and remedies that establish effective judicial protection 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
There is however no such requirement of an additional element that would push any 
interpretation away from borderline cases, but this was hardly based on any Treaty 
provision or other provision that is binding on the CJEU. It is, as aforesaid, all a 
matter of policy choice of the CJEU and how it perceives the effectiveness of 
protection in a given area. The possibility to move away from borderline 
interpretations can also appear evident from the comparison between the judgments in 
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Jego Quere and Unibet, also highlighted previously.310 In Jego Quere, the ECJ 
effectively accepted that effective judicial protection exists even though a private 
party may need to break the Law in order to obtain access to a court in order to 
attempt a challenge against an EU measure by means of a preliminary reference, 
whereas in Unibet, it denied that effective judicial protection existed where national 
Law had a similar effect of requiring a private party to break the Law in order to 
obtain access to a court to challenge the national implementing measure. In Jego 
Quere the Court was moving along the borderline of what could be considered as 
effective, whereas in Unibet it chose to move towards a safer interpretation under 
almost identical circumstances. This example demonstrates that there can indeed be a 
move to safer interpretations, by moving away from borderline interpretations where 
the element or the influence of subjective opinion is stronger. 
At this stage, and before continuing to the consideration of the effect of the reform in 
Article 263(4) TFEU, it is important to explore briefly the requirements of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
as well as considerations based on the Rule of Law, that are relevant to the issue of 
access to justice and locus standi for judicial review. It is also important to consider 
the possible justification of the locus standi rules as developed by the CJEU, and also 
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4. The ECHR 
 
The provisions of the ECHR that relate to access to justice are found in Article 6 
ECHR which provides for the right to a fair trial and Article 13 ECHR which provides 
for the right to an effective remedy. 
 
4.1. Article 6 ECHR 
 
The relevant part of Article 6 ECHR provides that in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by Law. A basic premise is that the legal proceedings available 
must provide a remedy capable of addressing someone’s contentions on the merits.311 
It can be invoked in constitutional proceedings to the extent that these have a decisive 
bearing on a dispute concerning a civil right.312 
Despite the lack of an explicit guarantee of right of access to a court, this has been 
firmly established by the European Court of Human Rights in Golder v. United 
Kingdom,313 on the basis that it would be inconceivable that Article 6(1) could offer 
procedural guarantees, yet that it should not first protect that which alone makes it in 
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fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. Legal 
certainty, which is also an aspect of the Rule of Law, is identified as one of the 
components of the right of access to a court, which is considered as impaired when 
the rules cease to serve the aims of legal certainty and the proper administration of 
justice, and form a sort of barrier preventing a litigant from having his case 
determined on the merits by the competent court.314 The right exists in private 
litigation or claims against the state, including claims arising out of administrative 
decisions.315 
The right of access means access in fact as well as access in Law, and under Golder it 
is a right to effective access to the courts.316 
The right of access to a court is however not absolute and may be subject to 
limitations because the right itself by its very nature calls for regulation by the state. 
The limitations applied should not restrict or reduce access in such a way or to such 
an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired, and in any event, all 
limitations must pursue a legitimate aim and there must also be a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
achieved.317 Court costs, restrictions on the right to bring proceedings by particular 
categories of litigants, restrictions of abusive litigants and limitation periods have 
been accepted as proper limitations on access to a court.318 
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It should be stressed that the ECHR does not guarantee any right to have a case 
referred by a domestic court to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 
TFEU, but a refusal of a request for a preliminary ruling may infringe the fairness of 
the proceedings if it appears to be arbitrary. As also mentioned above, the European 
Court of Human Rights has held that Article 6(1) ECHR imposes an obligation on 
national courts to give reasons for any decision refusing such referral, with reference 
to the CJEU’s Case-Law.319 
Another guarantee offered by Article 6(1) ECHR is that of a trial within a reasonable 
time. The concept of reasonable time seems to be vague however. As W. Schabas 
characteristically quotes, reasonable time is a roguish thing, and rather like the 
Chancellor’s foot it may be long or short, or indeterminate, depending upon many 
factors. Attempting to set guidelines for application of the principle of trial within a 
reasonable time, the Case-Law does little more than proclaim that this is to be 
assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.320 
 
4.2. Article 13 ECHR 
 
Article 13 ECHR provides for the right to an effective remedy, formulated that 
everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated, shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. It requires the 
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national authorities to ensure that there is a domestic remedy that allows the 
competent national authority to address the substance of a complaint under the 
Convention and provide appropriate relief. It is said to provide an additional 
guarantee for a person in order to ensure that he effectively enjoys the rights conferred 
by the Convention.321 The remedy must be effective in practice as well as in Law, in 
particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts 
or omissions of the State.322 It has however been decided that the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 13 ECHR does not guarantee a remedy allowing a challenge to 
primary legislation before a national authority, on the ground that it is contrary to the 
Convention.323 
It is also worth noting that Article 13 ECHR has been interpreted in the light of the 
principle of subsidiarity. It has been considered as fundamental to the machinery of 
protection established by the Convention that the national systems themselves provide 
redress for breaches of its provisions, with the European Court of Human Rights 
exercising a supervisory role subject to the principle of subsidiarity.324 
Article 13 ECHR is related to the rights to access to a court and to trial within a 
reasonable time under Article 6(1) ECHR.325 It is notable for the purposes of this 
discussion that in Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France326, in the context of challenges 
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against administrative acts, the European Court of Human Rights held that an 
individual is entitled to expect a coherent system that would achieve a fair balance 
between the authorities’ interests and his own, and in particular he should have had a 
clear, practical and effective opportunity to challenge an administrative act that was a 
direct interference with his right. A test which A. Ward argued the EU judicial review 
system would fail as it seemed impossible to attain the level of coherence required, 
mainly due to the complexity of the locus standi rules and the relationship between an 
action for annulment and preliminary reference validity review, as well as in view of 
the parallel systems of implementation which are split in many areas between EU and 
national authorities.327 
It is observed that a cumulation of possible channels of redress in the national legal 
system must be taken into account when deciding whether an applicant has an 
effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13, rather than examining any or each 
procedure in isolation.328 The European Court of Human Rights in Leander v. 
Sweden329 stated that it was a general principle of Article 13 ECHR that although no 
single remedy may itself entirely satisfy its requirements, the aggregate of remedies 
provided for may do so. In the same judgment the European Court of Human Rights 
further stated that the individual applicant must have a bona fide opportunity to have 
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4.3. Bosphorus and the EU preliminary reference mechanism 
 
It should further be noted that the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus 
Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland330 considered the preliminary reference system of the 
EU, and noted that while the ECJ’s role is limited to responding to the question 
referred by the national court, the response will often be determinative of the domestic 
proceedings and detailed guidelines on the timing and content of a preliminary 
reference have been laid down by the Treaty. It also noted the parties to the domestic 
proceedings have the right to put their case to the ECJ during the preliminary 
reference procedure, finding that in such circumstances, the protection of fundamental 
rights by EU Law can be considered to be equivalent to that the of ECHR system. The 
European Court of Human Rights had also noted the restrictive locus standi 
provisions for a direct action for annulment, without having to pronounce on that 
aspect.331 
A more critical, but concurring separate judgment was given by Judge Ress in 
Bosphorus. While subscribing to the finding that an effective protection of 
fundamental rights exists within the EU including those guaranteed by the ECHR, 
even if the access of individuals to the ECJ is rather limited as the European Court of 
Human Rights has recognised, if not criticised, Judge Ress noted that the European 
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Court of Human Rights has not addressed the question whether this limited access is 
really in accordance with Article 6(1) ECHR and whether the provisions of Article 
173 EC as it then was, should not be interpreted more extensively in the light of 
Article 6(1) ECHR, a point that was in issue in Jego Quere. The judge emphasised 
that one should not infer from the findings of the Court that the Court accepts that 
Article 6(1) ECHR does not call for a more extensive interpretation. Judge Ress 
continued that since the guarantees of the ECHR only establish obligations “of 
result”, without specifying the means to be used, it seems possible to conclude that the 
protection of fundamental rights, including those of the ECHR, by EU Law can be 
considered as equivalent, even if the protection of the ECHR by the ECJ is not a 
direct one but rather an indirect one through different sources of Law, namely the 
general principles of EU Law. This separate judgment of Judge Ress also noted that 
the criticism has sometimes been made that these general principles do not fulfil the 
required standard of protection as interpreted by the ECJ, as they are limited by 
considerations of the general public interest of the EU, and this renders it difficult for 
the ECJ to find violations of these general principles. In the judge’s view, one cannot 
say for once and for all that in relation to all ECHR rights, there is a presumption of 
compliance because of the mere formal protection by the ECJ, and it may be expected 
that the Charter of Fundamental Rights may enhance and clarify this level of control 
for the future. 
It has been suggested that Court in Bosphorus misinterpreted the position of 
individuals in the preliminary reference procedure, in considering that the parties to 
domestic proceedings have the right to put their case to the CJEU, as no such right 
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exists.332 It is of course the national court that frames the questions that will be 
referred to the ECJ, and the parties have no right to intervene, apart from their 
submissions to the court before these questions are framed. However, they have a 
right to make their submissions to the ECJ on the questions referred. 
 
4.4. EU accession to the ECHR 
 
The accession of the EU to the ECHR,333 despite being an obligation in Article 6(2) 
TEU following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, is at a halt after the Opinion of the 
of the Full Court of the ECJ of 18/12/2014,334 declaring the draft accession agreement 
as incompatible with EU Law.335 To some this appeared as bringing about a definitive 
stop to the accession process,336 but it has also been argued there is little choice other 
than to proceed with EU accession to the ECHR,337 although there seems to be need 
for amendments of the Treaties or the Draft Accession Agreement. The future seems 
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unknown at present as to accession and as to the relationship between the two courts, 
the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights.338 
It has been eloquently described that upon accession, the EU will be institutionally 
bound by the ECHR, which will have the same characteristics as EU primary Law, 
and the EU will accordingly be subject to its supervision, making it possible for 
individuals to bring complaints directly against it and for the preferential treatment 
under Bosphorus to be lifted.339 The core of the Bosphorus doctrine was also deduced 
to say that measures that a state has adopted in the implementation of obligations 
imposed on it as a member of an international organisation it has joined after acceding 
to the ECHR will be presumed to be compatible with the ECHR if the said 
organisation protects human rights in a way that could be considered as equivalent to 
their guarantee under the ECHR, but such presumption is not absolute.340 It was 
argued that this seeks to ensure that the ECHR will not be an obstacle to further 
European integration by the creation of the EU as a supranational organisation.341 
A point identified by A. Ward should also be noted. The period it takes for the ECJ to 
return preliminary reference questions sent by a national court of a Member State that 
is also a state party to the ECHR, cannot be counted in calculating whether there has 
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been unreasonable delay in proceedings in breach of Article 6(1) ECHR.342 In the 
case cited, a preliminary reference took around two and a half years to complete, and 
it was noted by the European Court of Human Rights that this appeared relatively 
long, but to take it into account would adversely affect the preliminary reference 
system instituted by the then Article 177 EEC and work against the aim pursued in 
substance of that Article.343 
Mention should also be made of the effect accession would have in relation to the 
issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35(1) ECHR. The European 
Court of Human Rights has held that the general rule is that Article 35(1) ECHR does 
not necessitate an applicant to make use of remedies which are inadmissible according 
to domestic Laws or settled legal opinions of the domestic state.344 The potential 
problems in relation to the action for annulment, being now the principal, and after 
accession the main domestic remedy against EU acts, have been identified by P. Gragl 
to relate to the potential complexity as to the admissibility of an action for annulment 
under the reformed Article 263(4) TFEU and the uncertainty created therefrom.345 
Another important problem in relation to Article 35(1) ECHR after accession is also 
identified by P. Gragl, in that it is not yet clear whether the preliminary reference 
procedure under Article 267 TFEU is a necessary requirement under the exhaustion of 
national remedies rule, and it is not yet also clear what the scope of Article 267 TFEU 
will be considered to be under the ECHR lens and how it may coherently adjudicate 
on this matter in relation to Article 6 ECHR.346 The European Commission on Human 
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Rights has held in Divagsa347 that the refusal of a national court to request a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU may infringe the fairness of the proceedings under 
Article 6 ECHR, something that leads P. Gragl to consider this as meaning that the 
preliminary reference proceedings are integral to national proceedings. It is however 
noted that no complaint based on a refusal to refer has yielded any noteworthy results 
so far, although it has been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights348 that 
there may be circumstances in which such a refusal by a national court might 
constitute a violation, particularly where it appears to be arbitrary.349 
A joint statement by the Presidents of the two courts recognises the complexity of the 
situation where if, for whatever reason, a reference for a preliminary ruling were not 
made, the European Court of Human Rights would be required to adjudicate on an 
application calling into question provisions of EU Law without the CJEU having the 
opportunity to review the consistency of that law with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. While it is stated that in all 
probability that situation should not arise often, it is recognised that the fact remains 
that it is foreseeable that such a situation might arise because the preliminary ruling 
procedure may be launched only by national courts and tribunals, to the exclusion of 
the parties, who are admittedly in a position to suggest a reference for a preliminary 
ruling, but do not have the power to require it. It is then expressly stated that this 
means that the reference for a preliminary ruling is normally not a legal remedy to be 
exhausted by the applicant before referring the matter to the European Court of 
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Human Rights.350 The preliminary reference procedure has also been treated similarly 
under the Draft Accession Agreement.351 
A solution was given to this in the Draft Accession Agreement, with the co-
respondent mechanism. Under Article 3(2) of the Draft Accession Agreement, when 
an application is directed against an EU Member State, the EU may become a co-
respondent if it appears that the compatibility of EU Law with the ECHR is called 
into question. Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement then provides that where 
the CJEU has not had an opportunity to assess the compatibility with ECHR rights of 
a provision of EU Law, then it shall be afforded sufficient time to do so. This solution 
was however among the provisions found incompatible with the Treaties by the CJEU 
in Opinion 2/13 because, first, it did not reserve exclusively to the CJEU the power to 
rule on whether the CJEU has already dealt with an issue, and second, it did not 
permit the CJEU to rule on the interpretation, but only on the validity, of EU Law. 
 
5. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights was given legal effect under the Lisbon Treaty 
and has been recognised under Article 6(1) TEU to have the same legal value as the 
Treaties. The Charter is addressed to the EU and will also apply to the Member States 
when implementing EU Law. It applies to all EU activities that relate to the 
implementation or application of EU Law. The Preamble of the Charter refers to the 
Charter as reaffirming the rights that result in particular from the constitutional 
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traditions common to the Member States, the ECHR and the general principles of EU 
Law.352 
The relevant parts of Article 47 of the Charter, provide that, under its first paragraph, 
everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Law of the Union are violated 
as the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
it lays down, and, under its second paragraph, that everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by Law. Under an Explanatory Note issued, the first paragraph 
of Article 47 of the Charter is based on Article 13 ECHR, and its second paragraph is 
meant to have the same meaning and scope as the second paragraph of Article 6 
ECHR.353 This Explanatory Note further states that in EU Law, the protection 
afforded is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a 
court, and the CJEU enshrined this right as a general principle of EU Law.354 It 
however also clarifies that Article 47 of the Charter has not been intended to change 
the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules 
relating to the admissibility for direct actions for annulment otherwise than under the 
reformed part of Article 263(4) TFEU. 
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It has been noted by D. Shelton that the right to a remedy, or the obligation to provide 
a remedy when human rights are violated is expressly guaranteed by most global and 
regional human rights instruments, which effectively guarantee the same two 
requisites of a remedy that are set forth in Article 47, these being the procedural right 
of effective access to a fair hearing, and the substantive right to adequate redress.355 
At the same time, D. Shelton further notes that the EU right to a fair hearing is wider 
than Article 6(1) ECHR in that it may be relied upon by parties alleging a violation of 
any right conferred upon them by EU Law, and not only in respect of rights 
guaranteed by the Charter, this being the consequence of the fact that the EU is a 
community based on the Rule of Law.356 
Article 47 of the Charter, along with Article 19(1) TEU,357 effectively incorporate the 
right to effective judicial protection, which is one of the general principles of EU 
Law,358 and in essence guarantees a right to obtain a remedy in a competent court. 
Along the lines of Article 13 ECHR, this remedy must be effective both in Law and in 
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practice.359 It seems rightly argued that there are, and should be, several aspects of the 
right to effective judicial protection, one of which is the requirement of actual access 
to courts, which are independent, impartial and competent to rule on both fact and 
Law, and that this possibility of applying to a court may not be restricted or denied 
altogether.360 
It has also rightly been observed that the repeated declaration by the CJEU that the 
right to effective judicial protection is one of the general principles of EU Law, 
stemming from the constitutional traditions of the Member States, gives very little 
guidance as to the specific contents of that right, the constraints to which it may 
subject, and the way it should be balanced with other conflicting interests.361 It has 
also interestingly been noted that while the right to effective judicial protection lacks 
such certainty in comparison to the ECHR jurisprudence,362 the CJEU’s continued 
reliance on this concept when Member States are required to protect this right and EU 
Law rights in general, makes it seem that there is no reason in Law or in logic to deny 
individuals access to the same type of sanctions when they challenge EU measures.363 
Despite the entry into force of the Charter, the problematic nature of locus standi for 
an action for annulment under Article 263(4) TFEU is however still in place.364 
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6. The Rule of Law 
 
The Rule of Law is said to underline all jurisprudence relating to access to justice 
both in the EU and ECHR.365 As F.G. Jacobs reiterates, the Rule of Law is universally 
recognised as a fundamental value, but there is not universal agreement about what it 
means, nor is there agreement about how it can be reconciled with other competing 
values, like the requirements of democratic government.366 He continues that there are 
two aspects of the Rule of Law, the formal and the substantive. Formally, it requires 
that the exercise of power, and accordingly all acts of the public authorities, are, with 
narrow exceptions, subject to review by the courts to ensure that the exercise was 
authorised by Law.367 
Although recognised that there is no clear definition, and that it is even less clear what 
the Rule of Law means in an EU context,368 among the basic elements deduced by A. 
Arnull is that there should be an independent and impartial judiciary with 
responsibility for resolving disputes over precisely what the Law requires and 
providing effective remedies where the Law is breached.369 Noting further that there 
remain several respects in which observance of the Rule of Law in the EU remains 
imperfect, and access to the Courts is one of the most pressing concerns, especially in 
the case of direct actions for annulment.370 In a very useful summary, it is stated that 
the basic elements of the Rule of Law are, on a view, purely technical, in that that 
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they are concerned with the form rather than the content of the Law and with the 
mechanics of the legal system. There is also a view that the Rule of Law does not 
extend further than this, and that the notion is just one of the virtues which a legal 
system may possess and by which it is to be judged. And those who have this 
conception of the Rule of Law say that the content of the rules is a matter of 
substantive justice, which is an independent ideal, in no sense part of the Rule of Law. 
However, the notion is sometimes used in a wider sense to embrace aspects of 
substantive content, often implying something about the rights of the individual. The 
dividing line between the formal and the substantive conception of the Rule of Law 
can be difficult to draw, not least because some of the technical elements of the Rule 
of Law are regarded as fundamental rights.371 
In another useful statement, recognising that the Rule of Law is a classic example of 
an essentially contested concept and that the EU is seemingly as hopeless at defining 
it, D. Kochenov considers that it is clear what the Rule of Law is not, and it is not 
democracy, the protection of human rights or other wonderful things, each of them 
existing independently of the Rule of Law, and it is not mere legality which is 
adherence to the Law. A strong notion in the Rule of Law tradition is that it is 
absolutely hostile to the untrammelled exercise of power, bringing the basic meaning 
of the Rule of Law down to the idea of subordination of the Law to another kind of 
Law which is not up to the sovereign to change at will.372 
Nevertheless, it has also been argued that most general principles, including the Rule 
of Law, have clear cores and contestable margins, and that it is no argument against 
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the existence of the clear core that one can imagine cases at the margins over which 
one can reasonably argue.373 
In an extensive examination, L. Pech374 notes that the Rule of Law has become, in the 
light of multiple references to it, an overarching and primary principle of EU 
Constitutional Law. The concept, which is regularly equated with the idea of a 
government of Laws, not of men, enjoys widespread support and an undeniable high 
degree of consensus, not least because of its lack of a definition and the consequent 
dissensus as to its meaning, something which of course is not a problem peculiar to 
the EU.375 It is something commonly left to the courts, and similarly to most national 
courts, the CJEU views the Rule of Law as an umbrella principle which can be relied 
on as an interpretative guide and as a source from which more specific legal standards 
can be derived.376 This absence of a definition has had the consequence of allowing or 
even obliging the CJEU to flesh out a definition, leading to the developments in the 
area of judicial review, where the statement that all acts of the institutions shall be 
subject to review was welcomed.377 It is characteristically noted that, on the other 
hand, the concept has not convinced the CJEU to relax locus standi for direct actions 
for annulment, and indeed the question whether the Rule of Law can be relied on to 
justify an unconditional right of access for individuals deserves a negative answer, but 
that is not to say that there is no room for improvement.378 
Closely related to the Rule of Law discussion are considerations of judicial or legal 
accountability, which is more important in the EU given the democratic deficit 
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issues.379 As rather classically stated, to secure accountability, the introduction of a 
neutral third party, the judge, is perceived as necessary, and this intervention can take 
place in several forms, such as criminal proceedings or judicial review proceedings.380 
Similar considerations as under the Rule of Law apply in subjecting legislative and 
administrative action to judicial review.381 
 
7. Justifications of the standing rules 
 
With the above in mind, and before proceeding to the examination of the Lisbon 
Treaty reform, the possible justifications of the locus standi rules as developed by the 
CJEU also demand consideration. The starting point should of course be some of the 
rather classic works on the function and justifications of locus standi rules in Public 
Law theory. This is followed by a consideration of the possible justifications for the 
locus standi rules as developed in the judicial review system, ending with an 
assessment of these from the standpoint of the individual. 
 
7.1. Locus standi rules in Public Law Theory 
 
To P. Cane, in Public Law actions, the interests of the individual are in conflict with 
the interests of the government, which, at least in democratic theory, represent the 
aggregates of the interests of a majority of citizens. Rules on standing require the 
applicant to say why he should be allowed to come to court to enforce one of the 
values given effect to by the substantive grounds of review of administrative 
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action,382 and they should be used only to ensure that an appropriate applicant is 
before the courts.383 
Conversely, D. Feldman sees that when litigation raises issues which go beyond the 
material interests of the litigants or those whom they claim to represent, the courts 
face major political and constitutional choices, and also have to answer the question 
whether litigation in the public interest will be the prerogative of the state and its 
organs or whether it will be the right of some or all citizens. The answer to such a 
question depends on the model of the constitution the judges adopt. If they have a 
statist or elitist view, they will tend to give the state or members of a ruling elite a 
monopoly in deciding where the public interest lies and enforcing it. If they see the 
constitution as based on a participatory political theory, public interest litigation by 
individuals or groups may be more acceptable. However, if everyone is permitted to 
raise public interest issues, litigation becomes an alternative or a supplement to 
orthodox political processes, taking the courts beyond their core function of 
adjudicating on individuals’ rights and duties. If judicial review is legitimate in a 
democracy if it bolsters participation and limits the impact of a lack of access to, or 
voice in, the political system, the judge will need to decide what sort of participation 
or representation in politics is required by the constitutional scheme. And such 
questions are likely to turn on ideas about the role of citizens in politics.384 
Put rather differently by S. Freeman, inevitably one’s view regarding the democratic 
legitimacy or role of judicial review must turn upon how he conceives of democracy, 
and according to one common view, what democracy essentially involves is equal 
consideration of and responsiveness to everyone’s interests in deliberations on Laws 
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and social policies.385 The standard basis for objecting to judicial review is that it is 
inconsistent with democracy and the majority rule in that judicial reversals of majority 
decisions violate the basic democratic principle of equal consideration of everyone’s 
interests, which majority procedures are designed to accommodate,386 but he argues 
that this is based on a misconception of the nature of legislative power and a short 
sighted conception of democracy, whereas there is nothing undemocratic about 
judicial review of Laws that infringe equality of fundamental rights.387 
While not making an unconditional argument, J. Waldron criticises judicial review, as 
being politically illegitimate as far as democratic values are concerned mainly by 
privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable 
judges.388 He also builds an argument that rights are not better protected by judicial 
review than in democratic legislatures or procedures, but his focus in these assertions 
is on judicial review of primary legislation enacted by an elected legislature of a 
polity, not judicial review of executive action or administrative rulemaking, the 
judicial review of which is widely accepted and a requirement of the Rule of Law.389 
To receive a reply by R.H. Fallon, presenting arguments that although courts are not 
better overall at identifying rights violations than are legislatures, they have a 
perspective that makes them more likely to apprehend serious risks to some kinds of 
fundamental rights which are morally more disturbing than errors that result in 
erroneous overenforcement of fundamental rights. The argument is made that a 
judicial review system can be so designed that the total moral costs of such 
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overenforcement will be lower than those that would result from the 
underenforcement that would occur in the absence of judicial review.390 
 
7.2. The choice for locus standi in the EU judicial review system 
 
In considering the EU judicial review system and locus standi of private parties, the 
starting point has to be the statement that the general rule is that in an international 
legal order dominated by states, the individual citizen is generally viewed as lacking 
international legal capacity, and accordingly cannot appear, apart from very limited 
exceptions, in an international forum to advance his rights.391 
The possible justifications of the standing rules in the EU system were examined by 
C. Harding, who makes interesting observations. In the first place, he states that an 
individual is just one of an indeterminate number of persons affected by a regulation, 
so that his interest in the annulment would be proportionately small and uncertain. 
Secondly, the annulment of a legislative act is potentially more disruptive of 
established interests so that a private party’s proportionately small interest in a general 
measure does not justify his being able to set in motion the process of annulment. The 
author notes that on the whole, the distinction between legislative and non legislative 
acts does not loom so large in Member State legal systems, but since the distinction is 
fundamental to the Community judicial review system, the ECJ had to develop more 
exact distinguishing criteria to deal with borderline cases.392 
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The possible explanations are also examined by A. Arnull,393 who considers this a 
very difficult question. It seems likely that this approach was the product of a number 
of factors, some connected with the perceived intentions of the authors of the Treaty 
and some with the ECJ’s own view of the needs of the Community system. One factor 
mentioned by the ECJ itself in Producteurs de Fruits is the fact that the system of the 
Rome Treaties lays down more restrictive conditions than the ECSC Treaty. He 
quotes E. Stein and G.J. Vining394 who, as mentioned above, argued that the 
Community is a body at the borderline between the federal and the international, and 
in International Law the very notion of an individual having independent standing to 
sue before an international tribunal is little short of revolutionary.395 The limited 
standing was also seen as a reflection of the liberal economic philosophy which 
underpins much of the Treaty, especially in its original form.396 He refers to H. 
Rasmussen, who acknowledged that the expression “direct and individual concern” 
was essentially ambiguous and regarded the restrictive interpretation it had been given 
as part of a wider policy to allow itself to act more like a high court of appeals of 
Community Law, with all other national courts or Community courts established, 
acting as courts of first instance, and that interest outweighs the citizen’s interest in 
direct access to the ECJ.397 A further consideration is that expressed by C. Harding,398 
that a proliferation of direct challenges by private parties, perhaps accompanied by 
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interim measures,399 could have seriously disrupted the proper functioning of the 
Community system. This danger was particularly acute during the period when the 
Council did not adopt legislation until a consensus had emerged in its support. He 
deduces that the most progressive of the ECJ’s decisions have been concerned 
principally with making the Community work. Where, as in cases of direct effect, this 
has meant protecting the rights of the individual against encroachment by national 
authorities the ECJ has not hesitated to uphold the rights of the individual. Where the 
conflict was between the rights of the individual and those of the Community’s still 
immature institutions, however, the ECJ initially tended to give precedence to those. 
He then concludes that a growing realisation on the part of the ECJ that the strict 
application of the standing requirements could produce substantial injustice led 
ultimately to the breakdown of any coherence its Case-Law may once have had. The 
result was a significant relaxation of the standing rules, against the background of 
increasing maturity of the Community system, which was also consistent with 
developments in a number of national legal systems. He considered the unduly 
restrictive rules on standing as incompatible with the notion of a Community based on 
the Rule of Law, and advocated for a basic test based on whether the applicant has 
been adversely affected by the contested act, similar to s. 10 of the US Administrative 
Procedure Act 1946.400 
More recently, A. Arnull identified that the strongest case against judicial review 
concerns rights based challenges to primary legislation where a court is being asked to 
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overturn the conclusion reached by a democratically elected legislature, leading to a 
conclusion of the existence of a close link between judicial review and democracy, 
and the very problem lies in the democratic deficit issues faced by the EU.401 
A very interesting account comes from C. Harlow,402 who relates categories of access 
to two developed theories of public interest representation in courts. The first theory is 
state oriented, where public interest representation is left to an official of the state, 
who possesses functions to bring before the courts matters of public interest where no 
one has locus standi. Such an official acts like a privileged applicant as no objection 
can be raised to his appearance on the ground of lack of interest. The second theory is 
founded in pluralist political theory and stresses the non governmental dimension of 
public interest representation, and demands that courts, legislators and administrators 
can arrive at decisions only after consultation of a variety of viewpoints, including 
those of private parties. This theory has gained ground, creating demand for 
procedures whereby third party and collective interests could be presented in 
courts.403 
Considering the locus standi criteria for an action for annulment against EU measures, 
C. Harlow notes that little attempt has been made to relate criticism to the theoretical 
discussion of the public interest, noting that it would be a mistake to assume that the 
growing phenomenon of public interest litigation is an unmitigated good or that wider 
standing should be conceded just because it is demanded. Drawing from the American 
experience of public interest litigation, it could be said to have blurred the political 
and legal boundary, pushing the courts into the centre of the political process, while 
the procedural changes inspired by it have led to prolixity, delay and expense, the 
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result of which has been to imperil the ideal of impartial justice.404 She argues that the 
CJEU is a natural magnet for wealthy repeat players willing to use legal proceedings 
systematically to protect their interests,405 and that in these shark infested waters, the 
CJEU must be cautious if it is not to stultify the Commission’s work, since 
administrative and adjudicative procedures are expensive, time consuming and 
capable of endless manipulation by the parties involved.406 However, she makes the 
point that modern courts increasingly show a democratic willingness to hear as many 
citizens as possible, and for the CJEU of its own accord to open its doors to public 
interest representation would at the same time enhance its standing and help to redress 
the general democratic deficit of the Community.407 
The drafters’ intentions troubled H. Rasmussen, who considers that the most possible 
explanation is that they did not want to vest authority in the CJEU to review the legal 
acts of the institutions if the bringing of such actions was not under some sort of 
political control. He considers that the drafters could rightly hypothesise that the 
Member States and the institutions would blend concern for the upholding of legality 
with considerations of the political expediency of bringing annulment actions. In 
contrast, private applicants could be assumed to only look at their own interests in 
bringing the application of a general act to a halt by filing an action for annulment.408 
He concludes that while some shielding from such actions is obviously desirable as it 
would serve not to add more burdens on the rulemaking processes which would 
increase their slowness and inadequacy, the resulting situation is not a tenable one for 
the view of judicial protection of the individual against the powerful institutions.409 
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Another author, M. Hedemann-Robinson, considers that the main arguments in favour 
of restricting the numbers of private applications were basically the need to prevent 
the EU courts being flooded with litigation and ensure that Community legislation 
would not be continually and unnecessarily shrouded in legal uncertainty or be held to 
ransom by the economic interests of individual litigators.410 He also tries to discern a 
hierarchy of Community enactments, but he recognises that this can be by implication 
only. At the top of the tree are regulations, which have general application and being 
directly applicable, bear features which closely resemble national Laws. Decisions, 
however, have the capacity to be either akin to a generalist or an administrative 
measure. He states that on the one hand, they can fairly be described as administrative 
in nature if they are designed to manipulate the behaviour of specific private actors, 
but on the other hand, they can be of a legislative or generalist nature, as opposed to 
being administrative, when they are addressed to Member States which are instructed 
to carry out measures which affect their territory generally and without reference to 
the commercial activities of particular individuals. Standing is accordingly 
differentiated.411 He further notes that the Treaty is descriptive rather than 
prescriptive, in that it does not instruct the legislature when to utilize a regulation, 
directive or a decision. In a significant number of instances, the Treaty leaves it 
entirely to the discretion of the legislature, but the EU courts accepted that the 
legislature could not avoid judicial review proceedings by simply the type of measure 
chosen. Economic analysis seems to be absent in determining individual concern in 
the opinion of M. Hedemann-Robinson.412 Even if the applicant constituted the sole 
trader, one of a very small number of persons or the largest player affected by a 
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measure and liable to be fairly easily identified by the legislature, the EU courts did 
not sway away from their traditional position. On the one hand, he argues that there is 
some merit in this, in that it is not easily justifiable why someone should be granted 
standing simply because of his dominant position. On the other hand, he argues that 
where the legislature is able to identify with far greater accuracy the effects on the 
market participants concerned, measures take on a more administrative and specific 
nature, as opposed to legislative character. In these cases, it becomes unrealistic to 
accept that such enactments are passed irrespective of the particular commercial 
activities of the market players concerned. The approach makes little sense 
pragmatically as well, as argued by P. Craig,413 since the range of affected parties is 
normally established by the principles in supply and demand. If there are two or three 
firms in the industry this is because they can satisfy the current market demand, and 
the number is unlikely to alter significantly if at all. 
Another view has been expressed, that the nature of the subject matter provides the 
best rationale for the CJEU’s approach, and also serves to distinguish the mainline 
cases from those in other areas, such as dumping, competition and state aid, where 
there is more willingness to proceed with the substance.414 
The admissibility of actions for annulment seems a fundamental problem of every 
economic order which is based on the Rule of Law to J. Schwarze.415 On the one 
hand, it is essential in the public interest to grant the necessary freedom to the 
European institutions in constituting and shaping the economic order by legislation 
and administration. On the other hand, the Rule of Law generates the need to grant 
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appropriate judicial protection to private parties affected by those measures.416 The 
jurisdiction under Plaumann is based on the idea that due to their significance and 
general validity, regulations should not be put at the discretion of a vast number of 
challenges. He sees three reasons for this. First, this would increase judicial workload. 
Secondly, regulations are adopted after long and hard negotiations, and would be 
impeded even if these are only partially annulled. Thirdly, the exclusion of direct 
challenges is justified because of the availability of indirect routes. Citing N. 
Neuwahl,417 he agrees that the judicial review system is based on the premise that no 
act is excluded from judicial review altogether, but it is not necessary that judicial 
protection is in every case granted to the largest possible extent.418 
For K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut,419 there seem to be advantages in imposing on 
Member States and national courts the obligation to provide effective remedies and 
for the ECJ in using national courts as filters, in that this can assist in avoiding being 
inundated with manifestly unfounded actions and for the institutions not being 
interrupted all the time by direct actions, other than those brought by privileged 
applicants. However, they see the argument derived from the workload as 
questionable, in the sense that as a matter of principle it is an admission of weakness 
to let the extent of judicial protection depend on the ECJ’s perceived burden. But also 
in practical terms this assessment is not strong, in the sense that an indirect route for 
judicial review basically is a cumbersome way to end up in Luxembourg after all, 
marred with all the procedural defects identified by AG Jacobs, and the only major 
shift rather seems to transfer the protection of individuals from the CFI to the ECJ. 
They further see that there is also the danger that treating national courts as filters 
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could actually only deter them from sending references. The argument derived from a 
possible disturbance of the functioning of the institutions is also troublesome in that 
an indirect challenge can be equally disruptive for the institutions as an action for 
annulment, or even more so, since indirect challenges take place at a far later time 
when the institutions have taken hundreds of decisions on the basis of the contested 
act.420 Admittedly, the right to an effective remedy does not necessarily imply a right 
of access to a court with competence to invalidate a measure enacted by the 
legislature, and reference is made to the ECHR Case-Law, and in particular Posti and 
Rahko v. Finland,421 where a violation has been found not because of the 
unavailability of access to a court capable of invalidating a Finnish decree, but 
because the applicants were left without a remedy, and no one can be required to 
breach the Law so as to be able to have a civil right determined in accordance with 
Article 6(1) ECHR.422 A comparison with the position in many Member States who 
provide far greater access to courts against administrative and to a lesser degree 
legislative acts seems not convincing to them, as national legislatures are generally 
democratically elected whereas there is a democratic deficit in the EC and there is no 
clear hierarchy of norms.423 The approach also relating to Kobler liability for failure 
to send a preliminary reference seems also inappropriate in terms of an effective 
remedy as there are extensive delays for the initial proceedings to reach the highest 
courts who have an obligation to refer, and then fresh proceedings for compensation 
should be issued.424 
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To S. Bogojevic, the choice for a restrictive interpretation of the locus standi criteria 
and the diversion of private parties to national courts seems to be in accordance with 
judicial subsidiarity, allowing legal issues to be resolved closer to the citizen. This 
reflects a deeper interest in maintaining the delicate balance between the regulatory 
powers of the Commission and of the Member States, and from this viewpoint, 
judicial subsidiarity is the result of a deliberate political strategy.425 
 
7.3. Theories of political science 
 
An application of theories of political science has revealed several motivations for the 
CJEU’s position on locus standi to M. Eliantonio and N. Stratieva. According to the 
reasoning of rational choice institutionalism, the CJEU only engages in activism when 
it is given the impetus by external actors and expects the changes to be approved by 
the majority of the Member States. Consequently one can deduce that a reform will 
take place only when the institutions and the Member States push for it, and under the 
Lisbon Treaty they seemed unwilling to change direct and individual concern. They 
continue that if viewed under the alternative approach of historical institutionalism, 
according to which the CJEU would be acting on the basis of self interest, the 
willingness to perform changes was evident in other areas, but not in standing. In the 
case of standing, judicial restraint can be justified by the CJEU’s desire to keep the 
EU immune from challenges. Finally, they argue that path dependency suggests that 
the policy choices made in the early days of the life of the institution, like the 
interpretation of individual concern, have been entrenched and too high costs would 
have to be incurred in order to change them. Therefore, despite the path inefficiencies 
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that are sustained due to the incompleteness of the system for judicial remedies, the 
initial choice is maintained.426 
 
7.4. Thoughts from the individual’s standpoint 
 
The arguments that centre upon the significance of certain EU measures or the 
problems that institutions face in order to achieve consensus in the process of 
adopting them, seem to sit rather unwell with individual rights and the principle of the 
Rule of Law. It seems difficult to maintain that the difficulties faced in the adoption of 
a measure or its perceived importance can be valid justifications for restricting the 
possibilities to challenge its validity. 
The argument based on the possibility of disruption that would result following the 
annulment of a measure also sits rather unwell. It is inevitable in any system that there 
will be a gap between the time a measure enters into force and the time when 
challenges against it are determined by the courts. The argument seems to sit equally 
unwell with any notion of legality, in that it cannot be easily justified that any such 
disruption resulting from the annulment of an illegal measure can constitute a ground 
for accepting its illegality or prolonging its illegality. The strange result of such an 
argument is that actually a direct challenge, which is a shorter procedure than a 
preliminary reference which comes additional to national proceedings, would actually 
create less disruption, as also recognised by AG Jacobs in UPA, in that a measure 
shall be declared invalid with binding effects throughout the EU in a shorter 
timeframe, and not after a longer period of its application. 
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The main arguments identified by M. Hedemann-Robinson in favour of restricting the 
numbers of private applications,427 also sit rather unwell with the notions of the Rule 
of Law and individual rights. The first, which was the need to prevent the EU courts 
being flooded with litigation offers little justification for any restriction, as it can 
equally be argued that the protection of individual rights cannot depend on a system’s 
allocation of resources to its courts or judicial bodies. Equally, the second argument, 
based on the need to ensure that EU legislation would not be continually and 
unnecessarily shrouded in legal uncertainty or be held to ransom by the economic 
interests of individual litigators, also seems problematic. Its first limb, that EU 
legislation would be shrouded in uncertainty has been dealt with previously. And the 
second limb could seem rather exaggerated, as it seems difficult to envisage how 
individual litigators by lodging direct actions for annulment to protect their interests 
could hold the EU to ransom. It is the contrary that may be argued, in that the EU 
should not be allowed to hold individual litigators to ransom by restricting access to 
courts capable of granting an effective remedy or providing effective judicial 
protection to their rights. With due respect of course, it can be argued that this cannot 
be a strong argument for restricting challenges to legality. If the quality of legislation 
is satisfactory and does not infringe general principles or individual rights, then the 
EU and its various bodies have nothing to fear from direct challenges, let alone be 
held to ransom. 
The argument of E. Stein and G.F. Vining428 that the Community is a body at the 
borderline between the federal and the international, and in International Law the very 
notion of an individual having independent standing to sue before an international 
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tribunal is only short of revolutionary seems to be correct, at least for its time. 
However, it should now be seen in the light of how much the EU has remarkably 
developed since then, and how much wider its competencies and its legislative and 
regulatory activities are. With the EU deciding on net meshes for fishing, 
pharmaceutical products, construction products, food, drink, banking, insurance 
policies, and electronics, it can hardly now be resembled to any other international 
body. This justification seems no longer appropriate in the case of the EU. 
The extent to which the unavailability of a direct action for annulment is mitigated by 
alternative routes of challenges is also questionable and has been considered above. 
The choice or need or policy for decentralisation emerges as a valid argument. 
However, like any other policy, it cannot override or reduce the effect of individual 
rights, including the right to effective judicial protection. Decentralisation in the 
judicial review system, which effectively translates into having national courts acting 
filters for validity challenges may not be precluded in principle, provided however 
that it works and is effective. Not only is it not precluded, as mentioned above, 
references to a superior court on matters of Law or the constitutionality of legislation 
are actually common in the Member States and around the world. The criticism of the 
judicial review system is based on the problems of this procedure, as implemented in 
the EU through the preliminary reference procedure. If these problems cannot be 
overturned, and the system cannot provide effective judicial protection and respect for 








8. Protection of the individual and the individual as a protector 
 
A final consideration that should be borne in mind before proceeding to the effect of 
the reform in Article 263(4) TFEU, is the important role of individuals in private 
enforcement of EU Law. 
The protection of individual rights must of course be a central aim of EU Law, but 
there can very well be another side of the coin. Private parties can also play a 
significant role in ensuring legal accountability of the various actors and enhancing 
compliance with the Rule of Law within the EU. This aspect does not feature very 
well in the discussions on standing of private parties in direct actions for annulment 
but should by no means be underestimated. Whole sectors of European Law have 
been built or operate through private enforcement,429 and the areas of environmental 
policy,430 consumer policy,431 public procurement432 and competition433 can be listed 
as such examples. 
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It has been neatly summarised434 that what became known as the private enforcement 
model of EU Law, which ensures the possibility for private parties to initiate legal 
proceedings for alleged infringements of their rights under EU Law, not only serves 
the interests of those parties themselves, but also adds to the supervision exercised by 
the Commission or otherwise by the Treaties, and this implies that private parties are 
recruited as “private attorneys general”435 or “private policemen”,436 employing the 
vast potential resources of the general European population in securing the uniform 
and effective application of EU Law.437 Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights have also been described as innovations aiding the 
private enforcement model.438 
When private interests are affected, more force is naturally put in litigation for the 
annulment of a measure by the person aggrieved. This aids and promotes 
accountability and democracy. Whole chapters in books are devoted to the democratic 
deficit in the EU and the problems or deficiencies of internal checks and balances in 
EU Administrative Law439 and also how judicial review is one of the significant 
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responses to the EU’s democratic deficit due to its contribution to substantive 
legitimacy.440 The institutions, the Member States and other privileged applicants who 
can lodge actions for annulment without having to satisfy any standing criteria can in 
some respects be so heavily influenced by political ideas, choices and limitations in 
deciding whether to pursue such a challenge, that they cannot be expected to perform 
this role adequately. Private parties on the other hand, are not affected or influenced 
by such political factors, and will go as far as they can to protect their rights and 
interests, subjecting all players to legal accountability.441 This may potentially come a 
long way in mitigating the shortcomings of accountability mechanisms in the 
administrative system of the EU. No system can be complete without private 
enforcement, which is capable of invaluably supplementing even the most thorough 
accountability mechanisms. 
Private enforcement in validity challenges does not burden the funds of the EU, apart 
from the resources that have to be allocated in defending such challenges. In all other 
respects, private funds are used in enforcing accountability and compliance with the 
Rule of Law. On the contrary, the argument may also be made that if challenges are 
found to be ungrounded, then funds, in the form of legal costs, are paid to the 
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institutions as successful parties. In this sense, private enforcement can in fact be seen 
as a self-funded surveillance mechanism that oversees and supplements the due 
fulfilment of tasks by various actors in complex checks and balances of administrative 
structures, and this should also form an important consideration in the discussion of 
the judicial review system and the locus standi criteria. 
9. Summary of key findings 
The following key findings of this chapter can be summarised for ease of reference: 
a) The ECJ was allowed considerable discretion by the Treaties in relation to the 
interpretation of the locus standi criteria of direct and individual concern, and 
was actually forced to find a solution on its own and of its own. As a matter of 
judicial policy choice, the interpretation was very restrictive, leading to a 
decentralised judicial review system. 
b) The historical overview of the academic reception of the locus standi rules 
reveals that the shortcomings of the judicial review system on which criticism 
continues to be based, were actually realised in the very early years of the then 
EEC. 
c) The right to effective judicial protection is not entirely clear, at least when it 
comes to the question of access to judicial review proceedings. As a result, 
how one views the EU judicial review system is, to a degree, a subjective 
opinion, and consequently, from one’s standpoint the system may appear 
effective, whereas it may appear completely ineffective to another. 
d) Likewise, Article 6 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR, Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the principle of the Rule of Law, are also not entirely 
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clear when it comes to access to judicial review proceedings. Nevertheless, 
systems of indirect challenges such as the preliminary reference mechanism 
are generally acceptable, but examination is anyway carried out on a case by 
case basis. 
e) There are various possible explanations as to why the ECJ chose a restrictive 
interpretation of the locus standi rules, leading to a decentralised judicial 
review system. However, if the shortcomings of the EU judicial review system 
cannot be overturned, and endanger effective judicial protection or respect for 
individual rights, any policy of judicial decentralisation should give way. 
f) There are anyway important benefits associated with private enforcement of 
EU Law, and in the area of judicial review, private parties can play a 
significant role in ensuring legal accountability and enhancing compliance 
with the Rule of Law. 
The following chapter examines the Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus standi criteria 
in Article 263(4) TFEU, and the interpretative choices of the CJEU for the new 







CHAPTER 4: THE LISBON TREATY REFORM IN ARTICLE 263(4) TFEU 
 
This chapter covers the Lisbon Treaty reform of the locus standi criteria, and the 
interpretation of the notions of a regulatory act and implementing measures by the 
CJEU. It then relates the developments back to the questions of judicial policy choice 
of the CJEU. 
1. The regulatory act not entailing implementing measures 
The effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform depended on the interpretation of the new 
provision in Article 263(4) TFEU, under which a private party is now afforded 
standing to file an action for the annulment of a regulatory act that is of direct concern 
to him and does not entail implementing measures. With the test of direct concern 
already being in place, the extent of the reform naturally depended on the 
interpretation of the term “regulatory act” and the question of what degree of further 
action would constitute “implementing measures”.442 
Tons of ink were spent immediately after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty as to the 
definition of the concept of a “regulatory act”. A term which, despite having a clearer 
or better place in the draft Constitution of Europe under the nomenclature and 
hierarchy that would have been created under it, had no connection with other 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Arguments advocating for its interpretation to 
include legislative acts and not only non legislative acts of general application were 
readily put forward, depicting and conveying not least the universal outcry of the 
                                                 
442 As also pointed out in P. Craig & G. De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 6th 
edition, 2015). See also A. Albors-Llorens, “Remedies Against the EU Institutions After Lisbon: An 
Era of Opportunity?” (2012) 71(3) Cambridge Law Journal 507. 
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academic world for the highest possible relaxation of the standing criteria after 
decades of customary application of the Plaumann test.443 And the time seemed 
absolutely right, since the CJEU had been given what it asked for in UPA and Jego 
Quere in order to reconsider the judicial review system it had developed, a reform of 
the Treaty by the Member States. 
Surprisingly, the interpretation of the notion of “implementing measures” was not so 
central in the early discussion that followed the reform, which primarily focused on 
the interpretation of the term “regulatory acts”.444 At least it was not so much foreseen 
as a potential obstacle to the extent of the reform. This could arguably be attributed to 
the early expectation that it will be closely related to the interpretation of direct 
concern, which related the purely automatic application of a measure to the existence 
of real discretion in its implementation, and considering the criterion as satisfied even 
in cases where some discretion existed but its exercise was entirely theoretical.445 Or 
perhaps also to the lack of a publicly available record in the travaux preparatoires as 
to any adversarial discussion in relation to the potential interpretation of this in the 
Discussion Circle of the European Convention, which itself, from what is reported, 
seems to have focused more on the choice of term or name for what was finally 
                                                 
443 See among others S. Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private 
Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU” (2010) 35 European Law Review 542, R. Barents, “The 
Court of Justice After the Treaty of Lisbon” (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 709, at p.p. 122-
126, P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2012), Chapter 11, at p.p. 317-318, and S. 
Peers and M. Costa, “Judicial Review of EU Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon; Order of 6 September 
2011, Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. Commission & Judgment of 25 October 
2011, Case 262/10 Microban v. Commission”  (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 82. 
444 See for example among others, A. Arnull, “The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU 
Law: An Unruly Horse?” (2011) European Law Review 51, at p. 70, S. Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules 
for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU” (2010) 35 
European Law Review 542, R. Schutze, European Union Law (CUP, 2015), at p. 359, I. Blahusiak, 
“Access of Citizens to the Court of Justice: The Role of Regulatory Acts” Dny práva – 2010 – Days of 
Law, 1 ed. Brno: Masaryk University, 2010, available at 
http://www.law.muni.cz/content/cs/proceedings. 
445 See also M. Bergstrom, “Judicial Protection for Private Parties in European Commission 
Rulemaking” in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, Rulemaking by the European Commission – The New 
System for Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2016), Chapter 10, at p.p. 220-223. 
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branded a “regulatory act”.446 Time however only proved correct the reservations 
expressed by some of the commentators, and certainly the expectation of A. Albors-
Llorens, that the interpretation of this requirement that the act should not entail 
implementing measures will be as important as the notion of a regulatory act.447 
2. Interpretation of “regulatory acts” 
The question of what constitutes a regulatory act reached the GC quickly. In Inuit448, 
an action for annulment of a Regulation on trade in seal products which was actually 
adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was filed, and the applicants 
claimed, among others, that this constituted a regulatory act not entailing 
implementing measures so their action should be held to be admissible without them 
being required to show individual concern. Although the measure predated the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, standing had to be judged under the revised criteria in 
Article 263(4) TFEU which applied at the time the action was filed.449 The GC was 
forced to categorise a measure predating the Lisbon Treaty, under the categories of 
measures provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, in order to apply the standing rules of 
Article 263(4) TFEU. The contested measure was adopted under the codecision 
procedure, which is the predecessor of the ordinary legislative procedure, and would 
accordingly have been a legislative act under the Lisbon categorisation. The 
applicants maintained that even so, legislative acts may also be regulatory acts, this 
being a term covering all acts of general application. The GC disagreed, holding that 
the term encompasses all acts of general application other than legislative acts. 
                                                 
446 See for example S. Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private 
Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU” (2010) 35 European Law Review 542, T.C. Hartley, The 
Foundations of European Union Law (OUP, 8th edition, 2014), Chapter 12, at p.p. 383-386. 
447 A. Albors-Llorens, “Remedies Against the EU Institutions After Lisbon: An Era of Opportunity?” 
(2012) 71(3) Cambridge Law Journal 507, at p. 526. 
448 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  [2011] ECR 
II-5599. 
449 See for example Case T-539/08 Etimine SA and Ab Etiproducts Oy v. Commission. 
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The applicants appealed the order dismissing their application to the ECJ,450 
employing no more no less virtually all arguments generated in the academic 
discussion advocating for a broader interpretation of the term so as to include 
legislative acts. And also employing virtually all known arguments condemning the 
EU judicial review system as not providing effective judicial protection, and 
highlighting the Lisbon Treaty reform as an opportunity to enhance judicial 
protection. 
The ECJ agreed with the GC and dismissed the appeal, holding that the term 
“regulatory acts” cannot be interpreted to include legislative acts. Acknowledging that 
the new provision which formed the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU relaxed the 
conditions of admissibility, it then proceeded to examine the construction of the 
whole of this paragraph, highlighting the use of the term “acts” in the first limb 
covering acts addressed to an applicant, and in the second limb covering acts which 
are of direct and individual concern to an applicant. It then highlighted by way of 
comparison the use of the term “regulatory act” in this third limb. Existing Case-
Law451 dictated that the term “acts” had to be construed as encompassing all acts of 
general application, legislative or otherwise, and individual acts, so the ECJ regarded 
impossible an interpretation of the term “regulatory act” to include legislative acts 
since this would amount to nullifying the distinction made between these two terms in 
the text of Article 263(4) TFEU and its three limbs.452 
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In the view of the ECJ, this conclusion was corroborated by the origins of the 
provision which came to be Article 263(4) TFEU, as evidenced in the travaux 
preparatoires of Article III-365(4) of the draft Constitution for Europe, which showed 
that a restrictive approach towards direct challenges against legislative acts was 
intended to be maintained. The Opinion of AG Kokott, was also in line with the 
judgment of the ECJ, having similarly considered that the drafting history of what 
came to be Article 263(4) TFEU rendered it clear that the term “regulatory acts” 
should not encompass legislative acts, adding that it was highly unlikely that the 
Intergovernmental Conference that negotiated the Lisbon Treaty wished to achieve a 
different outcome by the adoption of this reform than what was originally 
contemplated under the draft Constitution.453 
The ECJ then dealt with the applicants’ argument that there should be a 
reinterpretation of the test for individual concern along the lines of the proposal of AG 
Jacobs in UPA, since it was in their opinion obvious that the Member States were 
inspired by that call for reform in the revision of the standing rules effected by the 
Lisbon Treaty. This argument was rather summarily dismissed, holding that it is clear 
from the fact that these notions were not altered in any way by the reform, the existing 
interpretation of individual concern must not be altered.454 
The applicants had also argued that a strict interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU 
would be in breach of Article 47 of the now applicable Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, as well as Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, since it would not enable them to 
challenge the legality of acts that directly affect them. The ECJ stated that the Treaty 
had established a complete system of remedies and procedures that ensures legality 
                                                 
453 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council  
EU:C:2013:625, at para 46 of her Opinion. 
454 Paras 68-71 of the Judgment. 
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review of all EU acts, and that the ECHR and the Charter could not provide any basis 
for reinterpretation or further relaxation of the standing conditions. Article 47 of the 
Charter combined with Article 6(1) TEU made it clear that its adoption was not meant 
to reform the existing judicial review system any further.455 
A similar analysis had also been made by AG Kokott in her Opinion.456 Recognising 
that due account must be taken of the fundamental right to effective judicial 
protection, whether this is based on the Charter, the ECHR or the general principles of 
EU Law, this right does not dictate that a direct remedy must in all cases be available, 
highlighting at the same time that even the applicants themselves cite no authority to 
that effect. She also stated that there is no reason to fear for any gap in the protection 
if a direct action is not available against a legislative act as in the case before them, 
arguing that the applicants themselves could write to their national authorities 
requesting confirmation that the ban in trading of seal products is not applicable to 
them. A negative reply by the national authority must be reviewable before national 
courts, which in their turn may refer the issue of validity of the Regulation which is a 
legislative act to the ECJ, so effective judicial protection was ensured within the 
reasoning of UPA. 
As interestingly observed by C.F. Bergstrom,457 the ECJ avoided dealing with the 
notion of implementing measures in Inuit, focusing instead only on a general analysis 
and repeating its traditional position that the Treaties have established a complete 
system of remedies and procedures that ensures review, and that it is for the Member 
States to ensure compliance with the right to effective judicial protection. It is worth 
                                                 
455 See para 95 of the judgment. 
456 See paras 105-124 of her Opinion. 
457 C.F. Bergstrom, “Defending Restricted Standing for Individuals to Bring Direct Actions Against 
“Legislative” Measures” (2014) European Constitutional Law Review 481, at p.p. 490-491. 
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noting that the Opinion of AG Kokott was given on 17/1/2013 and the judgment of 
the Grand Chamber of the CJEU came on 3/10/2013, a timegap which itself seems to 
reveal how much the issue of the interpretation of “regulatory act” must have troubled 
the judges. And it could consequently be that in the circumstances, the judges 
composing the Grand Chamber might have wanted to avoid dealing with the issue of 
implementing measures in that case, since this was not absolutely necessary in order 
to give judgment, given the finding that regulatory acts do not include legislative acts. 
The outcome of Inuit leads to the seemingly immutable realities.458 Legislative acts 
are not included in the definition of regulatory acts. And also that the CJEU stands 
firm to its traditional position that the right to effective judicial protection, as well as 
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter, cannot form a basis for any 
further extension of the availability of a direct action for annulment, whether by 
means of the interpretation of the new third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU or 
reinterpretation of the test for individual concern. On the contrary, the ECJ treated the 
Lisbon Treaty reform as coming rather as a confirmation of the Plaumann test. 
The judgment in Inuit was characterised as a remarkable judgment for a court not 
generally noted for its restraint, which rather resorted to a narrow conservatism jerry 
built on the presumed intentions of the authors of the Treaties.459 
Despite some argumentation towards the wider definition to include legislative acts460 
and some to the narrower to include only non legislative acts,461 the interpretation of 
                                                 
458 See Chapter 1. 
459 A. Arnull, “Judicial Review in the European Union”, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers, The Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), Chapter 15, at p.p. 397-398. 
460 See for example among others M. Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not 
Hearts” (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 617, J. Bast, “Legal Instruments and Judicial 
Protection” in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart, 2009), 
and the useful summary in R. Schutze, European Union Law (Hart, 2015), at p.p. 359-360, and S. 
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the term “regulatory act” did not come as a surprise. Indeed, it seems difficult to flaw 
the reasoning of AG Kokott or the Grand Chamber of the ECJ especially in view of 
the travaux preparatoires, despite the arguments of the applicants in Inuit and some 
other arguments that these are inconclusive.462 The Final Report of the Discussion 
Circle on Reform of the Court of Justice provides evidence that the choice of the 
expression “regulatory act” was favoured since it would enable a restrictive approach 
to proceedings by private parties against a legislative act and a more open approach 
against a regulatory act.463 And it is also evidenced that, very likely, the main goal of 
the Lisbon Treaty reform was indeed to overcome the problem where a party was 
forced to break the Law in order to obtain access to justice, which existed in the case 
of measures of general application that did not require implementing measures.464 
It has even been nicely illustrated that the grammatical interpretation of the term 
regulatory act in the different language versions suggests that such a definition is 
more appropriate.465 However, the force of some of the arguments cannot be 
underestimated. In one of the first commentaries of the GC’s judgments in Inuit and 
                                                                                                                                            
Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New 
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TFEU – A Dissonant Extension of Locus Standi for Private Applicants” (2010-2011) 13 The 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 311, A. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Elgar, 
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Microban, S. Peers and M. Costa466 highlight that the reasoning begs the question 
why, if the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty intended such a distinction between 
legislative and non legislative acts, they did not use unambiguous wording to such 
effect, specifically limiting the exception to non legislative acts. Especially since they 
chose to make such distinction in other parts of the Treaty, such as Articles 15, 203, 
290, 296, 297, 349 and 352 TFEU. They further highlight the reference to legislative 
acts in the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU but not in the third limb of the fourth 
paragraph. They concede however that the historical interpretation of the GC by 
reference to the travaux preparatoires is clearly correct, and they even see five further 
arguments showing the correctness of this interpretation, which the GC did not 
invoke. The first is that the definition is the easiest to apply in practice, since it is 
straightforward to see whether an act is a legislative or a non legislative one, although 
this approach would, in their view, give precedence to legal certainty and 
transparency over a more fundamental aspect of the Rule of Law which is judicial 
accountability for the legality of acts of public authorities which can only be 
guaranteed by effective access to judicial review. The second is that the definition 
matches the hierarchy of norms as developed by the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
third is that this mirrors the standing conditions against legislative acts found in most 
Member States, arguing however that such comparisons with national Law are not 
usually a factor for interpreting EU Law. The fourth is the argument that since 
legislative acts enjoy greater democratic legitimacy than acts of the executive, judicial 
review should be limited, pointing out however that while this is a valid argument in 
national legal systems, it is not equally strong for the EU legal and political system 
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since it lacks the same legitimacy as those of Member States. The fifth is that a 
decentralised system respects judicial subsidiarity, although they argue that in the 
particular case this points in the opposite direction given the incapability of national 
courts to declare acts invalid. 
3. Interpretation of “implementing measures” 
The first judgments on the definition of the term “implementing measures” followed 
closely before this matter was also settled by the Grand Chamber of the ECJ. And 
unfortunately, it was quickly realised that an even higher degree of judicial 
conservatism on the part of the CJEU was forthcoming. 
In Telefonica,467 the contested measure was a decision of the Commission declaring a 
Spanish tax scheme as state aid and ordering repayment of the aid. The applicants 
filed an action for annulment against that decision claiming that it was a regulatory act 
not entailing implementing measures. The action was dismissed as inadmissible by 
the GC and the applicants appealed to the ECJ with the case being allocated to the 
Grand Chamber. The decision, although addressed to Spain, was considered by AG 
Kokott to be a measure of general application following existing Case-Law as it 
produced general effects within that Member State. On the other hand, she considered 
that it entailed implementing measures as against the applicants since the recovery of 
the aid had to be carried out by the national authorities. The Grand Chamber of the 
ECJ agreed. It first clarified that the question whether a regulatory act entails 
implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position of the person 
pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, 
and that it is irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures 
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with regard to other persons.468 It also clarified that in order to determine whether the 
measure being challenged entails implementing measures, reference should be made 
exclusively to the subject matter of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the 
partial annulment of an act, it is solely any implementing measures which that part of 
the act may entail that must, as the case may be, be taken into consideration.469 In 
view of these, the ECJ noted that the decision only declares the scheme incompatible 
but does not define the consequences for each tax payer. These consequences will be 
determined in the administrative documents, such as a tax notice, that will be 
produced by the national authorities, and which constitute implementing measures.470 
In Stichting Woonpunt,471 the applicants, who were not for profit housing 
organisations, sought the annulment of a decision by which the Commission 
confirmed that a Dutch scheme of aid was compatible with the common market, 
following certain commitments provided by the national authorities amending the aid 
scheme which benefitted the applicants. The ECJ found that it was apparent from the 
recitals to the contested decision that those commitments would be implemented by a 
national ministerial decree and by new housing legislation, which, following the 
reasoning in Telefonica, had to be regarded as implementing measures.472 The ECJ 
however found that the applicants were individually concerned in this case since the 
measure affected them as a group of persons who were identified or identifiable when 
that measure was adopted by reason of criteria specific to the members of the group, 
                                                 
468 At para 30 of the judgment. 
469 At para 31 of the judgment. 
470 At paras 35-37 of the judgment. 
471 Case C-132/12 P Stichting Woonpunt and others v. Commission  EU:C:2014:100. 
472 See in particular paras 50-54 of the judgment. 
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they formed part of a limited class of traders and the decision altered rights acquired 
by them prior to its adoption.473 
The question reached the Grand Chamber of the ECJ for a second time by way of 
appeal in T & L Sugars.474 This case involved annulment proceedings against a 
number of Regulations adopted by the Commission in relation to sugar quotas. This 
appeared to be a last chance to avoid such an open interpretation of the notion of 
implementing measures which was backed by a very strong Opinion by AG Cruz 
Villalon.475 
AG Cruz Villalon first noted that as regards direct concern the CJEU has consistently 
held that, for a natural or legal person to be directly concerned by a measure, that 
measure must directly affect the person’s legal situation and, where it entails the 
adoption of intermediate measures, it must leave no discretion to the authorities 
responsible for implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and 
resulting solely from EU rules. After all, the condition of direct concern, as 
interpreted by the CJEU in relation to the pre-Lisbon version of the Treaty, was 
already based on the understanding that where implementation was purely automatic 
there was no obstacle to the recognition of standing to bring proceedings. Noting 
further that it could be argued that the condition relating to the absence of 
implementing measures, in other words, the absence of acts going beyond purely 
automatic implementation, is inherent in the condition relating to direct concern. 
Something which, according to AG Cruz Villalon, can support the view that the 
                                                 
473 At paras 57-62 of the judgment. See also the similar judgment in Case C-133/12 P Stichting 
Woonlinie and others v. Commission  EU:C:2014:105. 
474 Case C-456/13 P T & L Sugars and Sidul Acucares v. Commission  EU:C:2015:284. See also C. 
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Lisbon Treaty complicated these simple rules, by adding in the third limb the 
requirement of direct concern and the absence of implementing measures, rendering it 
necessary to make sense of this conceptual duality. 
He went on to argue that the term “measure” inevitably means that a certain ‘power’ 
is exercised, and accordingly implies that a certain degree of discretion exists in the 
exercise of Member State authority. It does not follow solely from the fact that 
national public authorities are required to fulfil certain duties that the measures which 
those authorities take in order to fulfil those duties constitute implementing measures, 
and it is important to take into account, specifically and in each case, not only the 
nature, but also the form and the intensity, of the cooperation required from the 
national authorities. 
AG Cruz Villalon then explicitly stated that it would be difficult, if the objective of 
relaxing the admissibility conditions for natural and legal persons in connection with 
non legislative regulatory acts is not to be wholly frustrated, to interpret the new 
provision as meaning that the fact that non substantive or ancillary measures are taken 
by the national authorities, through any kind of action or adopted in the exercise of a 
circumscribed power, linking the applicant and the contested regulatory act, could be 
construed as grounds for concluding that, at one and the same time, the condition of 
direct concern is satisfied but the condition relating to the absence of implementing 
measures is not, simply because of that link. 
He thought that the inclusion of the two conditions, direct concern and not entailing 
implementing measures, calls for a functional division between those conditions. In 
reflection of that division, a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, 
defining the rule as such and determining its addressees, which is direct concern, and, 
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on the other hand, determining the various circumstances, these being among others 
procedural, quantitative, temporal, specific to its application in practice and to its 
implementation, which enable it to be said that that rule is fully and autonomously 
operational. It may also be argued that direct concern refers both to the definition of 
the rule and to the identification of its addressees, while implementing measures 
ensure that that rule, whose addressees have been identified, is fully operational. This 
would render it necessary to carry out a specific analysis of the purpose and content of 
the regulatory act itself and its effects on the applicant’s legal situation in order to 
reach a conclusion as to whether or not that act entails implementing measures.476 
On the facts of the particular case, he noted that it is true that operational 
implementation of the contested Regulations required the Member States to take 
action and to adopt a certain number of administrative measures, essentially receiving 
applications from the economic operators concerned, checking whether the 
applications are admissible in the light of the formal requirements established, 
submitting them to the Commission and then issuing licences on the basis of the 
allocation coefficients fixed by the Commission. He thought it difficult to conclude 
that the purely administrative activity thus carried out by the national authorities 
involves the exercise of implementing powers. The contested Regulations specified 
the scope ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis for each, as well as 
the eligibility and admissibility conditions which must be satisfied in order to benefit 
from those measures. 
The ECJ disagreed with that interpretation, holding that the decisions of the national 
authorities granting such certificates, which apply the coefficients fixed by the 
Implementing Regulation to the operators concerned, and the decisions refusing such 
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certificates in full or in part therefore constitute implementing measures within the 
meaning of the final limb of Article 263(4) TFEU. Firmly maintaining that this 
conclusion is not called into question by the allegedly mechanical nature of the 
measures taken at national level.477 
A thought on the possible rationale behind this approach seemed to A. Albors-Llorens 
to be the interpretation the ECJ gave as to the purpose of the reform, which was to 
prevent the situation where a private party would have to contravene a measure in 
order to obtain access to justice, commenting that if any measure is required at 
national level, theoretically there should be an opportunity to challenge it before a 
national court, which leads to the possibility of a preliminary reference on validity, 
but realising at the same time that this interpretation has the effect of limiting 
significantly the reform because a great proportion of EU measures require some 
action, even if entirely mechanical.478 
It is rather notable that this interpretation of the notion of implementing measures by 
the CJEU came contrary to early expectations of a more relaxed interpretation, which 
were corroborated by the judgment of the GC in Microban.479 That case involved a 
Commission Decision removing a substance known as triclosan from the list of 
materials that can come into contact with foodstuffs, that list being contained in a 
Directive, and effectively banning its use. The GC considered the contested decision 
to be a regulatory act of direct concern to the applicants, who were producers of 
triclosan, since it left no discretion to the Member States. It then likewise held that the 
contested decision did not require implementing measures since the ban was complete 
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European Union Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2017), at p. 286.  




and that any implementing measures taken during the transitional period would be 
ancillary to the pending prohibition, for which no implementing measures would be 
necessary. It seems difficult to reconcile this judgment of the GC with its later 
judgment in T & L Sugars or of course the judgment of the ECJ. 
In a comment well before these judgments, P. Craig argued that the most natural 
meaning of implementing measures would be that regulations, being directly 
applicable, do not generally entail implementing measures, this being also true for the 
great majority of decisions, whether they are classic individualised decisions or 
whether they are decisions of a more generic nature that are concerned with inter 
institutional relations. Recognising the argument that even regulations or some 
decisions will lead to modification of national rules, and the consequent question 
whether such national measures should be regarded as implementing measures for the 
purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU, he considered that such a conclusion must be 
wrong. A consequence of such a conclusion would be that the possibility of a direct 
challenge of the same regulation would vary from state to state, since whether any 
particular Member State needed to modify its national rules and if so how, would 
depend on the fit between the demands of the EU act and its pre existing Law, which 
will necessarily differ from one Member State to another. A result which will depend 
on national law and not the regulatory act itself.480 
The judgment in T & L Sugars was followed in several cases, and unfortunately the 
results confirm that this interpretation effectively diluted the effects of the reform. In 
Kyocera Mita,481 the contested Regulation, forming part of the Customs Code, set the 
duty that would be paid on certain types of machinery, but that had to be 
                                                 
480 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2012), Chapter 11, at p.p. 317-318. 
481 Case C-553/14 P Kyocera Mita Europe BV v. Commission  EU:C:2015:805. See also the similar 
judgment in Case C-552/14 P Canon Europa NV v. Commission  EU:C:2015:804. 
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communicated by the national authority which would also allow the release of the 
goods. The ECJ held that only then a measure against the applicants would be created, 
and given the fact that the mechanical nature of any national measures is not a 
relevant factor, that action constituted implementing measures. 
In European Union Copper Task Force v. Commission,482 by the contested 
Regulation, the Commission listed copper compounds on the list of candidates for 
substitution, annexed to that Regulation, on the ground that that substance fulfilled the 
criteria to be considered a persistent and toxic substance for the purposes of a 
Directive. The GC considered the contested Regulation to be a regulatory act for the 
purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU, but then held that this entailed implementing 
measures since it encompassed a further Regulation by the Commission for any 
renewals of the preapproved compounds which became candidates for substitution, 
and also required Member States to perform a comparative assessment of health and 
environmental lists, which also had discretion to decide on an application. 
In EGBA and RGA v. Commission,483 the contested decision was a state aid decision 
in the gambling and betting sector in France, allowing a scheme with the reasoning 
that it constituted aid within the equine sector established on the basis of the common 
interest that online horse race betting operators have in organising horse races on 
which bets are placed and that it benefited all online horse-race betting operators 
subject to the levy. The GC found that the contested decision was a regulatory act but 
since it was a decision addressed to France and did not define the specific and 
concrete consequences of the declaration of compatibility, either for the beneficiaries 
                                                 
482 Case T-310/15 European Union Copper Task Force v. Commission  EU:T:2016:265. 
483 Case T-238/14 European Gaming and Betting Association (EGBA) and The Remote Gambling 
Association (RGA) v. Commission  EU:T:2016:259. 
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or for any other person who may be affected in some way by the measure at issue, it 
entailed implementing measures for the purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU. 
More recently, in Netflix International BV and Netflix, Inc. v. Commission,484 an 
amendment of an aid scheme was again held to entail implementing measures since 
the specific and actual consequences of the contested Decision in respect of the 
applicants was considered by the GC to be given material form by national acts such 
as the tax notices defining the exact amount payable by each operator and the 
decisions granting aid using the new criteria introduced by the amendment. 
4. Back to policy choice 
The above lead back to the discussion on the policy choice of the CJEU. As a matter 
of fact, it has been rather blatantly admitted by the then President of the ECJ, Mr 
Rodriguez Iglesias, in an oral presentation485 which forms part of the travaux 
preparatoires of the Constitutional Treaty, that the definition of locus standi is 
primarily a policy choice and that any solution can be perfectly envisaged. A further 
admission can also be found in this presentation, and this is that it was indeed possible 
to convert the current conditions of admissibility into alternative conditions.486 
Although it has been acknowledged in Inuit that the Lisbon Treaty reform of Article 
263(4) TFEU came as a response to the calls for reform in UPA and Jego Quere, and 
the judgments of the ECJ in these cases expressly calling for Treaty reform in order to 
revise the standing conditions, this reform did not evidently come with sufficient 
clarity. The CJEU still had to answer the two major questions discussed above, and 
                                                 
484 Case T-818/16 Netflix International BV and Netflix, Inc. v European Commission  EU:T:2018:274. 
485 CONV 572/03. 
486 See also the outline of the discussion in M. Varju, “The Debate on the Future of Standing under 
Article 230(4) TEC in the European Convention” (2004) 10 European Public Law 43, at p. 50. 
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give its own interpretation of what is a “regulatory act” and what degree of action is 
required in order for an EU measure to “entail implementing measures”. 
These terms warranted definition within the context of the existing standing rules, and 
the Lisbon Treaty context in general. The CJEU was not on this occasion designing 
the judicial review system of the EU from the beginning, but was deciding the extent 
of the reform that the Member States effected on the judicial review system that the 
CJEU had already designed. It is rather questionable whether this was an easy task, or 
a task that should have been left to the CJEU had any specific reform or extent of 
reform been intended by the Member States. 
In relation to the first of these questions, the CJEU was given a term, “regulatory act”, 
that was not defined elsewhere in the Lisbon Treaty. Its literal meaning was not also 
helpful as to whether it was intended to cover legislative as well as non legislative 
acts, although it showed that it had to relate to acts of general application, regulating a 
matter. There was accordingly ample room for the calls for the widest possible 
interpretation, so that it also includes legislative acts. More precise guidance as to its 
interpretation existed however. This was defined in the failed Constitutional Treaty, 
from which it derived, as well as the travaux preparatoires of the Constitutional 
Treaty, as recognised in Inuit. The CJEU cannot accordingly be held solely or entirely 
responsible in this respect for adopting the narrower definition. On the other hand, it 
would hardly have been criticised if, despite that existing guidance, it adopted the 
wider definition, and accepted that this term also covered legislative acts. It was the 
Member States anyway that had introduced a term that was not defined, and whose 
literal meaning was inconclusive. As R. Schutze comments, teleological arguments 
point in both directions, depending on which telos one prefers, where those favouring 
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individual rights will prefer the wider view to include legislative acts, and those 
wishing to protect democratic values will prefer the narrower view.487 In this light, the 
existence of a policy choice made by the CJEU is also evident here, even though this 
choice can be significantly shielded from criticism. 
In relation to the other question as to whether an act entails implementing measures, 
the CJEU was left with considerable discretion, if not even absolute freedom. The 
phrase effectively allowed any possible interpretation, from that taken by the CJEU in 
T & L Sugars to any other tying the answer to any degree of discretion or exercise of 
autonomous will of a third party. A multi-language analysis of the wording of this 
provision that has been attempted seemed also inconclusive.488 
It is not easy to find any guidance from the text of the Lisbon Treaty or the context in 
which this was placed. Unlike the case of the notion of a regulatory act, such guidance 
does not derive from the travaux preparatoires. The only conclusion from the travaux 
preparatoires that seems to be relevant is the position that the amendment came as a 
response to the calls for reform, and more specifically in order to reverse the 
undesirable situation where a private party was forced to break the law in order to 
obtain access to justice and contest the validity of an EU act. This however, hardly 
advocated on its own for the most open interpretation as adopted by the Court in T & 
L Sugars and hardly set any limit to the scope of the reform as finally embodied in the 
text of Article 263(4) TFEU. Even if one accepts the CJEU’s position that this goal is 
achieved by the most open interpretation in T & L Sugars, which severely limits the 
instances of the new limb in Article 263(4) TFEU, then necessarily this is equally 
                                                 
487 R. Schutze, European Union Law (Hart, 2015), at p. 360. 
488 C. Werkmeister, S. Potters and J. Traut, “Regulatory Acts Within Article 263(4) TFEU – A 
Dissonant Extension of Locus Standi for Private Applicants” (2010-2011) 13 The Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 311, at p.p. 326-329. 
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achieved by less open, and consequently less restrictive, interpretations, allowing 
direct challenges in more instances. 
This can also be contrasted with the context in which the calls for reform were 
formulated. The calls for reform, and especially those of AG Jacobs in UPA and the 
CFI in Jego Quere, to which the CJEU referred and to which it recognised Article 
263(4) TFEU to constitute a response, covered much wider problems, of which the 
problem that an applicant would have to break the law in order to obtain access to 
justice in certain situations was only one. Since the CJEU recognised that the Member 
States acted not least as a response to such calls for reform, a wider interpretation 
would serve to satisfy other issues identified in that criticism. It cannot be said that the 
Member States did not offer such an opportunity to the CJEU, since at least the 
interpretation of what would constitute implementing measures, if not also the 
interpretation of regulatory acts, was wide open. 
There was also no other stressing factor for the CJEU to opt for this open 
interpretation, as could have possibly been a need to interpret national legislation, 
procedures or procedural rules, something which it resisted. The interpretation 
advocated by AG Cruz Villalon did not dictate such an examination of national rules, 
but on the contrary, only focused on the EU measure itself. 
This interpretation of implementing measures by the CJEU, arguably, even puts 
question marks on whether direct concern has any real place or use in this case of 
regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. In the sense that if an EU act 
does not entail any further action by anyone, even automatic or mechanical, then 
naturally nobody is vested with discretion in applying the EU act to the applicant. 
Under this reading, the requirement for direct concern may seem even obsolete. 
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It should perhaps be fair at this point to recall part of what have been described herein 
as the ninth and tenth realities,489 which says that the argument may be sustained that 
the EU judicial review system could still be regarded as more favourable than those of 
many Member States where direct actions against legislative acts are not in the formal 
sense available, since it permits actions for annulment against legislative acts, 
although with restrictive locus standi conditions.490 On the other hand, it is equally 
fair to recall another finding made by A. Turk from a comparison of the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, that the standing requirements in case of a challenge 
against acts of general application are, with the exception of Germany, more 
restrictive than those of national legal systems.491 
The impression has already been formed, that this much anticipated revision of the 
standing criteria by the Lisbon Treaty did not lead to any satisfactory result, and has 
been rendered of very limited effect following the intervention and interpretations of 
the CJEU. As a result, it is regrettably submitted that it seems doomed to be recorded 
in EU legal history as another “false dawn” and another missed opportunity. 
The effects of these interpretative choices of the CJEU for the notions of a regulatory 
act and implementing measures will be examined through a review of a sample of the 
older Case-Law under the revised locus standi rules in Chapter 5, and a quantitative 
study in Chapter 6. These offer a comparison as to what these restrictive 
interpretations have achieved, against what the system could have been like had the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon T & L Sugars for the notion of regulatory acts 
                                                 
489 See Chapter 1. 
490 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Turk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union 
(OUP, 2011), Chapter 25, at p. 840 and A.H. Turk, The Concept of Legislation (Kluwer, 2006), Part 2, 
Chapter 2, at p. 173. See also M. Eliantonio et al, Standing Up for your Right(s) in Europe (Intersentia, 
2013) and the Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev. 
491 A.H. Turk, The Concept of Legislation (Kluwer, 2006), Part 2, Chapter 2, at p. 173. 
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been adopted. Against these results, and in particular the comparison of the effects of 
the interpretation of the notion of implementing measures that the CJEU adopted to 






















CHAPTER 5: EFFECT OF LISBON TREATY REFORM THROUGH A 
REVIEW OF OLDER CASE-LAW 
 
This chapter examines a sample of the pre-Lisbon Case-Law under the reformed locus 
standi criteria in Article 263(4) TFEU. After setting out the background, it considers 
the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon legislative procedures, the methodology for review, 
and then proceeds to the review of the chosen Case-Law sample. The sample is 
grouped under the different categories of application of the Plaumann test for easier 
reference. 
1. The background 
Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the standing criteria of direct and individual 
concern applied to all measures under the EC pillar, irrespective of the procedure 
under which they were adopted. The type of a measure or the procedure under which 
it was adopted only became relevant for the purposes of standing for private parties 
after the application of the revised standing criteria in Article 263(4) TFEU, where it 
has to be decided whether the contested measure is a regulatory act. 
As previously examined,492 the GC493 and then the ECJ in Inuit494 were in line with 
the majority of commentators in holding that “regulatory acts” are measures of 
general application that are not legislative acts and were ready to categorise a pre 
Lisbon measure under the Lisbon categorisations. The EU courts’ methodology will 
be employed in an attempt for a review of the older Case-Law under the revised 
standing criteria. 
                                                 
492 See Chapters 1 and 4. 
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The purpose of this review is to see which of the most commonly cited cases or 
commonly cited examples of categories of cases in the criticism on the previous 
standing regime under Article 173 EEC and Article 230(4) EC would have been 
decided differently had they been considered under Article 263(4) TFEU. It is of 
course impossible to review nearly 60 years of Case-Law, so this review will 
concentrate on a selection of cases, to a large extent, those referred to in one of the 
definitive accounts of the previous standing regime of Article 230 EC, written by A. 
Ward.495 The benefits of such a review are that the effect of the reform can be 
examined by looking at real world scenarios of interrelation between EU acts and the 
effects or combined effects of various types of EU acts on private parties. It also 
allows an examination of the effect of the reform on Case-Law and precedents for 
which a change was argued to be necessary. It is naturally with reference to such 
previous Case-Law that the criticism developed and the authors of the Lisbon Treaty 
decided, among all the options open to them, to relax standing only for regulatory acts 
not entailing implementing measures. 
2. Post-Lisbon legislative procedures 
This methodology requires reference to the legislative procedures under the Lisbon 
Treaty and their predecessors. The Lisbon Treaty has simplified the legislative 
procedures in the EU to a large extent.496 Legislative acts are adopted under the 
ordinary legislative procedure of Article 294 TFEU or by the Council with the 
participation of the European Parliament, and vice versa, under the special legislative 
                                                 
495 A. Ward, Judicial Review and Rights of Private Parties in EU Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2007), 
Chapter 6. 
496 See P. Craig and G. DeBurca EU Law – Text Cases and Materials (OUP, 5th edition, 2011), at p. 
123 and M. Bergstrom, “Judicial Protection for Private Parties in European Commission Rulemaking” 
in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, Rulemaking by the European Commission – The New System for 
Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2016), Chapter 10, at p.p. 209 – 220. 
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procedure as provided in Article 289 TFEU.497 All other acts are non legislative. 
Legislative and non legislative acts are now published under these two headings in the 
Official Journal of the European Union and are easily identifiable.498 
The ordinary legislative procedure is a development of the co-decision procedure that 
existed under Article 251 EC. The special legislative procedure takes various forms 
depending on the particular Treaty article providing for its use. The common forms of 
this procedure are the adoption of a measure by the Council with the consent of the 
European Parliament, or the adoption of a measure by the Council after consulting the 
European Parliament. There are instances however where the consent of the European 
Parliament may be required for the adoption of a non legislative measure, but the 
cases where this is so are not very relevant to this discussion.499 
Two categories of non legislative acts are expressly covered in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
first is delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU, issued by the Commission to 
supplement or amend non essential elements of a legislative act. The second category 
is implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU, issued by the Commission or 
exceptionally the Council where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding 
Union acts are needed. There are also non legislative acts based directly on the 
Treaties and an example is Article 81(3) TFEU, providing for the possible adoption of 
a decision changing the decision making procedure as regards Family Law 
measures.500 
                                                 
497 For the origins under the Constitutional Treaty, see A.H. Turk, “The Concept of the “Legislative 
Act” in the Constitutional Treaty” (2005) 6 German Law Review 1555. 
498 See generally K.S.C. Bradley, “Legislating in the European Union” in C. Barnard and S. Peers, 
European Union Law (OUP, 2nd edition, 2017), Chapter 5, and R. Schutze, European Union Law 
(CUP, 2015), Chapter 7. 
499 See generally P. Craig and G. DeBurca, EU Law – Text Cases and Materials (OUP, 5th edition, 
2011), at p. 130. 
500 See generally J. Bast, “New Categories of Acts After the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of 
Parliamentarization in EU Law” (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 885, J. Bast, “Is There a 
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The distinction between delegated and implementing acts may be significant in other 
respects,501 but is not important for standing.502 As the term “regulatory act” was 
interpreted in Inuit, both delegated and implementing acts can be regulatory acts if 
they are of general application. In the case of delegated acts, these should in any case 
be of general application. 
3. Pre-Lisbon legislative procedures 
As the process for adoption of a measure is a crucial factor in its classification as a 
regulatory act, it is necessary for the purposes of this attempt to review older Case-
Law to have in mind the legislative procedures that existed before the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
As aforesaid, the ordinary legislative procedure in Article 294 TFEU is in essence the 
co-decision procedure that existed in Article 251 EC before the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty,503 under which the Council and the European Parliament jointly adopt 
                                                                                                                                            
Hierarchy of Legislative, Delegated, and Implementing Acts?” in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, 
Rulemaking by the European Commission – The New System for Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2006), 
Chapter 8, D. Curtin and T. Manucharyan, “Legal Acts and Hierarchy of Norms in EU Law” in A. 
Arnull and D. Chalmers, The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), Chapter 5, M. 
Chamon, “Institutional Balance and Community Method in the Implementation of EU Legislation 
Following the Lisbon Treaty” (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1501, and P. Craig and G. De 
Burca, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 6th edition, 2015), Chapter 4. 
501 See P. Craig, “Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New Comitology Regulation”  (2011) 
ELRev 671, A. Heritier, C. Moury and K. Granat, “The Contest for Power in Delegated Rulemaking”, 
in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, Rulemaking by the European Commission – The New System for 
Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2016), Chapter 6, P. Craig, “Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon 
Settlement: Tensions and Strains” in C.F. Bergstrom and D. Ritleng, Rulemaking by the European 
Commission – The New System for Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2016), Chapter 9, S. Peers and M. 
Costa, “Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts After the Treaty of Lisbon” (2012) 18 
European Law Journal 427, T. Christiansen and M. Dobbels, “Non-Legislative Rule Making After the 
Lisbon Treaty: Implementing the New System of Comitology and Delegated Acts” (2013) 19 
European Law Journal 42, D. Curtin, H. Hofmann and J. Mendes, “Constitutionalising the EU 
Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda” (2013) 19 European Law Journal 1, Z. 
Xhaferri, “Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and Institutional Balance Implications Post-Lisbon” 
(2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 557, and J. Mendes, “Delegated and 
Implementing Rule Making: Proceduralisation and Constitutional Design” (2013) European Law 
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502 See also H. Hofmann, “Legislation, Delegation and Implementation Under the Treaty of Lisbon: 
“Typology Meets Reality”  (2009) 15 ELJ 482, at p. 497, fn 69. 
503 Inuit, ibid. 
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a measure. This was originally introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and was 
already under increased use before Lisbon. It was however only after Lisbon that this 
procedure was extended to some of other important areas of EU activity, like 
agriculture, asylum and immigration. 
There was also the consultation procedure where the European Parliament was 
consulted by the Council, but the Council was not bound to adopt its opinion. This 
applied only where the specific Treaty article forming the basis of the measure that 
was going to be enacted provided for such consultation to take place. 
The cooperation procedure of Article 252 EC was introduced by the Single European 
Act in 1986 and has now been repealed by the Lisbon Treaty. This procedure afforded 
a greater role to the European Parliament by according it two readings for measures 
that came within its ambit, through which it was able to propose amendments. 
Before the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, the Council generally acted 
alone upon a proposal of the Commission. 
There was also the assent procedure where the European Parliament had to give its 
assent for a measure to be adopted, but this is not so relevant for this discussion. It 
was introduced by the Single European Act in 1986 and continued to exist for some 
important matters, the most notable being expansion of Community membership 
under Article 49 TEU, Article 105(6) EC on the functioning of the European Central 
Bank, Article 107(5) EC on the amendment of the statute of the European System of 




As Craig and DeBurca assert,504 the distinguishing characteristic of the different 
legislative procedures that applied within the Community Pillar was principally the 
degree of power afforded to the European Parliament. The Commission always had 
the right of initiation of legislation, something which has also been formalised by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
4. Methodology for review 
The methodology that will be employed in this review of older Case-Law is the same 
as that employed by the GC in Inuit505 and subsequently endorsed by the ECJ for the 
classification of the contested measure which was passed before the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, under the categories of acts provided for by the Lisbon Treaty. Three 
tasks are involved. 
The first task is to determine how the contested measure was adopted, in order to see 
if this was the result of a legislative or a non legislative procedure. If it was adopted 
under a legislative procedure, in effect one of the predecessors of the ordinary and 
special legislative procedures, then it would be a legislative act under Lisbon and the 
reform of the standing criteria would not make any difference to the result. 
If it was not adopted under a legislative procedure, then it would be a non legislative 
act under Lisbon and the second task will be performed. This is to determine whether 
the contested measure is of general application. If it is not of general application then 
it would not be classified as a regulatory act under Lisbon and the reform would not 
have made any difference to the result. 
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If the contested measure would be classified as a non legislative act and is of general 
application, then it would be classified as a regulatory act under Lisbon. The third task 
would then be to determine whether the contested measure entailed implementing 
measures. If it did, then the reform would not have made a difference to the result of 
the case as the applicant would still need to satisfy the criteria of direct and individual 
concern. If it did not entail implementing measures, then it would be a regulatory act 
not entailing implementing measures and the applicant would not be required to 
satisfy the criterion of individual concern under the revised criteria of Article 263(4) 
TFEU. In this part of the task, a comparison will be made between the results that are 
produced by the CJEU’s interpretation of the notion of implementing measures in T & 
L Sugars with the results that would have been produced had the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon been accepted. In line with T & L Sugars and related Case-Law, the 
question whether implementing measures are entailed is judged exclusively from the 
standpoint of the applicant. 
In some instances, references from cases are intentionally rather longer than this 
review would necessitate. This was considered desirable for the sake of showing the 
restrictive scope and complexity of certain applications of the Plaumann test for 
individual concern, in order to show in contrast the difference that would have been 
made had the interpretation of implementing measures been different, and also the 
importance that such a different interpretation such as that proposed by AG Cruz 
Villalon would have made. 
5. The 2002 calls for reform 
It is convenient to start this review with the landmark cases, where calls for reform 
were advanced by AG Jacobs and the CFI. In Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. 
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Council,506 the contested measure was Council Regulation (EC) 1638/98 of 
20/7/1998, amending Regulation 136/66/EEC, reforming the Community aid regime 
in the olive oil sector. Regulation 1638/98 was adopted by the Council under ex 
Article 43, which later became Article 37 EC, on the common agricultural policy. 
Measures could be adopted by the Council on a proposal by the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament. This was not the co-decision procedure so it is 
not a predecessor of the ordinary legislative procedure. Nevertheless, the participation 
of the European Parliament in a measure adopted by the Council points to the 
direction of a special legislative procedure507 and suggests that this would still have 
been a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty. The relevant provisions are now found 
in Article 43 TFEU which allows measures to be adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
upon a proposal by the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee. No doubt, if such a measure was adopted under the Lisbon Treaty it 
would have been a legislative act and the standing criteria would still be direct and 
individual concern. The applicants failed to establish individual concern so this case 
would not have been decided differently. 
In Commission v. Jego Quere,508 the measure in question was Commission 
Regulation (EC) 1162/2001 which was an emergency measure aimed at the protection 
of juvenile hake by providing minimum mesh sizes for fishing nets. This was adopted 
by the Commission under the authority granted to it by Council Regulation 3760/92 
which established a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture. The contested 
measure would under Lisbon be a non legislative act of general application, which 
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507 See Article 289(2) TFEU. 
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would make it a regulatory act. Before the judgment of the CJEU in Telefonica or T & 
L Sugars, it seemed highly arguable that it did not entail implementing measures, and 
would accordingly be challengeable by showing only direct concern.509 Indeed this 
would be so under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, and it would accordingly 
lead to a different result in the main action as the applicants had failed to establish 
individual concern. It remains however highly doubtful under that under the 
interpretation of the CJEU, as there is the possibility of some intervention by national 
authorities which could be regarded as implementing measures regardless of their 
mechanical nature. It seems accordingly arguable that although the CJEU accepted 
that the Lisbon Treaty reform intended to reverse the situation where a private party 
would have to break the Law in order to obtain access to a national court, its 
interpretation of implementing measures may not even be capable of reversing Jego 
Quere, which was the judgment that generated much of the discussion on this 
shortcoming of the previous locus standi rules. 
 
6. The Plaumann case 
The founding case of the test for individual concern naturally attracts particular 
attention. In Plaumann v. Commission,510 the measure in question was Decision No. 
SIII 03079 of the Commission of 22/5/1962, refusing to authorise the Republic of 
Germany to suspend in part customs duties applicable to fruit imported fresh from 
third countries. This was a Decision of the Commission upon an authorisation by a 
prior measure, something likely to be considered as a delegated or implementing act 
under the Lisbon Treaty and accordingly a non legislative act. This was addressed 
                                                 
509 See also S. Peers and M. Costa, “Judicial Review of EU Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon; Order of 6 
September 2011, Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. Commission & Judgment of 25 
October 2011, Case 262/10 Microban v. Commission”  (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 
82, at p. 99-100, taking a similar view for the contested measures in UPA and Jego Quere. 
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188 
 
only to the Republic of Germany but was of general application as it affected any 
importer of fresh fruit in Germany.511 Under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, 
an act of the German national authorities not suspending such duties would not be 
considered as implementing measures, and the measure would accordingly be 
challengeable by showing only direct concern. However, under the CJEU’s 
interpretation, such acts would constitute implementing measures, maintaining the 
need to show individual concern. 
7. General open and closed class 
It is interesting to review some of the cases coming under the general application of 
the Plaumann test, commonly referred to as the open and closed class category. In 
Calpak v. Commission,512 the challenge was against Regulations 1731/79 and 1732/79 
adopted by the Commission under an authorisation from Council Regulation 516/77 
which altered the amount of financial aid for producers of Williams pears preserved in 
syrup. Standing was denied as the applicant producers belonged to an open class. This 
was a regulation based on an earlier legislative act, and would accordingly be 
considered as a delegated or implementing act under the Lisbon Treaty. It was of 
general application and would accordingly be considered as a regulatory act under the 
Lisbon Treaty. Under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, this act would not entail 
implementing measures and would not require the applicant to show individual 
concern under Article 263(4) TFEU, while under the test of the CJEU this would lead 
to the opposite conclusion. It is interesting to note that in the scenario of the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, this would provide an awkward contrast with the 
position in UPA, where, similarly, the financial aid scheme for producers of olive oil 
                                                 
511 As in Case C-274/12 P Telefonica v. Commission  EU:C:2013:852. 
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was altered by the contested measure. Although both measures had similar effects on 
the applicants in these two cases, just because the measure in UPA was adopted under 
a legislative procedure the applicants in that case would be unable to challenge it as 
they would fail to establish individual concern.513 Under the interpretation of the 
CJEU, the position is unaltered. 
There are also two good examples where value was removed from existing contracts 
because of Community measures, but the applicants would still not be able to 
challenge them directly as they would be legislative acts. The first is Buralux v. 
Council,514 where the action for annulment was against Council Regulation 259/93 
which allowed Member States to prohibit, under certain conditions, shipments of 
waste. The applicants carried out collection, shipment and dumping of household 
waste originating in Germany and exportation to France, having concluded renewable 
5 year contracts with public bodies in Germany. Pursuant to the contested Regulation, 
France effectively prohibited the importation of household waste for dumping 
purposes. The applicants were denied standing as they belonged to an open class. The 
contested Regulation was adopted by the Council upon a proposal of the Commission, 
having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament. The involvement of the 
European Parliament makes this likely to be classified as a legislative act under the 
Lisbon Treaty, so the locus standi conditions remain unaltered. 
The second such example is The Galileo Company and Galileo International LLC v. 
Council.515 The action was against Council Regulation 323/99 which amended 
Council Regulation 2299/89. Regulation 323/99 was adopted by the Council under the 
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procedure laid down in Article 189c (later Article 252 EC) with the participation of 
the European Parliament, upon a proposal of the Commission, and would be a 
legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty. The contested provision affected the use of 
travel reservation systems and removed value from existing contracts the applicants 
had. It sought to ensure that small or medium sized airlines and travel agents had 
access to information on large databases owned by airline companies, on services 
provided by the travel industry. Standing was again denied as the applicants belonged 
to an open class and could not satisfy individual concern. 
In Buralux, it was in a sense the French measure that directly caused the loss of value 
to the applicants’ contracts and there could be an argument that the Community 
measure as a legislative act was not the direct cause of this loss. This challenge could 
have failed on direct concern anyway, something which was not considered by the 
ECJ, given its finding on individual concern.516 The legislative act in The Galileo 
seems however to have been the direct cause of the applicants’ loss. 
7.1. Cases related to control of substances 
Cases on Community measures on control of the use of substances also provide 
interesting comparisons. In Alpharma Inc v. Council,517 the contested measure was 
Council Regulation (EC) 2821/98 which amended Directive 70/524/EEC concerning 
additives in feeding stuffs, by banning virginiamycin and other antibiotic growth 
promoters in animals. Standing was granted since, first, the process of authorising the 
marketing of virginiamycin vested the applicants with procedural guarantees,518 and, 
secondly, because they had already made applications to market virginiamycin before 
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the ban took effect, the authorisation scheme established by the EC provided them 
with legal safeguards. The contested Regulation was adopted by the Council upon the 
proposal of the Commission, under an authorisation granted under Article 11 of 
Council Directive 70/524, but without the involvement of the European Parliament. 
This Directive was adopted under Article 43 on the common agricultural policy, for 
which the ordinary legislative procedure is now specified.519 The lack of participation 
of the European Parliament in the adoption of the contested Regulation suggests that 
this would not have been a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty. It would have been 
a non legislative act of general application and accordingly a regulatory act. Under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, this would not entail implementing measures, and 
would be challengeable without the need to show individual concern, but the 
necessary involvement of national authorities in the enforcement and supervision of 
its application are likely to be regarded as implementing measures under the 
interpretation of the CJEU. 
The case of Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council520 was decided on very similar facts. 
This was another application for annulment of Council Regulation (EC) 2821/98, 
amending Directive 70/524/EEC. As already mentioned, the contested regulation 
actually withdrew from an annex of this Directive some antibiotics and thereby 
revoked the authorisation for their use in feeding stuffs. Having been adopted by the 
Council upon the proposal of the Commission but without the involvement of the 
European Parliament, this would be a regulatory act under Lisbon. Direct and 
individual concern were found to exist in this case. The applicants were said to be the 
only manufacturers of virginiamycin in the world, and this substance was prohibited 
by the contested measure. The measure would have been challengeable without the 
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need to show individual concern had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for 
implementing measures been adopted, but this again seems very questionable under 
the interpretation of the CJEU, given the possible involvement of national authorities 
despite the mechanical nature of such involvement. 
The action in DOW AgroSciences BV v. European Parliament and Council521 was for 
the partial annulment of Decision 2455/2001/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council, establishing a list of priority substances in the field of water policy and 
amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and the Council. The 
contested Decision was adopted under the co-decision procedure of Article 251 EC 
and would accordingly be a legislative act under Lisbon as that procedure is now the 
ordinary legislative procedure in Article 294 TFEU. The applicants failed on both 
direct and individual concern in this case, and it would not be decided differently 
under Lisbon. 
Similarly, Campo Ebro Industrial SA v. Council522 was an action for the annulment of 
Council Regulation (EEC) 3814/92, amending Regulation (EEC) 1785/81 and 
introducing application in Spain of the sugar sector prices provided for by that 
Regulation. The CFI considered that the contested Regulation was a measure of 
general application, which applied to objectively determined situations and produced 
legal effects for classes of persons envisaged in a general and abstract manner, namely 
producers within the sugar sector.523 Producers of isoglucose were not mentioned in 
the provisions. Even if, as the applicants claimed, they were the only producers of 
isoglucose in Spain, they were affected in the same way as any other trader. 
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Accordingly, the applicants failed under individual concern and their appeal was also 
dismissed.524 The contested Regulation was adopted by the Council having regard to 
the proposal of the Commission and the opinion of the European Parliament, under 
Article 43 on the common agricultural policy. Under Lisbon it would have been a 
legislative act so individual concern would still be required. 
The contrary result could have been produced by Bactria Industriehygiene-Service 
Verwaltungs GmbH v. Commission525 under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. 
This was an application for annulment of Commission Regulation (EC) 1896/2000 on 
the first phase of the programme referred to in Article 16(2) of Directive 98/8/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council on biocidal products. The purpose of this 
directive was to establish Community rules for the authorisation and placing on the 
market of biocidal products. The contested Regulation was designed to initiate the 
evaluation of existing active substances of biocidal products. Under Article 28(3) of 
the Directive, Commission Decisions addressed to Member States would state 
substances that will not be included in some annexes of the Directive and these 
substances will no longer be placed on the market for biocidal purposes. The 
contested regulation set the regime for the examination of existing active substances. 
The applicants claimed that the contested regulation was incompatible with its legal 
basis, this being the Directive, and that it distorted competition. They argued that they 
were individually concerned in that they belonged to a closed class, they had 
participated in the process leading to the adoption of the Regulation and that this 
action for annulment was the only remedy available to them. They failed on all 
grounds. In relation to this last argument, the CFI replied that it must be held that the 
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possible absence of remedies, supposing it is established, cannot justify an 
amendment by way of judicial interpretation of the system of remedies and 
procedures laid down in the Treaty,526 and further held that in no case does it allow 
standing where the conditions of Article 230(4) EC are not satisfied. Under Lisbon, 
the contested Regulation is likely to be regarded as a regulatory act. Under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, it would not entail implementing measures, being 
a complete set of rules, but it is very likely that the interpretation of the CJEU would 
lead to the contrary conclusion. 
Under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing measures, it would 
interestingly seem difficult to understand the rationale for the difference in treatment 
between DOW and Campo Ebro, on the one hand, and Bactria, Alpharma and Pfizer 
on the other. All involve measures dealing with substances that have similar or 
comparable effects on private parties, yet in some of the cases the applicants would 
under Lisbon still be required to show individual concern to challenge them, just 
because they would be considered to be legislative acts. The interpretation of the 
CJEU for implementing measures renders all these cases back to the position they 
would have been before the reform. 
7.2. Cases related to quotas 
Had again the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing measures been 
adopted, such differing results could also be produced in challenges to regulations 
related to quotas. In Chiquita Banana v. Council,527 the challenge was against Council 
Regulation 404/93 which was adopted by the Council upon the proposal of the 
Commission, having regard to the opinions of the European Parliament and the 
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Economic and Social Committee. This Regulation established certain arrangements 
for trade in bananas with third countries and a mechanism for the allocation of tariff 
quotas between categories of traders. The applicants were one of the few traders of 
bananas that were affected but they were denied standing as they belonged to an open 
class. The contested regulation would be a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty and 
the applicants would still be required to show individual concern. A challenge against 
the same measure, Council Regulation 404/93, can be found in Leon Van Parijs v. 
Council and Commission.528 The applicants were traders of bananas and sought to 
challenge the imposed tariff quota on the import of bananas from third countries. This 
was also dismissed as inadmissible since they belonged to an open class. 
On the other hand, Comafrica SpA and another v. Commission529 was an action for 
annulment of two measures adopted by the Commission. These were Commission 
Regulation (EC) 896/2001, laying down detailed rules for applying Council 
Regulation (EEC) 404/93, and Commission Regulation (EC) 1121/2001, fixing the 
adjustment coefficients to be applied to each traditional operator’s reference under the 
tariff quotas for imports of bananas. Commission Regulation 896/2001 was adopted 
under Article 20 of Council Regulation 404/93, as amended. Under Lisbon and the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, this would be a delegated or implementing act of 
general application and would accordingly have been classed as a regulatory act not 
entailing implementing measures, making it challengeable without the need to show 
individual concern. Likewise, Regulation 1121/2001 which set tariff quotas would 
also have been interpreted as a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures 
under this interpretation. It was adopted on the basis of Article 5(2) of Commission 
Regulation 896/2001. In the action, the applicants were held not to be individually 
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concerned by both contested regulations and under the interpretation of the CJEU for 
implementing measures they would likewise probably fail as they would still be 
required to show individual concern. 
Worthy of particular mention is Roquette v. Council.530 The contested measure was 
Council Regulation (EEC) 1293/1979, amending Council Regulation (EEC) 1111/77 
laying down common provisions for isoglucose. The applicants were manufacturers 
of isoglucose and the contested Regulation fixed the production quota for the 
applicant in an annex that it inserted in Regulation 1111/77. The contested measure 
was adopted by the Council upon the proposal of the Commission, having regard to 
the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee and after consulting the European 
Parliament. The involvement of the European Parliament suggests that under Lisbon 
this would have been a legislative act and individual concern would still be required. 
Interestingly, individual concern was found in this case and standing was granted. The 
annex referred to the applicants and other manufacturers by name and this was held to 
be a bundle of decisions, the addressees of which were individually concerned. This is 
an example of a Council Regulation, which would be a legislative act under Lisbon, 
fixing quotas specifically for certain manufacturers referred to by name. And yet, 
under Lisbon the applicants would still be required to show individual concern 
because of the procedure under which it was adopted. Whereas, for measures of a 
more general nature, like Commission Decision 2010/169/EU in Microban,531 
generally and abstractly providing for the non inclusion of triclosan in the list of 
additives which may be used in the manufacture of plastic materials and articles that 
come into contact with food, individual concern would not be required in cases where 
no implementing measures are entailed. However, it might be that on the authority of 
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Roquette, considering similar measures specifically referring to private parties by 
name as a bundle of decisions, the same protection is afforded to these parties as 
individual concern is satisfied. 
Other examples from various areas of EU activity also offer interesting results. In 
Josef Buckl & Sohne OHG v. Commission,532 the applicants operated duck and geese 
slaughterhouses in Germany and brought an action for the annulment of a 
Commission Decision dated 18/1/1991 in which it refused their request to re-establish 
completely the levies on the import of certain quantities of ducks and geese 
originating in Poland and Hungary that had been reduced by 50% by Council 
Regulation 3899/89. The Commission was vested with such an authority under 
Articles 4 and 5 of this Regulation. The ECJ began by noting that a decision of the 
Commission which amounts to a rejection must be appraised in the light of the nature 
of the request to which it constituted a reply.533 It then concluded that a regulation 
which re-established completely the levies would concern importers without 
distinction, and it was accordingly clear that the measure sought by the applicants 
would be one of general application.534 The action for annulment was declared 
inadmissible as the applicants belonged to an open class, being affected only in their 
objective capacity as traders, in the same way as any other trader. If the rule that a 
decision of the Commission rejecting a request must be appraised in the light of the 
nature of the initial request is employed in deciding whether such a rejection would 
under the Lisbon Treaty be considered as a regulatory act, then the contested decision 
in this case would be so considered as a regulatory act. And once again, most likely 
under the test of AG Cruz Villalon it would not entail implementing measures, so it 
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would be challengeable without the need to show individual concern, whereas this 
would not the case under the test of the CJEU. 
A similar case is Commission v. Camar Srl.535 This appeal involved various issues but 
of main interest is the appeal from the judgment of the CFI in Case T-117/98. This 
concerned an action for annulment of a Commission Decision rejecting a request of 
the applicants, who were the main importers of Somalian bananas, for adjustment of 
the tariff quota which was filed under Article 16(3) of Council Regulation 404/93. 
The CFI had granted them standing on the basis that they were the main importers of 
Somalian bananas and annulled the contested decision. The ECJ allowed the appeal, 
holding that they would not have been individually concerned by the regulation they 
asked the Commission to adopt, as they belonged to an open class, the contested 
decision was a rejection of a request for a regulation of a general nature and not of 
individual concern to them. As in Josef Buckl, if the same test is applied, under 
Lisbon such a regulation would have been a regulatory act. There now seems to be 
some inherent difficulty however in deciding whether such a potential regulatory act 
would entail implementing measures, and this seems rather as an anomaly. Except in 
the cases where the potential measure has to be adopted based on a prescribed 
procedure that is well in place subject to a Treaty Article or other governing 
legislation that puts it likewise in context with sufficient clarity, it seems difficult to 
make such predictions. 
In Abertal SAT Ltda v. Commission,536 the applicants who were Spanish producers of 
nuts and locust beans sought the annulment of Article 1 of Commission Regulation 
1304/91 amending Commission Regulation 2159/89 which laid down detailed rules 
for applying the specific measures for nuts and locust beans as provided by Council 
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Regulation 1035/72. The contested Article restricted the conditions under which 
producers’ organisations could apply to change plans which had already been 
approved in order to extend the surface area covered by the plan. It also restricted the 
payment of advances on the annual instalment of aid and brought in stricter 
requirements concerning the administrative information which such organisations had 
to supply in order to receive Community aid for improvement plans. The applicants 
were denied standing. Commission Regulation 1304/91 would have been a regulatory 
act under Lisbon, but it seems clear that under the interpretation of the CJEU, it would 
entail implementing measures and accordingly individual concern would still be 
required. It is not straightforward to say whether this is a provision that would not 
entail implementing measures even under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, 
since what it did was to lay down general rules to be followed by competent 
authorities in reaching a decision on a private party’s request. 
 
7.3. General examples 
 
In CNPAAP v. Council,537 the action was against Council Regulation (EC) 3604/93 
specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition of privileged access 
referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty. It provided for example, a definition of the 
terms “financial institutions” and “prudential considerations”, encountered in the text 
of Article 104a of the Treaty. This was adopted by the Council upon a proposal of the 
Commission and in cooperation with the European Parliament. This would 
accordingly be regarded as a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty and individual 
concern would still be required, despite its effects on private parties. 
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In Sociedade Agricola dos Arinhos Ld v. Commission,538 the contested measure was 
Article 2(a) of Commission Decision 98/653/EC concerning emergency measures 
made necessary by the occurrence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Portugal. 
Among others, it ordered Portugal to ensure that live bovine animals and embryos are 
not dispatched from its territory to other Member States or third countries. The 
applicants were all Portuguese breeders of fighting bulls for cultural and sporting 
events. They unsuccessfully claimed to be individually concerned on the basis that  
fighting bulls are a different category and are accordingly differentiated from other 
breeders. The CFI recognised that the purpose of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 
of the Treaty was to ensure that legal protection is also available to a person who, 
whilst not the person to whom the contested measure is addressed, is in fact affected 
by it in the same way as is the addressee.539 However, it found that the arguments put 
forward by the applicants did not show that they were differentiated from other 
breeders. The contested decision was addressed in general and abstract terms to 
indeterminate classes of persons and applied to objectively determined situations. 
There was also no procedural safeguard or right of the applicants to be heard during 
the process of adoption of the decision. The contested decision was addressed to all 
Member States. It was adopted by the Commission based on Article 9(4) of Directive 
89/662/EEC and Article 10(4) of Directive 90/425/EEC authorising it to take 
emergency measures to avert dangers of disease outbreak. Under Lisbon, this is likely 
to be classed as a regulatory act, which would not entail implementing measures 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, whereas it would so entail 
implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
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In Agricola Commerciale Olio v. Commission,540 the application was for the 
annulment of Commission Regulations (EEC) 2238/81 and 2239/81. Regulation 
2238/81 repealed Regulation (EEC) 71/81 which provided for the sale of a specific 
quantity of olive oil at a fixed price following complaints by some of the tenderers. 
Regulation 2239/81 reopened the sale by tender of this quantity by the Italian 
intervention agency. Both contested Regulations were passed by the Commission 
having regard to Council Regulation 136/66/EEC. Under Regulation 2239/81 the sale 
was restricted to the six undertakings designated by the drawing of lots and was no 
longer to take place at a fixed price but on the basis of the best tender received and on 
the condition that the price offered was at least equal to the minimum selling price to 
be fixed by 31/8/1981. The Commission argued that the regulations were of a general 
and abstract nature and not of individual concern to the applicants. The ECJ 
emphasised that Regulation 71/81 fixed unconditionally not only the price and the 
quantities of oil put up for sale, but also all the other conditions of sale, leaving no 
place for additional contractual stipulations. The applications to purchase could not be 
withdrawn and the Regulation provided that designation of the purchasers among 
those who submitted applications was to be by the drawing of lots, without the effect 
of the latter being subject to any letter of allocation being sent. From the time the lots 
were drawn, the situation as between the parties to the sale was determined. 
Regardless of when ownership was transferred, it follows that any intervention on the 
part of the Community institutions preventing the Italian authority from carrying out 
its obligations to the tenderers designated by the drawing of lots necessarily 
constitutes a measure of direct and individual concern to them. Both regulations were 
annulled in the action. Under Lisbon, both the contested Regulations would be 
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regulatory acts. They would not entail implementing measures under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, whereas the intervention of the Italian authorities 
would be considered as implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
In Weddel & Co BV v. Commission,541 the application was for the annulment of 
Commission Regulation (EEC) 2806/87 on the issue of import licenses for high 
quality fresh, chilled or frozen beef and veal. This Regulation fixed in great detail the 
criteria on the basis of which import licences must be granted, without leaving any 
discretion to the agencies of the Member States responsible for issuing licences, and 
was accordingly held to be of direct concern to the applicants. As for individual 
concern, the ECJ noted that the contested Regulation was adopted in view of the 
quantities of beef and veal in respect of which individual applications for import 
licenses had been lodged in the first 10 days of September 1987. When it was 
adopted, the number of applications which were likely to be affected was known and 
no new application could be added. On the basis of the total quantity for which 
applications had been lodged, the percentage up to which applications were to be 
granted was determined. Consequently, even if the Commission was aware only of the 
quantities applied for when it adopted the contested Regulation, it thereby decided on 
the treatment to be accorded to each application. This was accordingly considered as a 
bundle of individual decisions taken by the Commission pursuant to Commission 
Regulation (EEC) 3985/86 in the guise of a Regulation, each of those affecting the 
legal position of each applicant individually. The application was however dismissed 
on its substance. Under Lisbon, the contested Regulation would have been a 
regulatory act. Commission Regulation (EEC) 3985/86 was itself based on Council 
Regulations (EEC) 3927/86 and 3928/86 and would accordingly, along with the 
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contested Regulation, be considered as delegated or implementing acts under Lisbon. 
The same conclusion as in previously examined cases is also reached in respect of 
implementing measures, which would not be entailed under the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon, whereas the involvement of the national authorities would mean that 
implementing measures are entailed under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
In CAM v. Commission,542 the action was against Commission Regulation 2546/74 
concerning certain measures to be taken following the raising of threshold prices for 
cereals and rice and trading licenses for these products. This Regulation was itself 
adopted further to Council Regulations 120/67/EEC and 359/67/EEC, as amended, 
and is very likely to be considered as a regulatory act, along with the same conclusion 
as above in relation to the question of entailing implementing measures. Standing was 
anyway granted to the applicants in that case as they belonged to a closed class, but 
the application was eventually dismissed as no grounds for annulment were found. 
In Eridania SpA and others v. Council,543 the contested measure was Council 
Regulation 1534/95 fixing the derived intervention prices for white sugar for the 
1995-1996 marketing year, some other relevant matters for related products and the 
amount of compensation for storage costs. The applicant companies held together 
92% of the sugar production quotas allocated to Italy. They were denied standing as 
they belonged to an open class, despite their share of quotas allocated to Italy. The 
contested Regulation was adopted by the Council on a proposal of the Commission, 
under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) 1785/81 which was itself 
adopted under Article 43 on common agricultural policy with the participation of the 
European Parliament. The non participation of the European Parliament in the 
adoption of the contested measure suggests that this would be a non legislative act 
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under Lisbon. It was of general application, fixing prices and compensation for a 
particular marketing year, rendering it a regulatory act under Lisbon. It would not 
entail implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, so 
individual concern would not be required, but the opposite conclusion is reached 
under the interpretation of the CJEU. This area is now regulated under Council 
Regulation (EC) 318/2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar 
sector, which was adopted under Article 37 EC on common agricultural policy with 
the opinion of the European Parliament. Changes to national quotas and several other 
tasks have under this Regulation been delegated to the Commission, so measures 
similar to the contested Regulation in this case would still be regulatory acts. There 
have of course been several amendments to this Regulation by the Council with the 
participation of the European Parliament, and those would be legislative acts. 
Another case in the sugar sector where the contested measure was adopted by the 
Commission is Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH v. Commission.544 The application was for 
the partial annulment of Commission Regulation (EEC) 1837/78 defining the scope of 
Article 4(5) of Commission Regulation (EEC) 1380/75 laying down detailed rules for 
the application of monetary compensatory amounts. Commission Regulation 1380/75 
was itself based on Council Regulation (EEC) 974/71. The applicants were sugar 
exporters who had been granted before 1/7/1978 licenses to export sugar in which the 
refunds had been set in a national currency, and who claimed that they suffered 
damage as a result of the contested regulation. Direct concern was found. They 
claimed to be individually concerned as belonging to a closed class, but the ECJ 
disagreed on the ground that the system applied to all successful tenderers, whatever 
the date of the award, provided that exportation took place after 1/7/1978. Regulation 
                                                 




1837/78 would under Lisbon be classed as a regulatory act, which would most 
probably not entail implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz 
Villalon, but would fail under the interpretation of the CJEU due to the involvement 
of national authorities. 
In FRSEA and FNSEA v. Council,545 the action was for the annulment of Council 
Regulation (EEC) 125/93 amending Council Regulation (EEC) 805/68 on the 
common organisation of the market in beef and veal. The applicants were two 
associations of agricultural trade organisations representing the interests of French 
farmers. The contested Regulation laid down certain rules that would apply by 
amending the existing rules in Regulation 805/68. It was adopted by the Council upon 
the proposal of the Commission, having regard to the opinion of the European 
Parliament, and would have been a legislative act under Lisbon. Individual concern 
was not found in this case. 
 
In Kik v. Council and Commission,546 the applicant was a lawyer and trademark agent 
who sought to challenge Article 115 of Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 on the 
Community Trademark, in so far as this excluded Dutch from the languages of the 
Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market. The action was dismissed as 
manifestly inadmissible by the CFI. It was noted that Regulation 40/94 is clearly 
intended to establish a single procedural system whereby undertakings can obtain a 
Community trademark.547 As part of that single system, the language regime set by 
Article 115 produces legal effects with respect to a category of persons envisaged in 
the abstract, namely persons seeking to obtain a Community trademark on their own 
behalf or on behalf of their principals. The applicant was affected by the contested 
                                                 
545 Case T-476/93 FRSEA and FNSEA v. Council  [1993] ECR II-1187. 
546 Case T-107/94 Kik v. Council and Commission  [1995] ECR II-1717. 
547 At para 36 of the Order. 
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measure solely in her objective capacity as a trademark agent, in the same way as any 
other trademark agent who is, or might be in the future, in the same situation 
regarding the language used until now in his or her professional capacity. The 
contested Regulation was adopted by the Council upon the proposal of the 
Commission and having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. It would accordingly be a legislative act under 
Lisbon. It is interesting to observe that if exactly the same act was adopted by the 
Commission through a non legislative procedure, then it would be a regulatory act not 
entailing implementing measures at least in relation to the exclusion of the Dutch 
language from the official languages of the Office, and individual concern would not 
be required. This seems to be so under both the interpretation of the CJEU and AG 
Cruz Villalon. 
In Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission,548 there was a challenge against a Commission 
Decision dated 7/7/1982, authorising the Netherlands not to apply Community 
treatment to certain brushes originating in China and in free circulation in other 
Member States. This Decision was not addressed to the applicants, but to the Benelux 
States alone, and it was necessary to determine whether it was of direct and individual 
concern to them. Individual concern was not satisfied as they belonged to an open 
class and this could not be invalidated by the fact that they were the only importers 
established in the Benelux States regularly importing into the Netherlands brushes 
originating in China and that it was one of its imports which led to the adoption of the 
contested Decision. This was published in the Official Journal as a Commission 
communication under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty, allowing the Commission to 
take such Decisions in areas of Commercial policy. This became Article 134 EC and 
                                                 
548 Case 231/82 Spijker Kwasten BV v. Commission  [1983] ECR 2559. 
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was then repealed under the Lisbon Treaty, something which creates some uncertainty 
as to whether this would be a legislative act. It does however resemble to a regulatory 
act of general application, having been issued by the Commission acting alone, in 
which case the same conclusion would be reached as to the question of implementing 
measures, in that they would not be entailed under the interpretation of AG Cruz 
Villalon, whereas they would be entailed under that of the CJEU. 
7.4. Cases related to use of descriptions and designations 
Challenges against Community acts regulating the use of descriptions and 
designations also provide interesting comparisons and produce results showing the 
potential of difference in treatment for measures of similar or comparable effect to 
private parties. In Deutz und Geldermann v. Council,549 the measure in question was 
Regulation 3309/85 of the Council, laying general rules about the description of 
sparkling wines. This was adopted by the Council upon a proposal of the 
Commission, having regard to the opinions of the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. The authorising act was Regulation 337/79 of the 
Council which was adopted under ex Article 37 EC, the equivalent of which is now 
Article 43 TFEU employing the ordinary legislative procedure for such measures. 
Regulation 337/79 would accordingly be a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Similarly, in FNAB v. Council,550 the contested measure was Council Regulation 
1804/99, supplementing Council Regulation 2092/91, related to the use of certain 
designations of organic products.  The applicants were denied standing as they 
belonged to an open class and the fact that their competitive position was affected by 
that measure was not sufficient to distinguish them individually from other traders. 
                                                 
549 Case 26/86 Deutz und Geldermann v. Council  [1987] ECR 941. 
550 Case C-345/00 P FNAB and others v. Council  [2001] ECR I-3811. 
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The contested Regulation was adopted by the Council upon a proposal of the 
Commission, having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament, and would 
also be classified as a legislative act under the Lisbon Treaty. 
On the contrary, the contested measure in Molkerei and another v. Commission551 was 
Commission Regulation 123/97 supplementing the Annex to Commission Regulation 
1107/96 on the registration of geographical indications and designations of origin 
under the procedure laid down in Article 17 of Council Regulation 2081/92. The 
applicants were producers of cheese affected by the inclusion of “Altenburger 
Ziegenkaese” as a protected designation in the contested Regulation. They also had 
been heard by the Commission during the procedure which led to the adoption of the 
contested regulation. They were denied standing as they belonged to an open class, 
with the ECJ regarding the contested regulation as a measure of general application, 
and hence of a legislative nature.552 This would be a regulatory act under Lisbon and 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon it would not entail implementing 
measures, while it would under the interpretation of the CJEU. In the scenario of the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, it would appear difficult to reconcile or justify this 
difference in treatment between Deutz, FNAB and also Codorniu553 on the one hand, 
and Molkerei on the other. 
Also of interest is La Conqueste SCEA v. Commission.554 The action was for the 
annulment of Commission Regulation 1338/2000, completing the Annex to 
Commission Regulation 2400/96 on the entry of certain names in the Register of 
protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications provided for 
                                                 
551 Case C-447/98 P Molkerei and another v. Commission  [2000] ECR I-9097. 
552 Para 67 of the judgment. 
553 Case C-309/89 Codorniu SA v. Council  [1994] ECR I-1853, considered below. 
554 Case C-151/01P La Conqueste SCEA v. Commission  [2002] ECR I-1179. 
209 
 
in Council Regulation 2081/92 on the protection of such indications and designations 
for agricultural products and foodstuffs, as regards registration as a protected 
geographical indication of the name “Canard a foie gras du Sud-Ouest”. The 
applicants were denied standing as they belonged to an open class, despite the 
economic impact the contested measure had on them which they claimed that 
essentially ousted them from the market in ducks for “foie gras du Sud-Ouest”. The 
contested Regulation is now likely to be considered as a regulatory act under Lisbon 
which, under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon would not entail implementing 
measures but would under the interpretation of the CJEU due to the involvement of 
national authorities. It would be a delegated or implementing act under the authority 
Council Regulation 2081/92. Commission Regulation 2400/96 would not entail 
implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon but would under 
the interpretation of the CJEU. These Commission Regulations basically inserted 
protected names in an Annex. It also seems that the same considerations as to 
implementing measures apply to Council Regulation 2081/92. 
The question that seems to arise from these cases is whether the task of determining if 
an act entails implementing measures encompasses an examination of whether the 
authorising legislative act on which it is based and which contains general provisions 
about the enforcement or the rules that apply also entails implementing measures. In 
other words, if there is an authorising legislative act that sets complete rules and the 
delegated act only amends an annex by inserting a designation or a description to the 
list, whether such a delegated act should be considered along with the legislative act 
in order to decide if the end result requires implementing measures. An answer seems 
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to have come from Microban,555 where the contested measure was a Commission 
decision amending an annex to a directive. The GC accepted that it did not entail 
implementing measures despite the fact that the directive required implementing 
measures, on the justification that the directive had already been transposed by the 
Member States.556 It should however be borne in mind that Microban was decided 
before Telefonica and T & L Sugars which applied a different interpretation to the 
notion of implementing measures. Accordingly, the possible intervention of national 
authorities would very likely constitute implementing measures anyway. 
8. Legal and procedural guarantees 
Of particular interest appears to be the review of the Case-Law in another category of 
applications of the Plaumann test, which exceptionally recognises individual concern 
as satisfied where there are legal provisions protecting the interests of a private party 
or requiring an institution to take a private party’s interests into account. The most 
commonly cited case in this category is perhaps Sofrimport SARL v. Commission.557 
This was an application for the annulment of Commission Regulations (EEC) 962/88 
and 984/88 suspending the issue of import licenses for dessert apples originating in 
Chile, and Commission Regulation (EEC) 1040/88 fixing quantities of imports of 
dessert apples originating in third countries and amending Regulation (EEC) 962/88 
suspending the issue of import licenses. All the contested Regulations were adopted 
under the system of surveillance of imports of dessert apples from third countries 
established under Commission Regulation (EEC) 346/88. The applicants were 
importers and wholesalers of fresh fruit with apples in transit to the Community. Their 
                                                 
555 Case T-262/10 Microban International Ltd and Microban (Europe) Ltd v. Commission  
EU:T:2011:623, at paras 33-39. 
556 See para 35 of the judgment. 
557 Case C-152/88 Sofrimport SARL v. Commission  [1990] ECR I-2477. 
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application for an import license was rejected based on the contested Regulations. 
Direct concern was satisfied as Regulation 962/88 required the national authorities to 
reject pending applications for import licenses without allowing them any discretion. 
The ECJ held that the applicants were in the position referred to in Article 3(3) of 
Council Regulation (EEC) 2707/72 which required the Commission, in adopting such 
measures, to take account of the special position of products in transit to the 
Community. Only importers of Chilean apples whose goods were in transit when 
Regulation 962/88 was adopted were in that position, and accordingly formed a 
closed class that was sufficiently well defined and could not be extended after the 
measures took effect. Secondly, since Regulation 2707/72 gave specific protection to 
those importers, they must have been able to enforce observance of that protection 
and bring legal proceedings for that purpose. The criterion of individual concern was 
accordingly satisfied. The contested Regulations were then annulled on the merits of 
the case. Their claim for compensation for non contractual liability also succeeded. 
The contested measures, as described above, would all be considered as regulatory 
acts, which under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon would not entail 
implementing measures, but would under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
Regularly cited in this category is also Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission.558 This was an 
application for annulment of Commission Decision 81/988/EEC authorising France to 
take protective measures with regard to imports of cotton yarn from Greece, as 
provided for in Article 130 of the Act of Accession of Greece to the European 
Communities.559 This Decision was addressed to the French Republic and the 
Hellenic Republic, and authorised France to limit imports of cotton yarn from Greece. 
The Commission was specifically authorised to adopt such measures under Article 
                                                 
558 Case 11/82 SA Piraiki-Patraiki and others v. Commission  [1985] ECR 207. 
559 OJ No. L291, 19/11/1979, p. 17. 
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130 of the Act of Accession of Greece. As to the issue of direct concern, the ECJ 
noted that without implementing measures adopted at national level, the contested 
Decision could not have affected the applicants, but held that in this case, that fact 
does not in itself prevent the Decision from being of direct concern if other factors 
justify the conclusion that they have a direct interest in bringing the action. It was 
concluded that under the circumstances the possibility that France might decide not to 
make use of the authorisation granted by the contested Decision was entirely 
theoretical, since there could be no doubt as to their intention to apply the Decision, 
and direct concern was satisfied. As for individual concern, the applicants belonged to 
an open class and could not succeed on that ground. Some of them had however 
concluded agreements with customers in France. In order to ascertain whether the 
measure whose authorisation was being considered meets the conditions laid down in 
Article 130(3) of the Act of Accession of Greece, the Commission had to take into 
account the situation in the Member State with regard to which the protective measure 
was requested. In particular, in so far as the circumstances permitted, the Commission 
must have inquired into the negative effects which its decision might have on the 
economy of that Member State as well as on the undertakings concerned. It was 
accordingly under an obligation to consider the contracts some of the applicants had 
entered into. Those undertakings were held to be individually concerned on this 
ground. The contested Decision was annulled on the merits of the action. Under 
Lisbon the contested Decision is likely to have been a regulatory act since it was not 
adopted under one of the legislative procedures and was of general application. It is 
evident however that it did entail implementing measures and individual concern 
would accordingly still be required. 
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This case seems to provide a good example of the differences between the notion of 
direct concern and the notion of entailing implementing measures even if the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon had been accepted. Direct concern would in any 
case have to be wider and found in cases such as this, where a Member State has 
discretion in applying the act, but the possibility of not making use of it is found 
under the circumstances to be entirely theoretical. 
In Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Commission560 which was a challenge against an anti-
dumping measure, the reasoning for finding individual concern was very similar to 
Piraiki-Patraiki due to the resemblance of Article 130(3) of the Act of Accession of 
Greece to Article 109(2) of Council Decision 91/482/EEC on the association of the 
overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community. The 
contested measure was Commission Decision 93/127/EEC introducing safeguard 
measures in respect of rice originating in the Netherlands Antilles, adopted under 
Article 109 of Council Decision 91/482/EEC. Unlike the Decision in Piraiki-Patraiki, 
which was addressed only to France and Greece, the contested Decision was 
addressed to all Member States and set detailed measures and procedures to be 
followed in respect of rice originating from the Netherlands Antilles, without 
requiring implementing measures. Under Lisbon, it would have been a regulatory act 
which would probably not entail implementing measures under the interpretation of 
AG Cruz Villalon, but would under that of the CJEU. The applicants were actually 
held to be individually concerned in this case, having rice in transit to the Community, 
the ECJ holding that the judicial protection an individual enjoys cannot depend on 
whether the contested Decision is addressed to one Member State or to several, but 
                                                 
560 Case C-390/95P Antillean Rice Mills NV and others v. Commission  [1999] ECR I-769. 
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must be established on the basis of the specific situation of that individual compared 
to all other persons concerned. 
In Unifruit Hellas EPE v. Commission,561 the contested measure was Commission 
Regulation (EEC) 846/93 introducing a countervailing charge on apples originating in 
Chile, and Commission Regulations (EEC) 915/93 and 1467/93 amending that 
Regulation. The enabling legislation for the adoption of the contested measures was 
Council Regulation (EEC) 1035/72 on the common organisation of the market in fruit 
and vegetables. The CFI repeated that it is settled Case-Law that the fact that it is 
possible to determine more or less exactly the number or even the identity of the 
persons to whom a measure applies at any given time is not sufficient to call into 
question the legislative nature of the measure, as long as it is established that it applies 
to them by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in 
question in relation to its purpose.562 The CFI then considered that the contested 
Regulations were not directed specifically to the applicant and that the applicant’s 
concern was only in its objective capacity as an importer of Chilean apples, in the 
same way as any other trader in an identical situation.563 The CFI was also faced with 
an argument that the applicant had goods in transit and that those importers whose 
goods were in transit at the time of adoption of the contested measures constituted a 
closed class. The CFI noted that belonging to a closed class is, according to settled 
Case-Law, not enough on its own.564 It then noted that unlike the Sofrimport case, 
where Regulation 2707/72 required the Commission to take into account the special 
position of products in transit, there was no such provision in Regulation 1035/72 or 
                                                 
561 Case T-489/93 Unifruit Hellas EPE v. Commission  [1994] ECR II-1201. 
562 At para 21 of the judgment. 
563 Para 23 of the judgment. 
564 Para 25 of the judgment. 
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in any other measure.565 Individual concern was consequently not found and this was 
not appealed. The CFI also dismissed the action for damages for non contractual 
liability, and the ECJ dismissed the appeal.566 All these contested Regulations would 
have been regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures under Lisbon and the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but would be considered as entailing 
implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
In Rica Foods (Free Zone) NV v. Commission,567 the action was for the annulment of 
Commission Regulation (EC) 465/2000, introducing safeguard measures for imports 
from the overseas countries and territories of sugar sector products with “EC/OCT” 
cumulation of origin. The applicants also put forward a claim for damages. In this 
action, the contested Regulation was considered to be of general application, applying 
to all imports of sugar into the Community, in the unaltered state or in the form of 
mixtures. It was accepted to be of direct concern to the applicants as it left no 
discretion to the national authorities of the Member States responsible for 
implementing it.568 For individual concern, the CFI cited Antillean Rice Mills569 and 
held that under a specific provision, this being Article 109 of Council Decision 
91/482/EEC, the Commission had the obligation to inquire into the negative effects 
which its decision might have on the economy of that Member State as well as on the 
undertakings concerned. It then noted that this finding is not sufficient in itself to 
establish that those undertakings affected by a safeguard measure are individually 
concerned.570 They still had to show that they were affected by reason of a factual 
situation which differentiates them from all other persons. Citing Piraiki-Patraiki, the 
                                                 
565 Para 26 of the judgment. 
566 In Case C-51/95 Unifruit Hellas EPE v. Commission  [1997] ECR I-727. 
567 Joined Cases T-94/00 Rica Foods (Free Zone) NV and others v. Commission  [2002] ECR II-4677. 
568 At para 49 of the judgment. 
569 Case C-390/95P Antillean Rice Mills NV and others v. Commission  [1999] ECR I-769. 
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CFI further noted that undertakings which had already entered into contracts which 
had been prevented from being performed, in part or at all, by the contested measure 
were individually concerned. The applicants in this case were proved to have had such 
contracts in place and were accordingly individually concerned. However, the action 
was dismissed on its substance. Under Lisbon this would also be have been classified 
as a regulatory act which would not entail implementing measures under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but would under that of the CJEU. 
This commonly quoted Case-Law in this category of exceptions to the normal 
Plaumann test seems to be against Commission measures adopted under the authority 
of a Council measure. It is very difficult for any accurate finding to be substantiated in 
quantitative terms, but at least this is what the commonly cited Case-Law reflects. It 
seems that such requirements can be imposed directly by the Treaty article forming 
the basis of the measure or by another act of an EU institution or joint act of 
institutions. Provided that the Treaty articles do not generally provide for such rights 
to private parties, the reality under the Lisbon Treaty seems to be that such 
requirements will be imposed by a legislative act or by a non legislative act. If they 
are imposed by a non legislative act, it is highly unlikely, if not impossible in view of 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, that such a non legislative act will prescribe the use of a 
legislative procedure for the adoption of further measures. Such further measures will 
normally also be non legislative acts. 
If these requirements are imposed by a legislative act, then again any further measures 
adopted under a legislative act are likely to be non legislative, in the form of delegated 
or implementing acts. There is of course the chance that the Council and the European 
Parliament may amend the original legislative act or in certain cases choose to retain 
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the power of adopting such further measures,571 as a continuation of their initial 
legislative act imposing such requirements to take into account a private party’s 
interests. 
It then follows that a high number of such acts that are adopted under the authority of 
a prior measure imposing requirements to take into account a private party’s interests 
before their adoption, will be non legislative and of general application. This 
exception could accordingly have had a reduced role, perhaps even a significantly 
reduced role, under the Lisbon Treaty since it will not have any place in challenges 
against regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. However, the 
interpretation of implementing measures by the CJEU renders it even questionable as 
to whether the reform would have any effect at all in this area, since it seems 
inevitable that there will be some degree of intervention or involvement, although 
possibly even purely automatic or mechanical, by national authorities. 
9. Exclusive right and exceptional economic impact 
Another category of applications of the Plaumann test which is seen as an exception 
to its general application, consists of the cases where a measure causes economic 
impact on a private party which is so exceptional that it differentiates this party from 
all others, despite belonging to an open class, and so causes individual concern to be 
satisfied. The instances where this has been accepted are however extremely limited 
and the Case-Law is full of unsuccessful attempts to establish individual concern on 
these grounds.572 
                                                 
571 An example of such reservation can perhaps be found in Case C-309/89 Codorniu SA v. Council  
[1994] ECR I-1853. 
572 See for example Case C-96/01 P The Galileo Company and Galileo International LLC v. Council  
[2002] ECR I-4025. 
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In Codorniu SA v. Council,573 the action for annulment was against Council 
Regulation 2045/89 amending Regulation 3309/85 on the common organisation of the 
market in wine. This was adopted by the Council, having regard to the opinion of the 
European Parliament. It concerned the descriptions used for wine production methods, 
presentation and designations and restricted the use of the word “cremant” only for 
wines produced in France and Luxembourg under a particular method. Regulation 
3309/85 was adopted on the basis of Article 54(1) of Council Regulation 337/79 
which provided that the Council could adopt this by a qualified majority upon a 
proposal of the Commission, a procedure which was at the time the ordinary 
legislative procedure and the predecessor of the co-decision procedure, now the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Regulation 337/79 was also in itself adopted under this 
same procedure. Council Regulation 2045/89 was adopted by the Council having 
regard to the opinion of the European Parliament under Article 43 on the common 
agricultural policy. This would accordingly be classified as a legislative act under the 
Lisbon categorisation. Standing was granted to the applicants in this case, who were 
the holders of a trademark containing the word “cremant” since 1924 and the 
deprivation of use of this trademark would result in considerable benefit to the 
applicant’s competitors. This exceptional impact distinguished the applicant from 
other traders. 
In Extramet v. Council,574 the challenge was against Council Regulation 2808/89 
adopted under authorisation from Article 12 of Council Regulation 2423/88. Under 
this Article, such regulations could be passed by the Council acting by qualified 
majority upon the proposal of the Commission, but without the participation of the 
European Parliament and is likely to be considered as a non legislative act under 
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Lisbon. It was of general application and would not entail implementing measures 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but again would so entail implementing 
measures under the interpretation of the CJEU. This regulation concerned anti-
dumping duties imposed on certain products from China and the Soviet Union. The 
applicant was granted standing on an exceptional basis due to the extremely adverse 
economic impacts this had on it. It was the largest importer and this regulation would 
actually force it to obtain its supplies from its main competitor. The contested 
regulation was eventually annulled. 
This category continues to have its place under Lisbon. Both legislative and 
regulatory acts can of course produce such an impact on private parties. 
10. Anti-dumping 
The area of anti dumping has also been considered as an area where the ECJ has taken 
a more relaxed approach to individual concern, because of the nature of the measures 
that are adopted. The first example in this category was Extamet, already considered 
above. Before further examples are examined, it should be noted that before the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the founding provision for all measures was found in 
Articles 133(1) and (2) EC, which dealt with the common commercial policy. Article 
133(2) EC provided that the Council could adopt measures for implementing the 
common commercial policy upon proposals of the Commission. The relevant 
provisions are now found in Article 207 TFEU, paragraph (2) of which now provides 
that the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures defining the 
framework for implementing the common commercial policy. 
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There was always a “basic” Council regulation setting out the general framework in 
this area.575 The process for anti-dumping measures remained similar in general terms 
throughout the years, despite the changes in the basic regulations. Normally, there 
will be an investigation by the Commission which would lead to the adoption of a 
provisional measure imposing anti-dumping duties. The Commission would then 
submit a proposal to the Council for the adoption of a definitive measure and the 
Council would decide on this.576 The basic regulation currently in force is Council 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. The provisions related to the adoption of measures 
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties by the Commission are found in Article 7 
of this Regulation. The provisions for the adoption of Regulations imposing definitive 
anti-dumping duties are contained in Article 9 of this Regulation, which provides that 
these will be imposed by the Commission. 
Commission measures imposing provisional or definitive anti-dumping duties under 
this Regulation will be non legislative acts under the Lisbon Treaty and will normally 
be of general application, and accordingly regulatory acts. It is very likely that such 
measures would not entail implementing measures under the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon, and would have been challengeable without the need to show 
individual concern. This is unfortunately not the case with the interpretation of the 
CJEU, since it is inevitable that there will be some degree of intervention by national 
authorities sufficient to bring this within the meaning of implementing measures in T 
& L Sugars. The same result seems to be produced from a review of some of the older 
cases. 
                                                 
575 See for example, Council Regulations 3017/79, 2423/88 and 384/96. 
576 See for example, Articles 11 and 12 of Council Regulation 3017/79, Articles 11 and 12 of Council 
Regulation 2423/88, Articles 7 and 9 of Council Regulation 384/96. 
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In Alusuisse Italia SpA v. Council and Commission,577 the applicants sought the 
annulment of Commission Regulation 1411/81 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on a type of orthoxylene originating in Puerto Rico and the United States, and 
Council Regulation 2761/81, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty for the same 
substance. Standing was denied as they belonged to an open class and could not 
satisfy individual concern. Commission Regulation 1411/81 was adopted under 
Article 11 of Council Regulation 3017/79 and is likely to be a regulatory act under 
Lisbon. Council Regulation 2761/81 was adopted under Article 12 of Council 
Regulation 3017/79, having regard to the relevant proposal of the Commission, but as 
aforesaid, without the involvement of the European Parliament, and would 
accordingly also be a regulatory act. Unfortunately, the conclusion is the same in 
relation to implementing measures, as these measures would not be considered as so 
entail any under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but would under that of the 
CJEU. 
In Allied Corporation v. Commission,578 the contested measure was Commission 
Regulation (EEC) 1976/82, imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
chemical fertilisers originating in the United States, and Commission Regulation 
(EEC) 2302/1982 amending that Regulation. Both were adopted pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EEC) 3017/79 on protection against dumped and subsidised imports from 
third countries. Council Regulation (EEC) 349/81 previously imposed a definitive 
anti-dumping duty and three of the applicants were individually referred to in this 
Regulation, having given relevant undertakings. The ECJ held that measures imposing 
anti-dumping duties are liable to be of direct and individual concern to those 
producers and exporters who are able to establish that they were identified in the 
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measures adopted by the Commission or the Council or were concerned by the 
preliminary investigations. The actions of the three applicants that gave undertakings 
under Article 10 of Council Regulation 3017/79 with the result that they were referred 
to individually in Article 2 of Council Regulation 349/81, and after withdrawing their 
undertakings, their individual circumstances formed the subject matter of the two 
contested Commission Regulations, were held admissible. Under Lisbon, both of the 
contested Regulations would be classed as regulatory acts which would not entail 
implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but would 
under that of the CJEU. 
In Nashua Corporation v. Commission and Council,579 one of the two joined cases 
was an application for annulment of the Commission’s decision rejecting the 
undertaking offered by the applicant in an anti-dumping proceeding concerning the 
importation of photocopiers originating in Japan. The other case was an application 
for annulment of Council Regulation (EEC) 535/87 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan. The action 
against the Commission’s decision was not admissible as this was a preparatory 
measure for the Council and could not be challenged. In relation to Council 
Regulation 535/87, the ECJ noted that Regulations introducing anti-dumping duties 
are legislative in nature and scope, inasmuch as they apply to all traders generally.580 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that some provisions of those Regulations may be of 
direct and individual concern to those producers and exporters of the product in 
question who are alleged on the basis of information about their business activities to 
be dumping. This was true, in the ECJ’s view, generally for producers and exporters 
                                                 
579 Joined Cases C-133/87 and C-150/87 Nashua Corporation and others v. Commission and Council  
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who are able to establish that they were identified in the measures adopted by the 
Commission or the Council or were concerned by the preliminary investigations. The 
ECJ also noted that the same is true of those importers whose resale prices were taken 
into account for the construction of export prices and who are consequently concerned 
by the findings relating to the existence of dumping.581 It went on to find the 
applicants individually concerned without any need to define the applicant as an 
importer or an exporter. In the light of its business dealings with another 
manufacturer, Nashua was directly and individually concerned by the findings 
relating to the existence of dumping by that manufacturer, and the provisions of the 
contested Regulation regarding that manufacturer’s dumping practices were of direct 
and individual concern to Nashua. This applicant’s action failed however on its 
substance. The contested measures would also have been regulatory acts under Lisbon 
which would not entail implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz 
Villalon but would under that of the CJEU. A very similar case, concerning the same 
Council Regulation and decided similarly on its substance, is Gestetner Holdings plc 
v. Council and Commission.582 
In Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission,583 the action was for the partial 
annulment of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) 1882/82 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on mechanical wrist watches originating in the USSR. The 
applicants were the leading manufacturers of mechanical watches and watch 
movements in the Community and the only manufacturer of those products in the 
United Kingdom. The ECJ noted that the contested Regulation was based on the 
applicants’ own situation as the preamble made it clear that the definitive anti-
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dumping duty was made equal to the dumping margin which was found to exist taking 
into account the extent of injury caused to Timex by the dumped imports.584 It then 
held that the contested Regulation constituted a decision of direct and individual 
concern to the applicants.585 The contested Article 1 of this Regulation was annulled. 
Under Lisbon, this Regulation would again be considered as a regulatory act not 
entailing implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but so 
entailing implementing measures under that of the CJEU. 
In Commission v. Nederlandse Antillen,586 the contested measure was Commission 
Regulation (EC) 2352/97 introducing specific measures in respect of imports of rice 
originating in overseas countries and territories and Commission Regulation (EC) 
2494/97 on the issuing of import licences for rice falling within CN code 1006 and 
originating in overseas countries and territories under the specific measures 
introduced by Regulation (EC) 2352/97. The application succeeded before the CFI 
and the contested Regulations were annulled. The arguments put forward were similar 
to those in Antillean Rice Mills NV and others v. Commission.587 The ECJ noted that 
both the contested Regulations were by their nature of general application.588 The ECJ 
then noted that whilst it was true that the imposition of safeguard measures affected 
the rice milling sector in the Netherlands Antilles, and that when the contested 
Regulations were adopted, most imports of rice originating in the overseas countries 
and territories into the Community came from the Netherlands Antilles, the fact 
nevertheless remained that that sector constituted only 0.9% of their gross national 
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product.589 It was also noted that the Netherlands Antilles were not the only rice 
producing overseas country and territory. In those circumstances, the ECJ held that it 
was not established that the contested Regulations had serious consequences in a 
significant sector of the economy of the Netherlands Antilles as distinct from every 
other overseas country and territory. It then held that in any event, the general interest 
an overseas country and territory may have in obtaining a favourable result for its 
economic prosperity is not sufficient on its own to enable it to be regarded as 
individually concerned.590 It then moved on to consider whether individual concern 
could be established as a result of the fact that under Article 109 of Council Decision 
91/482/EEC (“the OCT Decision”), the Commission was under an obligation to 
inquire into the effects of the measure on the economy of the particular overseas 
country and territory. It held that it was clear from Piraiki-Patraiki that the finding of 
the existence of that obligation is not sufficient to establish that those overseas 
countries and territories are individually concerned by those measures.591 It noted that 
para 28 of the judgment in Piraiki-Patraiki shows precisely that only those 
undertakings which had already entered into contracts which were due to be 
performed during the period of the application of the contested measure but which 
were prevented from being performed, in part or at all, were individually concerned. 
This meant that the Netherlands Antilles in this case were not discharged from the 
burden of showing that they were affected by the contested Regulations by reason of a 
factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons. The ECJ held that 
the fact that the Netherlands Antilles exported by far the most rice originating in the 
overseas countries and territories was not such as to distinguish them individually.592 
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The contested judgment was set aside and the applications were dismissed as 
inadmissible. Regulation 2352/1997 would be a regulatory act not entailing 
implementing measures under Lisbon had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon been 
adopted, but not under the interpretation of the CJEU. It was passed upon 
authorisation from the OCT Decision and set up the regime to followed without 
leaving discretion to the Member States on how this should be implemented. The 
conclusion is also the same for Regulation 2494/97 which was a form of 
implementation of Regulation 2352/97 in a particular case. 
In Antillean Rice Mills v. Council,593 the contested measure was Council Regulation 
304/97 introducing safeguard measures in respect of imports of rice from overseas 
countries and territories. The applicants were denied standing as they belonged to an 
open class of exporters of rice to the Community, although this Regulation would 
effectively force them to cease their operations. This Regulation was adopted under 
Article 109 in conjunction with Article 1(7) of Annex IV of the OCT Decision. This 
provided that where a Member State asked the Commission to adopt a certain 
measure and the Commission did not do so, the Member State could apply to the 
Council and the Council could adopt a different decision acting by qualified majority. 
There was no participation of the European Parliament and again, this measure would 
be a regulatory act under Lisbon, not entailing implementing measures under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but so entailing implementing measures under that 
of the CJEU. 
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In British Shoe Corporation Footware Supplies v. Council,594 the application was for 
the annulment of Council Regulation (EC) 2155/97 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain footwear with textile uppers originating in the 
People’s Republic of China and Indonesia and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty imposed. The Commission published a notice of initiation for this anti-dumping 
proceeding and this stated that interested parties should make themselves known in 
writing and submit all relevant information to the Commission. The applicants were 
importers and distributors of shoes in the European Union and responded to the 
Commission’s notice. The investigation led to the adoption of Commission 
Regulation (EC) 165/97, imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty, against which the 
applicants filed Case T-73/97 before the CFI. Meanwhile, the contested Regulation 
2155/97 was adopted and the CFI decided that there was no need to adjudicate on the 
action in Case T-73/97, as the adoption of the definitive measure manifestly removed 
any interest of the applicants in continuing with those proceedings. In considering 
standing, the CFI started by noting that although regulations imposing anti-dumping 
duty are, by virtue of their nature and scope, of a general nature, in that they apply 
generally to the economic operators concerned, their provisions may nonetheless be of 
individual concern to particular traders.595 It then further noted that this is generally 
the case where producers or exporters are able to demonstrate that they were 
identified in the measures adopted by the Commission or the Council, or were 
concerned by the preliminary investigations. By further analysing its existing Case-
Law, it noted that certain provisions of such regulations are also of individual concern 
to those of the importers whose resale prices were taken into account for the 
construction of export prices. It also noted that importers associated with exporters in 
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non Member countries on whose products anti-dumping duties are imposed may 
challenge the regulations imposing such duties, particularly where the export price has 
been calculated on the basis of their selling prices on the Community market. It 
further noted that the ECJ in Extramet has also held an action brought by an unrelated 
importer against such a regulation to be admissible where there were exceptional 
circumstances, in particular where that regulation seriously affected that importer’s 
business activities.596 The CFI then found that the applicants did not belong to any of 
these categories. On the one hand they were unrelated importers. On the other hand, it 
was clear from the contested Regulation that the existence of dumping was 
established not by reference to their resale prices but by reference to the prices 
actually paid or to be paid on export. Comparing the applicants with that in Extramet, 
the CFI noted that in Extramet the applicant had proved, first, that it was the largest 
importer of the product to which the duty was imposed, and, at the same time, the end 
user of the product, secondly that its business activities depended to a very large 
extent on those imports, and, thirdly, that it was seriously affected by the contested 
regulation in view of the limited number of manufacturers of the product concerned 
and of the difficulties which it encountered in obtaining supplies from the sole 
Community producer, who, moreover, was its main competitor for the processed 
product. The CFI noted that in this case, all the applicants taken collectively 
accounted for only 9.5% of all imports of the product at issue. They had also failed to 
otherwise prove a comparable severity of results flowing from the imposition of the 
duties. The CFI also noted that Extramet did not lay down an exhaustive list of the 
conditions which an unrelated importer must meet in order to be regarded as 
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individually concerned by a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties.597 The 
applicants also claimed that they were individually concerned by virtue of the fact that 
they were actively involved in the administrative procedure and that they provided 
information which the institutions received and evaluated specifically in the context 
of the examination of the Community interest in adopting the contested measures, 
citing Timex and Sinochem Heilongjiang v. Council.598 In relation to Timex, the CFI 
stated that in that case the ECJ found that the applicant was the leading manufacturer 
of mechanical watches and watch movements in the Community and the only 
remaining manufacturer of those products in the United Kingdom. The anti-dumping 
duty had also been fixed in the light of the consequences which the dumping had 
entailed for the applicant.599 As regards the judgment in Sinochem, the CFI noted that 
the applicant in that case was an exporter of the product in question, that it had 
intensively involved itself in the preliminary investigation, that all the information and 
arguments were received and evaluated by the Commission, and that furthermore, it 
was the only Chinese undertaking to have participated in the investigation.600 It then 
concluded that although participation by an undertaking in anti-dumping proceeding 
may be taken into account, amongst other factors, in order to establish whether that 
undertaking is individually concerned, if there are no other factors giving rise to a 
particular situation which distinguishes that undertaking from all other traders, such 
participation does not of itself satisfy individual concern.601 Since the applicants in 
this case had not proved the existence of other factors capable of distinguishing them 
from all other traders, they could not rely on such participation alone. For that 
purpose, the mere fact that a number of the applicants were specifically named in the 
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contested Regulation could not lead to a different conclusion. The action was 
accordingly dismissed as inadmissible. The contested Regulation was based on 
Council Regulation (EC) 384/96, and was adopted on the proposal of the Commission 
and after consultation with the Advisory Committee. It would under Lisbon also be 
regulatory act not entailing implementing measures under the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon, but which again would entail implementing measures under the 
interpretation of the CJEU. 
Anti-dumping seems to be an area where the problem of access to justice could have 
been greatly improved after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty but for the 
interpretation of the CJEU on implementing measures. Most private parties affected 
would have been able to challenge both the provisional and the definitive measures 
imposing the anti-dumping duties without the need to show individual concern, had 
the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon been adopted. Accordingly, under the 
interpretation of the CJEU, the relaxed approach taken by the EU courts for individual 
concern in this area and the Case-Law that developed continues to have its 
importance. 
 
11. State aid 
State aid is another area where the ECJ traditionally took a more relaxed approach to 
individual concern. In Kingdom of Spain v. Commission,602  the ECJ heard an appeal 
from the CFI’s judgment in Lenzing v. Commission603 by which the CFI partly 
annulled Commission Decision 1999/395/EC on state aid implemented by Spain in 
favour of Sniace SA, as amended by Commission Decision 2001/43/EC which was 
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the contested Decision. Spain and the Commission argued on appeal that Lenzing’s 
action was inadmissible. The ECJ noted604 that with regard more particularly to the 
field of state aid, persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed who call in 
question the merits of a decision appraising the aid are regarded as being individually 
concerned by that decision where their position on the market is substantially affected 
by the aid which is the subject of the decision in question, citing Cofaz v. 
Commission605 and Commission v. Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum.606 It 
then noted607 that as regards establishing such an effect, the ECJ has had occasion to 
clarify that the mere fact that a measure such as the contested Decision may exercise 
an influence on the competitive relationship with the addressee of that measure cannot 
in any event suffice for that undertaking to be regarded as individually concerned by 
that measure, citing Eridania v. Commission.608 It then statedthat, accordingly, an 
undertaking cannot rely solely on its status as a competitor of the undertaking in 
receipt of the aid, but must additionally show that its circumstances distinguish it in a 
similar way to the undertaking in receipt of the aid, 609 citing Comite d’ enterprise de 
la Societe francaise de production and others v. Commission.610 It moved on to state 
that it does not follow from the Case-Law that a particular position of this kind has to 
be inferred from factors such as a significant decline in turnover, appreciable financial 
losses or a significant reduction in market share following the grant of the aid. The 
grant of state aid can have an adverse effect on the competitive situation of an 
operator in other ways too, in particular by causing loss of an opportunity to make a 
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profit or a less favourable development than would have been the case without such 
aid. Similarly, the seriousness of such an effect may vary according to a large number 
of factors such as, in particular, the structure of the market concerned or the nature of 
the aid in question. Demonstrating a substantial adverse effect on a competitor’s 
position on the market cannot simply be a matter of the existence of certain factors 
indicating a decline in its commercial or financial performance.611 It cannot be ruled 
out that an undertaking will succeed in avoiding or at least limiting such a decline in 
some circumstances, by for example making savings or by expanding in more 
profitable markets. The ECJ then dismissed the appeal on admissibility.612 It held that 
the CFI correctly took into account the various factors adduced by Lenzing to show in 
essence the distinctiveness of the competitive situation of the viscose fibres market, 
which was characterised by a very small number of producers and by serious 
production overcapacity, the significance of the distortion created by the aid to Sniace 
and the effect of that aid on the prices supplied by Sniace. It was for Lenzing alone to 
adduce pertinent reasons to show that the Commission’s Decision may adversely 
affect its legitimate interests by seriously jeopardising its position on the market in 
question, and the factors adduced showed such an adverse effect. Both Decision 
2001/43/EC and Decision 1999/395/EC were adopted by the Commission on the basis 
of Article 88(2) EC. They were addressed to the Kingdom of Spain on particular cases 
of state aid. This does not seem to be a legislative procedure under Lisbon, and the 
Decisions could be regarded as not entailing implementing measures under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, but would entail implementing measures under 
that of the CJEU due to the involvement of national authorities. They are also 
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considered as measures of general application as they create general effects within the 
Member State following Telefonica613 and the existing Case-Law. 
Another example is Germany v. Kronofrance SA.614 Germany notified the 
Commission of a project to grant investment aid to Glunz for the construction of a 
wood processing centre and the Commission decided, under Article 4(3) of Council 
Regulation (EC) 659/99, laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 88 
EC, not to raise objections. Kronofrance, being a competitor of Glunz, succeeded 
before the CFI in annulling the contested Decision of the Commission. The CFI 
accorded Kronofrance the status of an interested party in terms of Article 88(2) EC 
and Regulation 659/99. The ECJ noted that since this was an action on a Commission 
Decision on state aid, it must be borne in mind that the preliminary stage of the 
procedure for reviewing aid under Article 88(3) EC, which merely allows the 
Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or complete conformity of 
the aid in question, must be distinguished from the examination under the formal 
investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC.615 It is only under the formal 
investigation procedure which is designed to allow the Commission to be informed of 
all the facts of the case that the Treaty imposes obligation on the Commission to give 
the parties concerned notice to submit their comments. It further noted that it followed 
that where, without initiating the formal investigation procedure, the Commission 
finds on the basis of Article 88(3) EC that the aid is compatible with the common 
market, the persons intended to benefit from those procedural guarantees may secure 
compliance therewith only if they are able to challenge that decision before the 
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Community courts, and to that extent such actions are admissible.616 Citing Eigentum, 
it stated that persons, undertakings or associations whose interests might be affected 
by the aid fall within this category. On the other hand, as the ECJ noted, if the 
applicant calls into question the merits of the decision appraising the aid as such, the 
mere fact that it may be regarded as “concerned” within the meaning of Article 88(2) 
EC cannot suffice for the action to be considered admissible, citing Cofaz and 
Eigentum on this.617 Since Kronofrance had established that it was a competitor of 
Glunz, the action was admissible. Again, under Lisbon, this would be a regulatory act 
which would not entail implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz 
Villalon, but would under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
 
12. Competition 
The CJEU had also developed a more relaxed approach to individual concern in the 
area of Competition Law, and the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, treating 
complainants of competition violations more generously. Complainants were allowed 
standing on the basis of individual concern when the Commission found the conduct 
that was the subject matter of their complaint not to be in breach of competition rules 
and also where it granted an exception. Such decisions of the Commission were not 
however usually of general application, so they will not normally be considered as 
regulatory acts under the Lisbon Treaty. Similarly, Commission decisions finding 
violations and imposing fines were not also of general application, and will also not 
be considered as regulatory acts. 
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A common example is Metro v. Commission.618 The applicants were wholesalers of 
electronics and a particular manufacturer, called SABA, refused to supply them with 
products as it did not belong to its distribution and sales network. The applicants 
complained to the Commission, which found SABA’s practice not to be in violation 
of the competition rules. The Commission addressed this decision to SABA only, not 
to the applicants. As regards the applicants, this decision would not, under strict 
Plaumann considerations, be of individual concern to the applicants, as they belonged 
to an open class. The ECJ however, considered that such parties that had a right to 
complain under the then Article 3(2) of Council Regulation 17/62619 of a competition 
violation should be able to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate 
interests if their complaint is not upheld by the Commission.620 The Commission’s 
decision in this case would under Lisbon be a non legislative act, but not being of 
general application, it would not be considered as a regulatory act, so the reform of 
the standing criteria has not brought any change in this respect. 
There are of course Commission acts in this area that of general application. An 
example can be found in Bond van de Fegarbel-Beroepsverenigingen v. 
Commission.621 This was an application for the annulment of Commission Regulation 
(EC) 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) EC to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices. The applicants were a representative body 
seeking to safeguard the interests of regional associations of garage owners and two 
economic operators bound by vertical agreements falling with the scope of the 
contested Regulation. The CFI found the Regulation to be of general application to 
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undertakings involved in vertical agreements and concerted practices, and accordingly 
of a legislative nature.622 Their arguments as to economic dependence were also not 
sufficient to establish individual concern. Under Lisbon, this is likely to have been a 
regulatory act, but it would certainly entail implementing measures under the 
interpretation of the CJEU. It is also rather questionable whether it would entail 
implementing measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon, since there are 
various parts of it, under which there could be involvement and independent 
assessment of specific vertical agreements or concerted practices by national 
authorities, despite the fact that it seems to be a rather complete set of rules. 
Accordingly, the likelihood is that it would be considered as entailing implementing 
measures under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon as well. 
13. The Greenpeace case 
Brief reference can be made to the commonly quoted Stichting Greenpeace Council v. 
Commission,623 where the contested measure was a Commission decision granting 
financial assistance to Spain for the construction of two power stations in the Canary 
Islands. This was based on a previous decision of the Commission, Decision C (91) 
440, authorising a maximum financial assistance for this, which, itself, was based on 
Council Regulation 1787/84, an act adopted by the Council upon the proposal of the 
Commission and having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament. Council 
Regulation 1787/84 is likely to be considered as a legislative act under the Lisbon 
categorisation as it was adopted under a legislative procedure, and the contested 
measure would be a non legislative act. However, the nature of this decision, which 
gives financial assistance for a specific purpose renders it questionable whether it will 
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be interpreted as being of general application, and could accordingly fail to fall within 
the definition of a regulatory act. 
14. Outcomes of this review 
This review corroborates the conclusion that the reform in Article 263(4) TFEU 
offered a great opportunity for significant improvement in the availability of a direct 
action for annulment for private parties. This opportunity seems indeed a missed one 
to a great extent, and this is largely due to the interpretation of the term 
“implementing measures” by the CJEU, which, as mentioned above, effectively limits 
the reform to the very few exceptional cases where the EU measure reaches private 
parties without any intervention by the national authorities. As it has been seen, a 
significant proportion of the cases in this sample, could have been decided differently 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. 
14.1. Lost opportunity for higher protection in anti-dumping 
The review also illustrates the great improvement that could have been achieved in 
some areas, such as anti-dumping, had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon been 
adopted by the CJEU. Of course, the area of anti-dumping is one of those where the 
CJEU adopts a more relaxed approach to individual concern, something which is 
evident from the Case-Law.624 This is also corroborated by the statistical study of T. 
Tridimas and G. Gari, where they find that the rate of admissibility in relation to anti-
dumping measures reaches a high 80%.625 Accordingly, judicial protection in this area 
seems already enhanced, compared to other areas, at least for the categories of 
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applicants generally found to satisfy individual concern under the existing Case-Law, 
these generally being producers and exporters of goods subject to anti-dumping 
duties. However, this does not necessarily mean that the wider availability of an 
action for annulment which could have resulted under the interpretation of 
implementing measures by AG Cruz Villalon is not desirable. Such a development 
would have potentially offered the possibility of an action for annulment to other 
parties affected by anti-dumping measures, other than those that are normally 
considered to satisfy individual concern under the existing Case-Law. 
14.2. Possibly locus standi irrespective of content or effects of an act 
It was interesting to observe while conducting this review, that in examining the 
admissibility of an action for annulment, there seems to be, after the Lisbon Treaty, a 
change of initial focus to some degree. This would have been especially so had the 
interpretation of implementing measures proposed by AG Cruz Villalon been 
adopted, but also exists to a more limited extent under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
The initial task previously involved the determination of the nature of an act based on 
its substance in order to consider direct and individual concern, although the CJEU on 
occasions continued to consider whether it was a measure of general application or a 
bundle of decisions. This approach seems to have sometimes continued despite the 
judgment in Codorniu, and the abandonment of the abstract terminology test, perhaps 
more as a factor taken into account in assessing individual concern. 
To a certain extent, the initial task after the Lisbon Treaty focuses on the procedure 
under which the contested measure was adopted in order to determine whether it is a 
legislative or a non legislative act. If it is a non legislative act, then focus will be 
placed on its content but again only in order to determine whether it is of general 
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application and whether it entails implementing measures, so that the applicable locus 
standi criteria are determined. None of these new tasks are, strictly speaking, related 
to the substance of a measure or its effect on private parties. Not even the criterion of 
direct concern is in a sense focused on the effects of a measure on private parties, but 
simply on the question whether someone exercises any discretion in applying the 
measure to a private party. 
In this sense, for regulatory acts that do not entail implementing measures, where a 
private party need only satisfy direct concern, it may be argued that an action for 
annulment becomes admissible and available without the applicant having to satisfy 
any criteria that are related to the core substance of the contested measure or its 
effects on this applicant. The question whether a measure was in fact a bundle of 
decisions or any question relating to the substance of the measure or its effects on the 
applicant come into play only where the measure is not a regulatory act that does not 
entail implementing measures and individual concern is still required. Only then does 
the substance of a measure and its effect on private parties become relevant for the 
assessment of standing. Due to the interpretation of implementing measures by the 
CJEU, this will however still be true in the majority of cases. 
It could of course also be argued that the primary consideration really is the question 
of whether an act entails implementing measures. If it does, the question moves 
immediately to the standard position of requiring direct and individual concern, and 
the procedure under which a measure was adopted as well as the question whether it 





14.3. Possible concerns for legislative acts 
Some concerns emerge from this review and largely relate to the rationale for 
dispensing the individual concern criterion only for regulatory acts that do not entail 
implementing measures, and not for legislative acts, or put another way, as a result of 
the exclusion of legislative acts from the interpretation of the notion of regulatory 
acts. These concerns are of course again more evident under the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon for implementing measures, since this interpretation would include 
significantly more measures within the scope of the Lisbon Treaty reform. 
In this respect, this review seems to give some support to the argument that the 
process of adoption of a measure might not be the proper criterion for the 
determination of the applicable standing criteria. This argument reaches the peak of 
its strength when comparing actual cases of legislative acts not entailing 
implementing measures to cases of regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures, at least under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. In some such cases, 
for example in the comparison of Chiquita Banana with Comafrica, it seems difficult 
to justify the difference in treatment for measures that produce similar or comparable 
effects on private parties, just because of the procedure under which they had been 
adopted. The process of adoption of a measure, being the basis for the distinction 
between legislative and non legislative acts under the Lisbon Treaty, has of course 
never been considered relevant in any way to the assessment of standing. 
It further becomes evident from this review that, in some of the cases that were 
reviewed, legislative acts indeed affected private parties in just the same way as 
regulatory acts. Indeed, the pre-Lisbon Case-Law shows that both measures that 
would, post-Lisbon, have been classified as legislative acts and measures that would 
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have been classified as regulatory acts were considered to belong to the same type or 
category, interestingly described by the EU courts to be “legislative” in nature,626 and 
had similar effects on private parties. In fact, the very essence of the judgment in 
Codorniu and the mere existence of this category of exceptions to the general 
application of the Plaumann test in cases of exceptional economic impact on an 
applicant, may even be seen as proof of this. Both Extramet and Codorniu, the 
contested measures in which would now have been classified as legislative acts, have 
been cited in challenges against all kinds of measures, irrespective of the type or 
process under which such measures were adopted. 
Of course, as mentioned, this problem of difference in treatment between legislative 
acts and regulatory acts producing similar effects, would have been significantly more 
intense had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing measures been 
adopted, as this appears from the comparison offered in this review. The interpretation 
of the CJEU is a step away from this issue, but still of course, on the other hand, so 
big a limitation to the extent of the reform, that makes this problem seem secondary. 
This issue will be further examined in the following chapter, in the quantitative study. 
14.4. Possible restriction of challenges by choice of procedure 
A final concern that is supported by this review is that there seems, in fact, to be some 
room for the EU institutions to restrict challenges for measures of similar effect 
through their choice of procedure for the adoption of a measure. It has always been a 
concern for the EU courts not to allow the institutions to avoid actions for annulment 
                                                 




by their choice of measure.627 It should of course be recognised that de jure all acts of 
EU institutions remain challengeable under Article 263(4) TFEU, although some 
require individual concern while others do not, so the judicial review system cannot 
be criticised for that. Given the difficulty of satisfying individual concern however, it 
seems possible to say that, except for measures that are based directly on the Treaty, 
where use of a legislative procedure is imposed by the authorising Treaty article, the 
Council and the European Parliament are de facto able, by their choice of procedure 
or by their decision whether to delegate a task to the Commission or the Council, to 
restrict challenges by means of direct actions for annulment. Of course, again, the 
interpretation of implementing measures by the CJEU significantly reduces the extent 
of this issue. 
With the results of this chapter showing that the reform has indeed been rendered of 
limited effect, the quantitative study of measures in the following Chapter adds to the 





                                                 
627 See for example Case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig v. Council and Commission  [1977] ECR 






CHAPTER 6: EFFECT OF LISBON TREATY REFORM THROUGH A 
QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
This chapter provides an assessment of a sample of post-Lisbon EU measures, 
seeking an appreciation of the effects of the Lisbon Treaty reform in quantitative 
terms. The methodology is first outlined, followed by the examination of the results. 
The results are presented both under the interpretation of the CJEU and of AG Cruz 
Villalon for implementing measures in order to offer a comparison. 
1. Scope 
The effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform in Article 263(4) TFEU has not been examined 
quantitatively. The various occurring or anticipated problems and shortcomings have 
been identified and are real, but the benefits of such an examination seem crucial. To 
refer to just one single example, it is arguably a shortcoming that legislative acts have 
been excluded from the definition of regulatory acts. However, no indication has been 
given as to its magnitude. 
Such an examination naturally requires extensive resources and analyses in order to 
render statistically accurate results. However, for the purposes of the intended 
assessment of the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform and the scale of the related 
problems and concerns, such statistically accurate results seem hardly necessary. The 
issues that are of interest for the purposes of this analysis do not require and do not 
depend on any degree of statistical accuracy of the results produced. In the sense that 
if a smaller sample produces similar and recurring results, it is not necessary for the 
purposes of this examination to have any more accuracy. The analysis and 
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conclusions to be drawn will hardly differ if, to give a very abstract and theoretical 
example, a smaller sample shows that on average 70% to 73% of non legislative acts 
are regulatory acts, or if a larger scale analysis, rendering more statistically accurate 
results, shows that 71.3% of non legislative acts are regulatory acts. What accordingly 
suffices is a more general overview, rendering a rough idea or rough appreciation of 
the position, and this can be adequately produced by means of a simpler quantitative 
study of legislative activity. 
In the light of the above, this exercise has been carried out by an analysis of the 
legislative activity within three randomly chosen calendar months, namely May 2010, 
January 2011 and September 2011, as published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. The results produced a repeating pattern, corroborating the 
expectation that it would be unnecessary to consider a larger sample for the purposes 
of the intended review. 
For the purposes of the intended classification, the distinction between legislative and 
non legislative acts is straightforward, and they are also published under different 
heads in the Official Journal of the European Union. The definition of the term 
“regulatory act” in Inuit to include all non legislative acts of general application has of 
course been followed. In contrast, however, the effect that a different interpretation of 
the term “regulatory act” would have had if it included legislative acts, is also 
produced by these results and also by the separate examination of all legislative acts 
of 2011. 
The interpretation of the term “implementing measures” by the CJEU in T & L 
Sugars, considering this to include any measures taken by national authorities, 
irrespective of the mechanical or automatic nature of such measures, has also been 
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followed. In order to show in contrast the effect that a different interpretation would 
have had, the results have also been classified, in the alternative, under the 
interpretation proposed by AG Cruz Villalon in T & L Sugars. 
2. Categories of classification 
For the purposes of the general analysis of the three randomly chosen calendar 
months, measures have been classified in 11 categories: 
a) Category A – Legislative acts 
This category records all legislative acts, irrespective of whether they entail 
implementing measures or not. These measures can still only be challenged 
directly by a private party able to show direct and individual concern. 
b) Category B – Non legislative acts 
This category records all non legislative acts, in order to compare this total 
number with its subcategory of regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures, and also to the number of non legislative acts that are measures of 
uncertain categorisation. It also serves to compare the number of measures that 
are passed as legislative acts to those that are passed as non legislative acts. 
c) Category C – Legislative acts with IM at EU level 
The third category will be legislative acts entailing implementing measures at 
EU level. The importance of this will lie in the possibility of a challenge 
against the implementing measure before the EU courts, which, if available, 
could be combined with a possibility of a challenge against the main 
legislative act recorded in this category via a plea of illegality under Article 
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277 TFEU. This naturally serves only as a record of such a possibility, which 
is dependent on whether the implementing measure will constitute a regulatory 
act not entailing implementing measures or whether a private party can 
otherwise show standing, something which cannot be known or researched. 
d) Category D – Legislative acts with IM at national level 
This category will supplement Category C, showing legislative acts entailing 
implementing measures at national level. For such measures, unless an 
applicant can show direct and individual concern for a direct action, a 
challenge against the national measure before the national courts coupled with 
an attempt for a preliminary reference will remain the main route of validity 
challenge by private parties. With possibly the added benefit of the Unibet628 
ruling, not permitting Member States to require an applicant to contravene the 
implementing measure in order to obtain access to justice, which may even 
suggest that new judicial means should be created at national level if this is 
necessary.629 
e) Category E – Legislative acts without IM 
For this category of legislative acts not entailing implementing measures, 
annulment can only be sought through a direct action for annulment by an 
applicant who can show direct and individual concern, unless their validity is 
somehow relevant in national proceedings and warrants a preliminary 
reference. This may be a category of measures where the possibility that the 
                                                 
628 Case C-432/05 Unibet v. Justitiekanslern  [2007] ECR I-2271. 
629 See G. Anagnostaras, “The Quest for an Effective Remedy and the Measure of Judicial Protection 
Afforded to Putative Community Law Rights” (2007) European Law Review 727, at p. 738, and G. 
Anagnostaras, “The Incomplete State of Community Harmonisation in the Provision of Interim 
Protection by the National Courts” (2008) European Law Review 586. 
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applicant may need to contravene the measure in order to obtain access to 
justice cannot be excluded. 
f) Category F – Non legislative acts without IM 
This category records all non legislative acts that do not entail implementing 
measures. This will not be limited to those non legislative acts that are of 
general application and accordingly classified as regulatory acts. The purpose 
of this category is to compare the number of this category with Category I 
which will record regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. 
g) Category G – Non legislative acts with IM at EU level 
This category records non legislative acts that entail implementing measures at 
EU level. The same considerations listed above for Category C apply, but for 
non legislative acts in this category. 
h) Category H – Non legislative acts with IM at national level 
This category records non legislative acts that entail implementing measures at 
national level. The same considerations as for Category D apply, but for non 
legislative acts in this category. 
i) Category I – Regulatory acts not entailing IM when examining the results 
under the interpretation of IM by AG Cruz Villalon, and regulatory acts 
entailing IM when examining the results under the interpretation of the CJEU 
When examining the results under the interpretation of implementing 
measures by AG Cruz Villalon, this category lists regulatory acts not entailing 
implementing measures which were the subject matter of the reform, and for 
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which individual concern need not be shown in direct actions for annulment. 
When the results are examined under the interpretation of implementing 
measures by the CJEU, this category lists regulatory acts entailing 
implementing measures. The reason for this differentiation is the strikingly 
different results that are produced by the two interpretations. 
j) Category J – Regulatory acts not entailing IM that relate to or are IM of 
another act when examining the results under the interpretation of IM by AG 
Cruz Villalon, and regulatory acts entailing IM that relate to or are IM of 
another act when examining the results under the interpretation of the CJEU 
When examining the results under the interpretation of implementing 
measures by AG Cruz Villalon, this follows Category I by listing regulatory 
acts not entailing implementing measures that themselves constitute 
implementing measures of another act. A private party can challenge these 
acts by means of an action for annulment by showing direct concern, and in 
the process of such an action for annulment will also have the possibility to 
lodge a plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU against the measure on 
which they are based, subject to the TWD rule of course.630 When the results 
are examined under the interpretation of implementing measures by the CJEU, 
this category lists regulatory acts entailing implementing measures that 
themselves constitute implementing measures of another act. The reason for 
this differentiation is, again, the different results that are produced by the two 
interpretations. 
                                                 
630 See the related concerns on the application of the TWD rule in S. Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules for 
Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU” (2010) 35 
European Law Review 542, at p.p. 548-549. See also R. Schwensfeier, “The TWD principle post-




k) Category K – Measures of uncertain categorisation 
This category lists the measures that are difficult to categorise. The number of 
these measures will relate to the examination of the workability of the 
reformed system and the question whether there is now a clearer set of rules 
for national courts to follow, especially in view of the effects of the TWD rule. 
3. Legislative acts 
As the numbers of legislative acts rendered within these three calendar months are 
limited, a further review has been carried out in relation to all legislative acts of the 
year 2011, which was again randomly chosen. The categories of classification in that 
review follow the above with some necessary differentiation. 
In that part of the review, Category A lists all legislative acts, Category B lists 
legislative acts with implementing measures at EU level, Category C those with 
implementing measures at national level, and Category D those with implementing 
measures possibly at both EU and national level. 
Following these, Category E lists legislative acts that do not entail implementing 
measures under the interpretation of the CJEU in T & L Sugars, whereas, as a 
comparison, Category F lists those that would not entail implementing measures 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. This comparison is of course theoretical 
since under Inuit legislative acts can never be considered as regulatory acts in order to 
benefit from the relaxed standing conditions. Nevertheless, it is useful in testing the 
argument whether the reform should have been extended to legislative acts as well. 
Category G then lists legislative acts that relate to or are implementing measures of 
another EU measure, since in those cases there is also the possibility of a plea of 
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illegality under Article 277 TFEU against that measure on which it is based in 
proceedings before the CJEU. 
Finally, Category H lists legislative acts that are of uncertain categorisation, based on 
similar considerations as stated above. 
4. Excluded measures 
The following measures have been excluded from this study, due to the danger of 
interfering with the results, and as not within the scope of the review: 
a) Measures authorising or incorporating international agreements. Although the 
jurisdiction of the EU courts not only covers EU acts approving the conclusion 
of the agreements, but also encompasses the agreements themselves once 
concluded and entered into force as integral parts of the EU legal order,631 
these have intentionally been left outside the scope of this study as acts not 
necessarily affecting private parties, but which in any event would highly 
unlikely have been classified as regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures under any definition. The number of these measures in the three 
months analysed was anyway very low, so their exclusion does not have any 
effect on the results or the discussion. 
b) Corrigenda. 
c) Acts of extra EU bodies, as not within the scope of Article 263 TFEU. 
d) Acts appointing judges of the EU courts, as not affecting private parties. 
                                                 
631 Case C-266/16 Western Sahara Campaign UK. See also the related discussion in C. Tovo, “Judicial 
Review of Harmonised Standards: Changing the Paradigms of Legality and Legitimacy of Private 
Rulemaking under EU Law” (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1187, at p.p. 1201-1202. 
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e) Acts appointing special representatives or officials of the EU, as not affecting 
private parties. 
f) Measures related to budgets and accounts of the EU or fixing remuneration of 
officials. These were however included in review of the legislative acts of 
2011. 
g) Measures declaring financial deficits of Member States. 
h) All measures adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 
review of which is still excluded from the scope of Article 263 TFEU. 
i) Recommendations, as not generally reviewable under Article 263 TFEU. 
Although there is of course the possibility that an act entitled as a 
recommendation which was intended to have legal effects would not constitute 
a genuine recommendation and would be open to review,632 this is something 
very difficult to judge for the purposes of this study, so this exceptional case 
was intentionally left outside its scope. 
5. Inherent problems 
There are however some inherent problems and shortcomings in this study, which are 
unavoidable. 
The first relates to the classification, for the purposes of this review, of a measure that 
is a regulatory act under the Inuit definition, but which has some provisions entailing 
implementing measures and others that do not. In practice, it seems highly arguable 
                                                 
632 Case C-16/16 P Kingdom of Belgium v. Commission, judgment of 20/2/2018. See also A. Arnull, 
“EU Recommendations and Judicial Review – ECJ 20 February 2018, Case C-16/16P Kingdom of 
Belgium v. European Commission” (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 609. 
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that a private party could contest the part requiring implementing measures by 
showing individual concern, and also contest the part not entailing implementing 
measures without needing to show individual concern. The answer would depend on 
the part actually challenged in an action for annulment, but this does not work for the 
purposes of this analysis. However, in the sample analysed this did not emerge as a 
common occurrence and would not accordingly prejudice the results. Such measures 
have been classified as of uncertain categorisation where there was such serious 
doubt, something which proved rather exceptional. Measures were however classified 
in their respective categories, and not as measures of uncertain categorisation, where 
it transpired that the largest part, or the main provisions, of a measure entailed or did 
not entail implementing measures, as regards an applicant engaging in a professional 
or other activity or having another capacity that is closely related to the measure. 
This leads to the second shortcoming, which is of course closely related to the first. 
This is caused by the fact that a measure may be interpreted as entailing implementing 
measures for one particular applicant or class of applicants, but not for another. The 
CJEU in T & L Sugars and the related Case-Law firmly settled that the question of 
implementing measures is judged from the standpoint of the party pleading that the 
contested provision is a regulatory act that does not so entail implementing measures. 
As this review is necessarily done in the abstract and without reference to any 
particular applicant, this appears as an inevitable issue. For the purposes of this 
review, a measure has been classified as a regulatory act not entailing implementing 
measures if it could be said that it would not entail implementing measures for some 
possible applicant or class of applicants, engaging in a professional or other activity or 
having another capacity that is closely related to the measure. Such a private party is 
anyway the most likely litigant. 
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For example, a measure dealing with car emissions has been considered from the 
standpoint of a car manufacturer, not from the standpoint of a consumer. 
Nevertheless, an interesting finding came to surface, and this relates generally to the 
fact that it seems rather infrequent, or it was at least very uncommon in this sample, 
that the same provision would require implementing measures as regards one class of 
applicants but not as regards another class of applicants. Generally, a provision either 
entails further implementation or does not entail further implementation. In the 
example of the car emissions measure, either a provision would require a further EU 
or national measure calculating or fixing the emissions standard for a particular car 
model, or it would not.633 And the answer appears to be the same for car 
manufacturers, car retailers and consumers. 
Of course, this shortcoming of considering a measure from the standpoint of an 
applicant defined in the abstract, is also further mitigated by the review of older Case-
Law in Chapter 5, which examines real scenarios. 
The third shortcoming is that the answer to the question whether an act entails 
implementing measures will not always be uncontroversial and necessarily involves a 
degree of subjective opinion. In order to mitigate this, only the clearer cases were 
listed in Categories I and J as regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. 
Doubtful cases were classified as regulatory acts entailing implementing measures or 
if there is real uncertainty, under Category K as measures of uncertain categorisation. 
As also previously mentioned, the existence of such possible uncertainty is anyway 
fruitful in considering the role of national courts, and the problems in the application 
of the TWD rule. 
                                                 
633 See the example of Regulation 510/2011 on car emissions, considered below. See also the further 
example of Regulation 305/2011 on construction products, also considered below. 
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Respectively, this shortcoming caused by the inevitable existence of some degree of 
subjective opinion also extends to measures of uncertain categorisation, which is 
another important area, in that for such measures national courts may face difficulties 
in applying the TWD rule. As previously mentioned, the nature of this study 
demanded that only the clearer cases of measures are classified as regulatory acts 
entailing or not entailing implementing measures. If there was doubt, a measure was 
classified as of uncertain categorisation, but this was not a common occurrence. 
The size of this review and the sample could also be regarded as a fourth shortcoming, 
but as mentioned above, they are considered as sufficient for the purposes of the 
intended study. 
Despite these three, or perhaps four, inherent shortcomings, this review does however 
convey an appreciation of the effect of the reform in quantitative terms, and also, on 
the typical content of legislative acts and their effects on private parties. It also 
provides a striking comparison as to what the effect of the reform would have been 
had the CJEU adopted the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon on implementing 
measures. 
6. The results for the three month sample 
The results for May 2010 appear in Appendices A and B, for January 2011 in 
Appendices C and D, and for September 2011 in Appendices E and F. Appendices A, 
C and E show the results produced under the interpretation of implementing measures 
adopted by the CJEU in T & L Sugars, whereas Appendices B, D and F show the 
results that would have been produced had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon 
been accepted. Appendix G shows the classification of all legislative acts of 2011. 
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6.1. Results of May 2010 
In May 2010, only 4 legislative acts were passed, one in the form of a decision and 3 
in the form of Regulations, all of which were acts requiring implementing measures 
both at EU level and at national level. Under the interpretation of implementing 
measures of the CJEU in Appendix A, out of 124 non legislative acts, 121 are 
classified as regulatory acts which require implementing measures and for which 
accordingly the criterion of individual concern remains under Article 263(4) TFEU. 
Of these 121 regulatory acts, 120 were acts that constitute implementing measures of 
other EU measures or relate to such other measures, and an action for annulment 
against these acts would also possibly enable the possibility of a plea of illegality 
against the other related measures. Only 2 non legislative acts did not entail 
implementing measures. 
Under the interpretation of implementing measures of AG Cruz Villalon in Appendix 
B, out of the 124 non legislative acts of May 2010, 84 would have been regulatory 
acts not entailing implementing measures, 2 would require implementing measures at 
EU level and 36 at national level. All 84 regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures were acts that constitute implementing measures of other EU measures or 
relate to such other measures. This also revealed 2 measures of uncertain 
categorisation, of which the uncertainty was centred upon ambiguity as to whether 
they would or would not entail implementing measures. 
6.2. Results of January 2011 
In January 2011, no legislative acts were passed. Under the interpretation of 
implementing measures of the CJEU in Appendix C, out of 110 non legislative acts, 
101 are classified as regulatory acts which require implementing measures and for 
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which, as above, the criterion of individual concern remains under Article 263(4) 
TFEU. Out of these 101 regulatory acts, 100 were acts that constitute implementing 
measures of other EU measures or relate to such other measures, and an action for 
annulment against these acts would also possibly enable the possibility of a plea of 
illegality against the other related measures. Again, only 4 non legislative acts did not 
entail implementing measures. There were two measures of uncertain categorisation, 
both of which were in the form of Decisions. Both amended earlier decisions and it 
was unclear whether they would entail implementing measures under either 
interpretation of that term. 
Under the interpretation of implementing measures of AG Cruz Villalon in Appendix 
D, out of the 110 non legislative acts of January 2011, 77 would have been regulatory 
acts not entailing implementing measures, 3 would require implementing measures at 
EU level and 24 at national level. All 77 regulatory acts not entailing implementing 
measures were acts that constitute implementing measures of other EU measures or 
relate to such other measures. The same two Decisions appeared as measures of 
uncertain categorisation in this review as well. 
6.3. Results of September 2011 
In September 2011, again only 2 legislative acts were passed, one in the form of a 
Decision and one in the form of a Directive. The Decision was an act requiring 
implementing measures both at EU level and at national level, while the Directive 
only at national level. Under the interpretation of implementing measures of the CJEU 
in Appendix E, out of 132 non legislative acts, 123 are classified as regulatory acts 
which require implementing measures. Of these 123 regulatory acts, 116 were acts 
that constitute implementing measures of other EU measures or relate to such other 
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measures, and an action for annulment against these acts would also possibly enable 
the possibility of a plea of illegality against the other related measures. Only one 
Decision appeared as a measure of uncertain categorisation under this interpretation 
of the CJEU, this being an ECB Guideline amending previous such guidelines and it 
was uncertain whether it would or would not entail implementing measures.  
Under the interpretation of implementing measures of AG Cruz Villalon in Appendix 
F, out of the 132 non legislative acts of September 2011, 111 would have been 
regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, none would require 
implementing measures at EU level and 18 at national level. Out of the 111 regulatory 
acts not entailing implementing measures, 104 were acts that constitute implementing 
measures of other EU measures or relate to such other measures. There was no non 
legislative acts that did not entail implementing measures. There were 2 measures of 
uncertain categorisation in the form of Decisions. One of them was the ECB 
Guideline that also appeared as such under the interpretation of the CJEU for the same 
reason, that it was uncertain whether it would or would not entail implementing 
measures under this interpretation either. The other amended the Annexes of another 
Decision and it was uncertain whether it would entail implementing measures under 
the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. This same Decision entailed implementing 
measures under the interpretation of the CJEU. 
6.4. Outcomes 
The results unfortunately show the inevitable and further corroborate the conclusion 
that the Lisbon Treaty reform has been rendered of very limited effect. They further 
corroborate AG Cruz Villalon in stating that an interpretation of implementing 
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measures to include any measure, irrespective of its automatic or mechanical nature, 
would frustrate the Lisbon Treaty reform in Article 263(4) TFEU.634 
This review further suggests that the major problem has not proved to be the more or 
less expected interpretation of the notion of a regulatory act, despite the opposing 
views expressed upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, since the majority of 
measures indeed tend to be non legislative acts of general application. This analysis 
shows that had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon been accepted by the CJEU, the 
improvement to the availability of an action for annulment would have been 
significant. Throwing into the equation the fact that most regulatory acts are based or 
relate to other EU measures, and accordingly private parties would have been able to 
lodge a plea of illegality against those acts as well in the process of actions for 
annulment against regulatory acts, the improvement in the protection would have been 
even greater. It is little exaggeration, at least based on these results, that the GC would 
have become the main forum for the protection of private parties against EU activity. 
Perhaps this was one of the main reasons why the CJEU adopted such an 
interpretation of implementing measures, as such a result, would reverse the judicial 
review system as created and so heavily defended by the CJEU since Plaumann. This 
being a highly decentralised system that placed national courts as the main forum for 
the protection of private interests against EU measures. Such a result would also 
enhance the perennial fear of mass litigation against the EU and the consequent 
disruption of the work of the institutions, leading back to the discussion of policy 
choice and the reasons for the restrictive interpretation of the locus standi criteria in 
the first place. 
                                                 
634 See Case C-456/13 P T & L Sugars and Sidul Acucares v. Commission  EU:C:2015:284, at paras 25-
33 of his Opinion. 
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This discussion can plausibly be extended to the intentions of the Member States in so 
formulating the reform. There is no evidence that the Member States did not intend 
such a significant change to take place, or that they did not anticipate that the reform 
would have this extent. The Member States simply relaxed the locus standi criteria in 
the case of regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, without any 
qualification and for whatever that meant. This can hardly deduce any intention that a 
significant change, or a change to this extent, was not intended, and the impact the 
reform would have had, had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing 
measures been accepted, can hardly form a justification for that of the CJEU. 
Another observation that can be made from this analysis is that the number of acts 
that require implementing measures at EU level is low, and consisted of legislative 
acts and very few non legislative acts. The vast majority of non legislative acts in this 
sample which, based on the interpretation under which they were examined, entailed 
implementing measures, this was almost universally at national level. For this vast 
majority that require implementing measures at national level, and accordingly an 
action for annulment is not available unless direct and individual concern is shown, 
private parties enjoy the benefit of Unibet, rendering it unacceptable for a Member 
State to force an applicant to contravene a measure in order to obtain access to justice. 
The fact that the vast majority of non legislative acts require implementing measures 
at national level can also serve as a comparison with legislative acts, a high number of 
which require implementation at EU level or at both EU and national level, as is 
shown in Appendix G. 
Further, as mentioned above, one of the anticipated problems was the application of 
the TWD rule following the Lisbon Treaty reform, as this requires national courts to 
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be able to recognise cases where a private party could undoubtedly have pursued an 
action for annulment but failed to do so within the time limit, so that they can refuse a 
preliminary reference on validity on that ground. Compared to the position under 
Article 230(4) EC, the change after the Lisbon Treaty reform effectively translates 
into whether national courts are able to readily recognise regulatory acts that do not 
entail implementing measures. As to the classification of a measure as a regulatory 
act, the question whether the measure is a non legislative act is straightforward, and 
the question whether it is of general application is also not a difficult task. The sample 
used herein comfortably corroborates this. 
The second question of whether the regulatory act entails implementing measures also 
appeared as unproblematic in this analysis, which rendered very low numbers of 
measures of uncertain categorisation. This is true under both the interpretation of the 
CJEU and AG Cruz Villalon. This further weakens the potential argument favouring 
the interpretation of the CJEU based on the interests of clarity, predictability or easier 
application by national courts. 
7. The results for legislative acts 
The analysis of all legislative acts of 2011 appears in Appendix G. A total of 91 
legislative acts were passed during that year, including acts related to EU budgets, 
with 8 of these entailing implementing measures at EU level, 34 at national level, and 
40 possibly entailing implementing measures at both EU and national levels. No 
legislative acts from this sample were classified as measures of uncertain 
categorisation. 
The theoretical comparison between legislative acts that would not entail 
implementing measures under the interpretations of the CJEU and AG Cruz Villalon 
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in T & L Sugars presents quite low numbers in both cases. Under the interpretation of 
the CJEU, out of 91 legislative acts, only 10 would not entail implementing measures, 
whereas under that of AG Cruz Villalon, only 14 would not entail implementing 
measures. Out of these, 8 related to EU budgets, and if these are removed, the 
numbers drop to just 2 under the interpretation of the CJEU and 6 under the 
interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. It is interesting to examine the content of these 8 
legislative acts that could possibly affect individuals as of themselves. 
Regulation 305/2011 lays down harmonised conditions for the marketing of 
construction products and repeals a previous Council Directive. This Regulation lays 
down very detailed rules, which include obligations of importers and distributors as 
well as harmonised technical specifications. These are indeed rules with which traders 
of construction products must comply with. However, the possible supervision for 
compliance with this Regulation or other intervention by national authorities would be 
considered as implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU, despite 
its, most likely, mechanical nature. On the other hand, the parts of this Regulation that 
set the technical standards and obligations would under the interpretation of AG Cruz 
Villalon be considered as not entailing implementing measures. 
The example of some of the provisions of this Regulation is illustrative. Among them, 
Article 11(1) provides that manufacturers of construction products shall draw up a 
declaration of performance and technical documentation describing all the relevant 
elements related to the required system of assessment and verification of constancy of 
performance. Article 11(5) also provides that manufacturers shall indicate on the 
construction product or on its packaging or in a document accompanying it, their 
name, registered trade name or registered trade mark and their contact address. Article 
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13(1) provides that importers of construction products shall place on the EU market 
only construction products which are compliant with the applicable requirements of 
this Regulation. Article 13(5) provides that importers of construction products shall 
ensure that while a construction product is under their responsibility, storage or 
transport conditions do not jeopardise its conformity with the declaration of 
performance and compliance with other applicable requirements in the Regulation. 
All these provisions impose immediate obligations on private parties despite the fact 
that they are included in legislative act, and in this sense, there seems to be virtually 
no difference had they been included in a non legislative act. Yet, since they are part 
of a legislative act, most applicants would be excluded from an action for annulment 
due to inability to show individual concern. 
Taking the example of Article 13(5) of Regulation 305/2011, the argument cannot be 
easily excluded that if an importer wishes to challenge the legality of its provisions on 
the grounds of, say, proportionality, he may first have to contravene it. The counter 
argument would be that such an importer may first write to the national authorities 
requesting a relaxation and challenge any possible refusal in national proceedings 
where a preliminary reference on validity of this provision can be requested.635 
The provisions mentioned above would anyway probably be considered as entailing 
implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU, due to the intervention 
of national authorities, for example, in supervising imports or compliance under 
Article 56 of this Regulation, although only mechanically in respect of these 
provisions. These provisions would most likely not entail implementing measures 
under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. 
                                                 
635 See the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European 
Parliament and Council  EU:C:2013:625 
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There are however other parts of this Regulation, such as market surveillance and 
safeguard procedures and provisions for delegation to the Commission of various 
tasks, which are distant from individuals and only set the framework for the further 
application and development of the rules. 
Regulation 510/2011 is another set of detailed rules setting emission performance 
standards for light commercial vehicles. Despite the details and standards that are set 
under it, most of its provisions operate in a way that encompasses extensive 
involvement of the Commission or national authorities. There are however parts, such 
as Articles 5 and 6 which provide for the calculation of emissions, which produce 
immediate effects by setting the methodology of calculations. Of course, the 
Commission or national authorities need to apply these to specific manufacturers and 
vehicles but this will be simply an application of the calculation to specific 
circumstances which cannot differ from the Regulation’s formula. While this would 
clearly be entailing implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU, it 
seems arguable that it would not under that of AG Cruz Villalon. 
Regulation 306/2011 is a simple legislative act simply repealing another Regulation 
on tariff rates for bananas. The possible intervention of national authorities by means 
of communicating the tariff rates that become applicable after the repeal would 
constitute implementing measures under the interpretation of the CJEU, whereas this 
would not be the case under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon. This again has 
effects in the same way as a non legislative act. 
Regulation 580/2011 is one of the two legislative acts in the sample that could be said 
not to entail implementing measures under both interpretations, being a plainly simple 
provision changing the duration of establishment of the European Network and 
265 
 
Information Security Agency. As such however, it is not the type of act that can be 
said to have consequences on private parties, being more of a functional or 
operational measure within a specific policy framework. This type of measure may 
fail the test for a reviewable act, which is a further requirement for an action for 
annulment, as possibly not being binding on and capable of affecting the interests of a 
private party by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position.636 
The second such measure is Regulation 1077/2011, establishing a European Agency 
for the operational management of large scale IT systems, and setting out its functions 
and competences. The same considerations apply to this as well as for Regulation 
580/2011, being again a functional or operational matter within a policy framework 
without any real consequences on private parties from that alone. 
Regulation 955/2011 repeals another Regulation on the proof of origin for certain 
textile products in its entirety, and amends another Regulation. As to the repeal, it can 
be said to have consequences on private parties. While it is possible that the 
intervention of national authorities could be considered as implementing measures 
under the interpretation of the CJEU, this would not be the case under that of AG 
Cruz Villalon. 
As aforesaid, all other legislative acts from this sample required further implementing 
measures or even simply set a wide framework for EU policies or action. In this light 
they could be characterised as rather distant from individuals, in the sense that they 
did not have themselves any immediate consequences on individuals, but the further 
action contemplated in their implementation would. Appendix G contains a brief 
summary of the content of the legislative acts analysed in this sample. 
                                                 
636 See Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission  [1981] ECR 2639. See also Chapter 2. 
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In terms of possible immediate effects, some legislative acts are even more distant 
from any effects on private parties than others. Such examples include  Directives on 
combatting late payments in commercial transactions, on administrative cooperation 
in the field of taxation, on patients’ rights in cross border healthcare, on combatting 
human trafficking, on tourism statistics, on cross border exchange of information on 
traffic offences, on combatting child pornography, on the European protection order, 
Regulations on the citizen’s initiative establishing the rules for submission to the 
Commission of a proposal signed by one million EU citizens to submit a proposal 
where a legal act of the EU is deemed necessary, on cooperation in the enforcement of 
consumer protection legislation, on a programme for further development of 
integrated maritime policy, on a financing instrument for cooperation with 
industrialised countries, and Decisions on the establishment of an EU action for the 
European Heritage Label and on the European year for active ageing and solidarity 
between generations. 
Others are less distant from any effects on private parties, like Directives on merger of 
public limited liability companies, on falsified medicinal products, on hazardous 
substances in electronic equipment, on the protection of copyright, on indications on 
foodstuffs, Regulations on rights of bus and coach passengers, on credit rating 
agencies, and Decisions on quotas benefiting from reduced excise duty and 
exemptions from tax on certain products, but still quite distant in the above sense, that 
their provisions are not such that without further significant implementation can reach 
the interests of private parties. 
The vast majority of legislative acts in this sample left something substantial or 
significant to be done at EU or national level, or at both. The type of measure that can 
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affect private parties, like the example of the Regulation on construction products 
covered above, is by no means excluded. However, the sample employed herein 
suggested that, at least quantitively, such legislative acts are rather the exception. 
In this sense, quantitatively again, the exclusion of legislative acts from the 
interpretation of the notion of regulatory acts, is not of the gravity that was 
anticipated. The numbers as well as the nature, function and content of the legislative 
acts in this sample suggest that, with exceptions of course, the exclusion of legislative 
acts is not such an effect that jeopardises the results of the reform as far as the 
protection of the rights of private parties is concerned. 
8. Summary of outcomes 
The results of this review also confirm that the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform is 
rather limited, and a great opportunity for significant improvement in judicial 
protection has been missed. It is once again confirmed that had the interpretation of 
AG Cruz Villalon for implementing measures been adopted by the CJEU, the result 
would have been entirely different. As the vast majority of EU measures are non 
legislative acts, and again in their majority, regulatory acts, the interpretation of AG 
Cruz Villalon would have significantly increased the availability of a direct action for 
annulment. 
This review also revealed that there are legislative acts that can have immediate 
effects on private parties. Although this possibility cannot be excluded, from the 
examination of the sample used herein, this seems to be rather the exception. 
Legislative acts generally appear to be rather distant from private parties, requiring 
further implementation before their effects reach private parties, or simply setting 
general policy frameworks. In this light, it appears that the non inclusion of legislative 
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acts in the interpretation of the notion of a regulatory act, may not be regarded as 
equally regrettable as the interpretation of the notion of implementing measures. 
The outcomes of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, firmly confirm the conclusion that the Lisbon 
Treaty reform is another false dawn, but regrettably even constitutes the greatest 





















CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
1. A false dawn 
Amid heavy criticism that the CJEU’s interpretation of the locus standi criteria for 
direct actions for annulment against EU measures did not ensure the effective judicial 
protection of private parties, the Lisbon Treaty relaxed these criteria in the case of 
regulatory acts that do not entailing implementing measures. The interpretation of 
these two notions, along with consequent question whether this reform would be the 
dawn of effective judicial protection or a false one, were left to the CJEU. 
While the CJEU adopted a rather foreseeable, although not universally desirable, 
interpretation for the notion of a regulatory act, the interpretation of the notion of 
implementing measures significantly limited the effect of the Lisbon Treaty reform, 
rendering it another false dawn in relation to effective judicial protection of private 
parties. The results of the review of older Case-Law and the quantitative study in 
Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that the CJEU would have greatly improved judicial 
protection had it adopted the interpretation proposed by AG Cruz Villalon in T & L 
Sugars for this newly introduced notion. 
1.1. Missing an unconditional opportunity 
With the above in mind, it seems difficult to find any boundaries or incompatibilities 
limiting the opportunity the Lisbon Treaty offered the CJEU to significantly enhance 
judicial protection by increasing the availability of an action for annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU. 
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To the question whether the CJEU had to go beyond the text of Article 263 TFEU, the 
answer is no. The interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing measures 
sufficed. 
To the question whether the CJEU had to abandon the heavily defended Plaumann 
formula for individual concern, the answer is no. Individual concern is no longer 
required for regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. 
To the question whether it needed to alter the interpretation of direct concern, the 
answer is also no. 
To the question whether the CJEU had to disregard the travaux preparatoires of the 
Constitutional Treaty and include legislative acts in the notion of a regulatory act, the 
answer is again no, although with some hesitation. Although Chapters 5 and 6 have 
shown that the possibility of legislative acts affecting private parties directly exists, 
the quantitative study in Chapter 6 suggests that this is rather the exception. 
To the wider question whether the CJEU had to recognise that it was wrong in 
accepting that the Treaties offered complete remedies and procedures to ensure 
judicial review and effective judicial protection even before the Lisbon Treaty, the 
answer is yet another no. A significant improvement in judicial protection could have 
been achieved only by the interpretation of the newly introduced notion of 
implementing measures. 
The CJEU did not have to touch the pre-Lisbon judicial review system and its 
interpretation of the locus standi conditions at all. The only requirement was that this 
newly introduced concept of implementing measures be given a pragmatic and not 
overly strict interpretation. Yet the CJEU, despite having been offered such an 
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unconditional opportunity, and despite being virtually unlimited in its interpretative 
choice, resorted to an overly restrictive interpretation in T & L Sugars which severely 
limits the effects of the reform. 
An interpretation which, despite the declaration that the purpose of the reform was 
primarily to prevent the situation where a private party is forced to contravene a 
measure in order to obtain access to a court, might, on a not overly weak view, not 
even be able to reverse Jego Quere. In the example of which, a national authority 
might communicate the prohibition of certain fishing mesh sizes by the EU act, 
investigate the activities of the applicants and then issue proceedings. Entirely 
mechanically or automatically, yet so entailing implementing measures in the 
reasoning of the CJEU. And in this respect, possibly an interpretation which may also 
still require applicants, in effect, to contravene measures in order to reach their 
national courts. 
Secondly, an interpretation which arguably also sits rather unwell with the retention 
of direct concern for regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures, in the sense 
that if there are no implementing measures, not even mechanical or automatic, no one 
can exercise any form of discretion anyway.637 So, in this respect, what is really the 
point of requiring direct concern, a realisation also corroborated by the Opinion of AG 
Cruz Villalon. 
Finally, an interpretation, whose inherent reassurance or guarantee in terms of 
effective judicial protection must be that there are national measures for applicants to 
challenge before national courts, arguably assumes dangerously too much of national 
systems and procedures. There can be no presumption that a notice demanding 
                                                 
637 See also the Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case C-132/12 P Stichting Woonpunt and others v. 
Commission  EU:C:2014:100. 
273 
 
repayment of state aid for example, being purely automatic or mechanical, would be 
challengeable in national administrative proceedings. National systems may very well 
treat this type of measures as confirmatory acts or otherwise non reviewable acts. 
Generally, there can be no certainty as to whether mechanical or automatic 
intermediate acts not entailing the exercise of any administrative discretion or 
otherwise not embodying the autonomous exercise of administrative power vested in 
a national authority, will be challengeable before national courts, although these will 
be considered as implementing measures for the purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU. 
Then Article 19(1) TEU and the right to effective judicial protection come into play, 
along with the UPA obligation that Member States should establish rules and 
procedures rendering such acts challengeable before national courts. But naturally, 
this national remedy invention requirement, while good on paper, is inevitably 
cumbersome to establish in practice, and constitutes a significant additional hurdle for 
private parties and another obstacle to judicial protection. 
1.2. Clarity and predictability being indecisive 
On the other hand, it could possibly be argued that the CJEU’s interpretation of 
implementing measures provides clarity. It is easy to identify the acts that entail 
implementing measures since this is so openly defined, and makes it easier for 
applicants to assess their possibilities of establishing locus standi for direct actions for 
annulment, and also for national courts in applying the TWD rule. 
For the same reasons of clarity and ease of application, it could possibly further be 
argued that this interpretation of implementing measures would further assist, 
following EU accession to the ECHR, if and when this occurs, in the determination of 
whether an applicant would need to exhaust an action for annulment under Article 
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263 TFEU, as a “domestic” remedy under Article 35(1) ECHR, before being able to 
claim a violation on behalf of the EU. Closely related to this, it would also render 
easier the application of the Vagrancy638 judgment that does not oblige an applicant to 
pursue clearly inadmissible means of challenge for the purposes of Article 35(1) 
ECHR. 
The above are true, and certainly clarity and predictability are important in terms of 
workability of the system and the protection offered therein. However, both the 
review of older Case-Law and the quantitative study conducted herein, did not reveal 
any such problems under the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon either. The 
application of this interpretation to the samples used has proved just as easy as that of 
the CJEU. Accordingly, the possible argument in favour of the interpretation of the 
CJEU based on clarity, easier application and predictability weakens. In this light, it 
becomes rather questionable whether this dilution of the effects of the reform can be 
justified even under such considerations of clarity and predictability. This can only 
render even further questionable the choice of the CJEU. 
1.3. Possibly a new focus for further reform 
The findings of the review of older Case-Law and the quantitative study in relation to 
what the position would have been had the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for 
implementing measures been adopted, are of such contrast, that even suggest that 
future calls for reform can be directed towards a reinterpretation of the notion of 
implementing measures than towards a reinterpretation of individual concern. Surely, 
a more liberal interpretation of individual concern would have greater effects in 
increasing protection by means of wider availability of an action for annulment, but it 
                                                 




can be suggested that a reinterpretation of the notion of implementing measures along 
the line of the proposals of AG Cruz Villalon would still render quite satisfactory 
results. And indeed, this can be achieved without touching any of the realities stated 
above.639 
2. The same shortcomings continue 
The Rule of Law Checklist of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe asks, 
among others, two important questions in relation to access to justice.640 Whether an 
individual has an easily accessible and effective opportunity to challenge an act that 
interferes with his rights. And whether access to justice is easy in practice. These two 
questions are bound to continue to trouble anyone reviewing the choice of the CJEU 
for a decentralised judicial review system built on the preliminary reference 
mechanism. 
The preliminary reference route is not completely ineffective as a means of 
challenging validity, and in theory, it might seem sufficient to mitigate the 
consequences of the limited availability of a direct action for annulment. The reality 
however is another issue, and entails the problems highlighted by AG Jacobs. On top 
of these comes the additional problem that in certain circumstances, national systems 
may not provide for challenges against certain types of measures, and the remedy 
invention requirement of UPA that Member States should establish rules and 
procedures rendering such acts challengeable before national courts constitutes, as 
mentioned above, yet another hurdle for private parties. It cannot accordingly even be 
excluded that the effectiveness of the preliminary reference mechanism for validity 
                                                 
639 See Chapter 1. 
640 Rule of Law Checklist of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law of the Council of 
Europe (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2016)007, at p. 25. 
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challenges, and consequently the level of judicial protection, may differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
All these are real and significant obstacles, making the preliminary reference 
mechanism undesirable for such a significant area of judicial review of legality in a 
supranational body such as the EU. Whatever the intention was, with the problems 
that are inherent in it, it could even be described as leading to a challenge based on 
stamina approach. Where only those who have the stamina to undertake all costs and 
wait for an unpredictable amount of time, can seek annulment of an EU measure that 
affects them. 
3. A system of possible inconsistency in judicial protection 
Since the effectiveness of the preliminary reference mechanism is highly dependent 
on national courts and national procedural rules, the level of judicial protection may 
likewise vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, one jurisdiction may 
permit courts to deal with requests for preliminary references on validity at an early 
stage of the proceedings, and by means of a specialised application for such a 
preliminary reference and shorten any delays.641 Or a type of national measure taken 
in connection to an EU act may be challengeable before national courts in one 
jurisdiction, thus providing private parties with easy access to justice, but not in 
another. 
However, it cannot also be excluded that levels of protection may also vary depending 
on the competence of national judges to deal with such issues. It seems inevitable that 
such competence will vary even among the courts or judges of a single jurisdiction. 
                                                 
641 See the example of the Preliminary Reference to the Court of the European Communities Procedural 
Regulation (No. 1) of 2008, in Cyprus. 
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These problems are of course not particular to the EU preliminary reference 
mechanism. They are inherent in such preliminary reference systems. The Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe characteristically recognises that the 
effectiveness of preliminary ruling procedures heavily relies on the capacity and 
willingness of ordinary judges to identify potentially unconstitutional normative acts 
and refer these questions to the constitutional court.642 What makes the position worse 
in the EU is that it is a union of several states and multi-jurisdictional. 
It might be argued that it is inappropriate to make general claims about the 
completeness of a system or the effectiveness of judicial protection, where these 
depend on several different jurisdictions. In the EU as it stands today, and with the 
activities it has today, a uniform and equal level of protection should be ensured, and 
this can only be achieved by a centralised judicial review system. The preliminary 
reference mechanism is so heavily dependent on various factors, jurisdiction specific 
or otherwise, that render it inherently unsuitable for such a task. 
The CJEU makes such a general claim that the Treaties established a complete system 
of remedies and procedures and that it is up to the Member States to ensure effective 
judicial protection. Apart from making such a general claim, in reality the CJEU has 
no means of assessing whether adequate standards of protection have been attained, 
unless a private party files a claim on Kobler liability for failure to provide access to a 
court or failure to send a preliminary reference. This naturally comes at a very later 
stage, after he has exhausted all national remedies.643 And presumably after he has 
been burdened with the full costs of the procedure. The delay and the risk entailed are 
                                                 
642 See Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev, at para 56. 
643 K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, “Judicial Review as a Contribution to European Constitutionalism” 
(2003) 22 YEL 1, at p.p. 16-18. 
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shortcomings in judicial protection. In addition, there can be no general finding that a 
Member State ensures effective judicial protection in all areas of law. There needs to 
be examination on a case by case basis. These problems could very well have been 
avoided by the availability of an action for annulment. 
It should further be noted that such a review on a case by case basis is customary 
under the ECHR, in the examination of compliance with the right to a fair trial and an 
effective remedy. Even without EU accession, such scrutinization of national rules 
and proceedings can nevertheless take place since all Member States are signatories, 
and Bosphorus644 was such an example. On the one hand, this can act as a mechanism 
assisting the goal of the CJEU, that Member States provide effective access to 
national courts where private parties may put forward their claims for invalidity of an 
EU measure. On the other hand, further such scrutinization could also backfire in a 
sense, and bring to surface the inherent problems of the preliminary reference route 
which come as a result of its reliance on national courts and proceedings. 
It is another of the realities that reference systems, sometimes termed as systems of 
indirect access to judicial review, exist all over the world and have not been declared 
incompatible with the ECHR.645 And it is true that the EU preliminary reference 
mechanism was considered compliant with the ECHR in Bosphorus. However, this 
reality and Bosphorus do not exclude further scrutiny of compliance in specific 
situations or on a case by case basis. And perhaps gradually Bosphorus may not last 
as a general rule of compliance of the preliminary reference mechanism with the 
ECHR in all cases. Further such scrutinization under the ECHR could move Member 
                                                 
644 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland  (2006) 42 EHRR 1. 
645 See also Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice of the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”), CDL-AD(2010)039rev. 
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States for further Treaty amendment towards a more centralised system. Or perhaps 
the CJEU to reconsider its choices. 
EU accession to the ECHR would have brought some control by the ECHR over the 
CJEU. This could be seen as something positive in the attainment of the above goal, 
because the ECHR is more distant from the political pressures of the EU than the 
CJEU, and is not bound by the choices the CJEU has made, be these judicial or policy 
choices. This is not of course to say that the CJEU lacks independency in any way, 
but only that the external supervision under the ECHR will act as an additional layer 
of protection of individual rights. And would render the EU as a possible respondent 
for violations of human rights. 
In the recent ground breaking ASJP646 ruling, the CJEU accepted that Article 19(1) 
TEU empowers the Court to review a national measure temporarily reducing the 
remuneration of judges for a possible violation of the independence of the judiciary, 
which is an aspect of the principle of effective judicial protection. Time will tell 
whether this ruling will be treated as limited to judicial independence or whether it 
will be extended to other aspects of the right to effective judicial protection.647 Such 
an extension would of course be welcome and could result in increased surveillance 
by the CJEU of national measures, or inaction, as regards the UPA obligation to 
establish rules and procedures enabling private parties to put forward their claims 
against the validity of EU measures before national courts, as another aspect of 
effective judicial protection. 
                                                 
646 Case C-64/16 Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses  EU:C:2018:117. 
647 See L. Pech and S. Platon, “Judicial Independence Under Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue 
in the ASJP Case” (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1827, at p. 1844. 
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One of the shortcomings that are foreseen however, is that such review of national 
measures or inaction under Article 19(1) TEU as in ASJP, would normally occur in 
the context of a preliminary reference sent by a national court on the compatibility of 
such measures or inaction with the said UPA obligation. The problem that seems to 
remain, is that, still, a private party will need to somehow obtain access to a national 
court to put forward such a claim. And may be faced with similar difficulties in 
obtaining access to a national court in order to seek review of a national measure or 
inaction under Article 19(1) TEU, and actually inducing such a reference, in as much 
the same way as these difficulties occur when seeking access to national courts or 
trying to convince national courts to request a preliminary reference on validity. If not 
even more difficulty if the failure to comply with this UPA obligation is attributable to 
national courts. In this light, the development of such a jurisdiction would not appear 
to significantly improve the position of private parties in validity challenges against 
EU measures. 
The above are accordingly illustrative of the difficulties in ensuring effective judicial 
protection or in providing adequate surveillance for this, in a decentralised judicial 
review system in a multi-state body such as the EU. 
4. Fundamental rights and concepts rather indecisive 
A strong notion in the Rule of Law tradition is that it is absolutely hostile to the 
untrammelled exercise of power, bringing the basic meaning of the Rule of Law down 
to the idea of subordination of the Law to another kind of Law which is not up to the 
sovereign to change at will.648 This statement centres on the sovereign. But who 
decides what the Rule of Law dictates in a particular situation. The answer should be 
                                                 
648 D. Kochenov, “EU Law Without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?” 
(2015) 34 Yearbook of European Law 74, at p.p. 80-82. 
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the courts. So what if the courts have a different idea of what the Rule of Law 
demands in a particular situation than what theory suggests. Erroneously by intention 
or in good faith. Then it might be argued that there is no compliance with the Rule of 
Law. But what if this is an area where the notion is not entirely clear or if theory does 
not point to any specific result or direction in that case. Then the argument becomes 
rather circular and inconclusive. In this sense the concept fails to provide any more 
guidance, and it all becomes a policy choice, which can be exercised by the legislature 
or the courts. 
Similar considerations apply to effective judicial protection, the right to a fair trial and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As regards access to justice in 
relation to locus standi rules for direct challenges and the use of indirect means of 
challenge, they remain likewise inconclusive and unclear. 
The case with the locus standi rules for a direct action for annulment is very similar. 
The choice had not originally been made by the drafters of the Treaties, so it had to be 
made by the CJEU. Several arguments were put forward that the interpretation of the 
locus standi rules should be altered, but the notion of the Rule of Law, the principle of 
effective judicial protection and recently Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, as well as the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy under Articles 6 and 
13 ECHR, did not clearly point to any particular direction, and arguments could go 
either way. Years have passed, and the drafters of the Treaties remained inactive in 
this area, despite effecting several other significant amendments to the Treaties. The 
time came where the drafters of the Treaties decided on a partial amendment of the 
locus standi rules by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet Article 263(4) TFEU still left the 
interpretation of the two most important elements of the reform, these being the 
notions of a regulatory act and implementing measures, to the judiciary. Accordingly, 
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again, the choice was only partially made by the drafters of the Treaties, but the gist 
of the choice was again left to the judiciary. The judiciary opted for interpretations 
which point towards its previous choices, for a decentralised judicial review system, 
built upon the preliminary reference mechanism, and very limited availability of 
centralised judicial review proceedings before the GC. Still not in obvious violation of 
any of the said principles and rights. The position and arguments become then rather 
circular. 
Maybe this is indeed an area where these principles of effective judicial protection, 
the Rule of Law and the right to a fair trial, fail to provide more guidance. It is 
accordingly a matter of policy whether a better judicial review system is desired. No 
reform will come without such a choice. Should this however really be treated as one 
of the limits of these concepts. Should there not be a demand that borderline cases 
should be avoided, and that there is compliance with these concepts beyond 
reasonable doubt. Or perhaps that these concepts dictate a duty to avoid 
interpretations that could lead to different levels of protection among Member States. 
Upon such considerations, the EU judicial review system should move away from the 
decentralised model which is built upon the preliminary reference mechanism, and 
move towards a centralised model, centred upon the direct action for annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU. 
5. Improvement is desired 
In any event, why should a better judicial review system not be desired. The EU 
judiciary is there, the procedures are there and well developed throughout the years. 
But there is anyway further sufficient reason for a policy choice in favour of a 
centralised judicial review system, and this is the need for uniform protection in 
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today’s EU, given its development and activities. In its areas of competence it acts 
even like a state or a sovereign, and there should be uniform protection against the 
acts of this state or sovereign, in as much as there should be uniform application of 
the measures passed by that state or sovereign. 
In this light, it can be argued that there was compelling reason for a policy choice in 
favour of accepting the interpretation of AG Cruz Villalon for implementing 
measures. It avoids the shortcomings of the preliminary reference mechanism for the 
majority of EU acts, and it also avoids the situation where there might be differing 
levels of protection under the preliminary reference mechanism. This is not an era of 
bare minimums in protection or even bare minimums of effectiveness in protection. 
This is not an era of a challenge based on stamina approach or end result. This is not 
an era of doubt whether the EU judicial review system would pass the standards of 
compliance with the ECHR or other concepts. This is an era of effectiveness beyond 
reasonable doubt in judicial protection. Why should this risk inherent in a multi-
national decentralised judicial review model continue to exist, and why should we not 
opt for the better available protection offered by a centralised judicial review system. 
This will be safer in respect of compliance with all rights and principles, and there 
should not be argument as to borderline cases. 
It has been characteristically stated that the question whether the Rule of Law can be 
relied on to justify an unconditional right of access for individuals deserves a negative 
answer, but that is not to say that there is no room for improvement.649 This is 
precisely what is desired. Improvement. 
                                                 
649 L. Pech, ““A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principe of EU Law” (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359, at p. 387. 
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Significant improvement can be achieved at any time, without further Treaty 
amendment, simply by a reinterpretation of the notion of implementing measures 
along the lines of the one proposed by AG Cruz Villalon. The Lisbon Treaty offered a 
great opportunity for a dawn of effective judicial protection. It is regrettable that it has 
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